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Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) have become the flagship of conservation organizations 
in recent years. The idea of securing ecosystem service (ES) provision through PES has been 
present in practical discourses of intermediaries directed at potential payers.  However, 
demonstrating that PES can actually achieve the intended goals has been difficult for 
practitioners. Researchers have pointed out that many PES schemes, particularly water-related 
ones, are based on unreliable assumptions and lack strong causal links between land use 
interventions and ecosystem services. This uncertainty in PES schemes arises not only from 
practical difficulties, but from the complexity of human-environment systems (HES), and the 
limits of knowledge about them. Researchers have been able to describe and discuss these 
major challenges. However, the literature is still poor on empirical studies exploring the 
additionality of PES schemes, that is, if those schemes produce additional effects not 
attributable to other factors, as well as studies exploring the importance of impact evidence 
for stakeholders involved. This dissertation contributes to filling this empirical gap by exploring 
four water-related payments schemes (here also called payments for watershed services, PWS) 
in Colombia, comparing the cases in terms of their efforts to produce impact evidence through 
monitoring and evaluation, and their associated challenges. Three cases from Brazil are also 
included in one of the chapters and compared with the Colombian cases by illustrating 
differences and similarities. This dissertation aims to understand the role that scientific 
uncertainty plays in the effectiveness of PWS schemes, i.e. in the actual achievements in terms 
of the goals of improving or maintaining the target ecosystem services. It also addresses the 
importance of impact evidence for the permanence of stakeholders, such as ES providers and 
payers, in the scheme. The results show that most of the PES payers’ respondents have 
additional motivations other than ES provision for engaging in PES schemes and would not 
disengage if effectiveness is not demonstrated. However, they do require indicators from 
intermediaries related to the activities performed. Most of the providers interviewed declared 
that they would have engaged in the PES scheme even without economic incentives because 
they are concerned with protecting water resources for their own sake. It turns out that 
intermediaries are the ones most concerned with presenting evidence of PES additionality for 
reasons such as securing future funds and sustaining trust relationships with other 
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stakeholders. In most cases studied here, monitoring and evaluation design did not start at the 
implementation stage, but were added at later stages, possibly as a response by the 
organizations promoting or managing PES schemes to the recent debates on the actual impact 
of PWS schemes on water resources. This dissertation argues that impact evaluation should be 
complemented with a deeper understanding of the uncertainties involved in PES, an explicit 
treatment of these in the whole process of PES negotiation, design and monitoring, and clear 
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Zahlungen für Ökosystemdienstleistungen (Payments for Ecosystem Services, PES) sind in den 
letzten Jahren zum Aushängeschild von Umweltorganisation geworden. Der Gedanke, die 
Bereitstellung von Ökosystemdienstleistungen durch PES abzusichern, ist in praktischen 
Diskursen von Vermittlern zu finden, die an potentiell Zahlende gerichtet sind. Praktikern ist 
bisher jedoch schwer gefallen, zu zeigen, dass PES tatsächlich zu den vorgesehenen Zielen 
führen können. Forscher haben darauf hingewiesen, dass zahlreiche PES-Schemata, 
insbesondere diejenigen mit Bezug auf Wasser, auf unsicheren Annahmen beruhen und 
außerdem gewichtige Kausalzusammenhänge zwischen Eingriffen in die Landnutzung und 
Ökosystemdienstleistungen vermissen lassen. Diese Unsicherheit in PES-Schemata geht nicht 
nur aus praktischen Schwierigkeiten hervor, sondern aus der Komplexität von  Mensch-
Umwelt-Systemen (human-environment systems, HES) und aus der Begrenztheit des Wissens 
über diese  Systeme. Forscher sind zwar in der Lage, diese wesentlichen Herausforderungen 
zu beschreiben und zu diskutieren. In der Fachliteratur mangelt es jedoch an empirischen 
Studien, die die zusätzliche Wirksamkeit von PES-Schemata untersuchen, d.h. ob diese 
Schemata zusätzliche Wirkungen zeigen, die anderen Faktoren nicht zurechenbar sind, bzw. 
Studien, die die Bedeutung von Nachweisen für ihre Wirksamkeit für die Interessengruppen 
(stakeholders) untersuchen. Die Dissertation trägt dazu bei, diese empirische Lücke zu 
schließen:  Dazu untersucht sie vier wasserbezogene Zahlungsschemata, hier auch Zahlungen 
für Wassereinzugsgebietsleistungen (payments for watershed services, PWS) genannt, in 
Kolumbien. Sie vergleicht die vier Fälle hinsichtlich der Bestrebungen, durch Beobachtung 
(monitoring) und Evaluation Nachweise für die Wirksamkeit zu erbringen, sowie hinsichtlich 
der damit verbundenen Herausforderungen. Eines der Kapitel enthält auch drei Fallstudien aus 
Brasilien, die als Vergleich zu den Fällen aus Kolumbien und der Darstellung von Unterschieden 
und Gemeinsamkeiten dienen. Diese Dissertation hat zum Ziel, die Bedeutung 
wissenschaftlicher Unsicherheit für die Wirksamkeit von PWS-Schemata zu verstehen, d.h. für 
die tatsächlichen Erfolge in Bezug auf das Vorhaben, Zielökosysteme zu erhalten oder zu 
verbessern. Sie setzt sich darüber hinaus auch mit der Bedeutung von 
Wirksamkeitsnachweisen für den Verbleib der Stakeholder (vorrangig ES-Träger und Zahlende) 
im PES-Schema auseinander. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die meisten Befragten aus der Gruppe 
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der PES-Zahlenden nicht nur aufgrund der Bereitstellung von Ökosystemdienstleistungen, 
sondern auch auf andere Weise motiviert sind, sich an PES-Schemata zu beteiligen, und dass 
sie ihre Beteiligung nicht beenden würden, sollte ihre Wirksamkeit nicht nachgewiesen 
werden. Von Vermittlern fordern sie dennoch Indikatoren für durchgeführte Maßnahmen. Die 
meisten der befragten Träger gaben an, dass sie sich auch ohne wirtschaftliche Anreize an 
einem PES-Schema beteiligt hätten, da sie sich um ihrer selbst willen um den Schutz von 
Wasserressourcen bemühen. Es stellt sich heraus, dass die Gruppe der Vermittler diejenige ist, 
die sich am meisten damit befasst, Nachweise für die zusätzliche Wirksamkeit von PES zu 
präsentieren, um dadurch zukünftig Geldmittel zu sichern bzw. um Vertrauensverhältnisse mit 
anderen Interessengruppen aufrecht zu erhalten. In den meisten hier untersuchten Fällen 
wurden Beobachtung und Evaluation nicht anfänglich ab der Einführung des jeweiligen PES-
Schemas durchgeführt, sondern erst in späteren Phasen, möglicherweise als Antwort der 
Organisationen, die PES-Schemata fördern und verwalten, auf die jüngsten Diskussionen über 
die tatsächlichen Auswirkungen von PES-Schemata auf Wasserressourcen. Diese Dissertation 
argumentiert für die Ergänzung der Evaluation von Auswirkungen durch eine tiefergehendes 
Verständnis der mit PES  verbundenen Unsicherheiten, eine explizite Bearbeitung dieser 
Unsicherheiten im gesamten Verlauf von PES-Verhandlung, -Gestaltung und –Beobachtung, 
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The present dissertation is organized in the following structure: 
Chapter 1, Introduction, presents the context of the study, the research questions and the case 
studies included in the dissertation. It also provides an overview of the fieldwork and data 
collection. 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background for the dissertation and is dedicated to explore 
important concepts and their origins in order to support the reader in navigating through the 
following chapters. It starts with some basic concepts from Hydrology and Institutional 
Economics, moves on to the origins of ecosystem services (ES) and payments for ecosystem 
services (PES), and concludes with some concepts from Ignorance and Uncertainty studies. 
Chapter 3 presents the 1st scientific article, entitled “Uncertainties in demonstrating 
environmental benefits of payments for ecosystem services”. This article offers a conceptual 
overview of uncertainty sources in PES and illustrates the main arguments with a brief case 
study. 
Chapter 4 presents the 2nd scientific article, entitled “Efforts and constraints to demonstrate 
additionality of payments for watershed services. Insights from Colombia and Brazil” This 
empirical study explores technical and institutional aspects of seven PWS schemes in their 
quest for demonstrating impact evidence of their conservation interventions and the 
respective constraints that can be found in practice. 
Chapter 5 presents the 3rd scientific article, entitled “Will PES schemes survive in the long-term 
without evidence of their effectiveness? Exploring four water-related cases in Colombia.” This 
article explores the perspectives and expectations of different stakeholder groups in PWS 
schemes regarding the evidence of the project impact, i.e. its effectiveness. 






This introduction presents a general overview of the importance of water for all living beings, 
including humankind in its multidimensional expressions. Subsequently, the context and 
objectives of this dissertation are presented and related to the core research questions, the 
explored cases and the fieldwork conditions for empirical data collection. 
1.1 Water for Life 
Water is a fundamental component of the planet and all living beings. Even the simplest form 
of life depends on water for survival, since an infinite number of chemical reactions needed to 
support life would not occur without it (Smith and Smith, 2000). Water bodies like rivers, lakes, 
and oceans, are home for an uncountable number of forms of life interacting in complex 
ecological relations in riverbeds, mangroves, deltas, coastal areas, coral reefs, etc. (Smith and 
Smith, 2000; Ward et al., 1999). It is therefore, not surprising that several ancient civilizations 
flourished close to water bodies or developed their strategies to obtain groundwater (Priscoli, 
2000; Vuorinen et al., 2007). Fisheries, crops, cattle ranching, and sanitation all depend on this 
important resource. 
Water has been such a central component of human societies that its meanings transcend 
those related to the pure physical human needs. It is at the heart of a large number of cultural 
expressions like myths, songs, and rituals (e.g. Garcia, 2007; Miranda et al., 2014). It is an 
essential part of several religious cosmologies (Vuorinen et al., 2007). It is present, for instance, 
in many Christian stories from the Old and New Testaments. In the Hindu traditions, the rivers 
play an enormous role in death rituals, in which the believer’s body is released to float 
downstream. In the Greek mythology, two rivers divide the world of the living ones from that 
of the dead and a boatman must carry every soul across them (Garcia, 2007). Yemanjá, the 
most iconic Afro-Brazilian deity, is the symbol of fertility and is originally associated with the 
sea and fisheries (Mason, 2016; Miranda et al., 2014; Rangel and Gomberg, 2016). In Colombia, 
the lakes formed in very high altitudes in the Paramos’ ecosystems were sacred places for the 
ancient Muisca people and gold offerings were frequently thrown into the lakes as part of 
religious rituals (Legast, 2000). 
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Such an important role played by the water can also determine the fate of many societies. 
Droughts and long dry periods have forced many communities around the world to migrate or 
led to their decline (e.g. Haug et al., 2003). Disputes over water sources for consumption, 
transportation or territorial domain have been associated with intense conflicts (Jerome Delli 
Priscoli and Aaron T. Wolf, 2010). As water is essential for food production, its scarcity could 
mean dependence over food imports from other countries (Brown, 2011; Ward et al., 2015). 
Governments also face the challenge to come up with diplomatic solutions for the common 
use of transboundary rivers and aquifers (Dinar, 2008). The challenges related to water 
resources availability, use, and management are many (Vörösmarty et al., 2010); e.g. water use 
demands and its spatial distribution (Wada and Bierkens, 2014), urbanization and floods (Hollis, 
1975), land use and its impacts on the water quality and quantity (Bruijnzeel, 1990). 
In order to address these social challenges, norms and rules on the use of land and the use of 
water have been proposed in a variety of contexts throughout the years. From integrated 
watershed management approaches (FAO, 2006), over taxes related to ‘polluter pays’ principle 
(Howarth, 2009) and land-surface zoning (Adams and Foster, 1992), to the more recently 
proposed Payments for Watershed Services (PWS) (Asquith and Wunder, 2008; Porras et al., 
2008; Smith et al., 2006), there is nowadays a large number of institutional attempts to deal 
with water management problems in a variety of contexts and scales. This dissertation focuses 
on the last mentioned mechanism, PWS. 
This very brief overview is a starting point to contextualize the problematics at hand, the 




“The history of social organization around river basins and watersheds is humanity’s richest 
records of our dialogue with nature. It is among the most fertile areas for learning about how 
the political and technical interact. The spatial and functional characteristics of the river basins 
influenced human settlement and interaction long before the idea of the river basin started to 
be formalized into legal and administrative terms. The direction of flow of rivers influenced the 
movement of civilization. Rivers have been crucial to means of communication leading to the 
formation of political units.” - Jerome D. Priscoli (2000, p. 623) 
1.2 Context and Research Questions 
In the recent decades, the idea of directly paying rural land owners to adopt certain 
conservation practices in order to protect natural resources, such as water, has gained strength 
after claims that another popular community-level approach, called Integrated Conservation 
and Development Projects (ICDPs)1, was not achieving the expected results in developing 
countries (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). The idea of direct payments for conservation was already 
present in the United States and Europe by the end of the 1990’s (e.g. European Commission, 
2005). It was portrayed as a more advantageous approach because governments were seen as 
failing to enforce conservation by law and indirect approaches, such as ICDPs, were considered 
inefficient due to a lack of control of the expected links between local development and desired 
environmental outcomes (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Ferraro and Simpson, 2002). Based on these 
calls and through the promotion of so-called ‘successful’ payment cases – either in the form of 
national programmes (Pagiola, 2008) or led by non-government actors (Perrot-Maître, 2006) 
– several international organizations and development agencies promptly begun to invest in 
those more direct conservation approaches that would be later called ‘Payments for 
Environmental Services’, or ‘Payments for Ecosystem Services’ (PES). 
However, the advantages of such an approach started to be questioned as soon as it gained 
strength. With a long list of points of criticism (e.g. Barnaud and Antona, 2014; Farrell, 2014; 
Kull et al., 2015; Pascual et al., 2014; Robertson, 2012, 2006), a number of researchers 
questioned  the most cited PES definition (in Wunder, 2007, 2005) and the assumptions 
underlying it (Lele, 2009; Muradian et al., 2010; Sommerville et al., 2009). This most cited 
                                                     
1 ICDPs were a popular approach for conservation in the 1980-90’s proposed as a way to achieve conservation in 
low-income countries by investing in sustainable production projects with communities living close to strategic 
areas for natural resources, such as protected areas (Peters, 1998; Wells et al., 1999). 
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definition of PES proposes that PES is a voluntary transaction that involves paying for a ‘well-
defined’ environmental service (ES)2 or a land use ‘likely’ to secure the service, and that the 
transaction should be done only if the service ‘provider’ secures service provision – the 
conditionality criterion (Wunder, 2005). As Wunder (2005, p. 3) pointed out, the word ‘likely’ 
refers to the existence of “important scientific insecurities” [sic], that in the case of water-
related PES (here called ‘payments for watershed services’ - PWS) mainly relates to the 
uncertainties around the links between land use and watershed dynamics, such as streamflow 
and processes influencing water quality (Kosoy et al., 2007; Lele, 2009; Lima et al., 2017). 
As Muradian et al. (2010, p. 1204) put it, “the context in which most PES schemes operate is 
often characterized by high uncertainty in the accountability of environmental services 
provision, due to the biophysical complexities associated with the relationships between land 
use and such services”. In practice, many PES schemes have been implemented without a 
strong causal relationship between the land use practices and the ES (Barnaud and Antona, 
2014; Lele, 2009; Muradian et al., 2010), meaning that the conditionality criterion is not met 
in most cases.  As this situation is particularly critical in the case of PWS schemes, proxies such 
as total forest area under protection and number of trees planted, instead of ES outcomes, 
have been frequently used by practitioners to demonstrate conditionality (Ponette-González 
et al., 2014; Porras et al., 2008; Quintero et al., 2009; Wunder, 2005). Because many PES 
schemes – especially in PWS cases – lack a demonstrable foundation, researchers have been 
pointing out that they may be based more on ‘faith’ rather than on empirical knowledge (Fisher 
et al., 2010; Kosoy et al., 2007; Muradian et al., 2010; Tallis et al., 2008; Wunder, 2007). 
Such concerns have led several scientists and conservation practitioners to advocate for more 
and better science to support PES (Naeem et al., 2015). However, it remains unclear if more 
science in itself will ensure the success of PES. A better science for PES would need to be able 
to not only demonstrate conditionality, but also present evidence of additionality, i.e. evidence 
that the observed environmental changes are clearly due to conservation practices and not to 
other factors, as widely advocated by environmental economists (Baylis et al., 2015; Boerner 
et al., 2017; Ferraro, 2009; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006). The implications for PES schemes 
                                                     
2 In this dissertation “payments for ecosystem services” is used as a similar term for “payments for 
environmental services”, since they are commonly used in the literature as synonyms (Wunder, 2013).  
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may be important: Assuming that one motivation for actors to engage as ‘payers’ in PES is 
linked to their expected return from the maintenance or improvement of the desired ES, how 
to sustain the actors’ commitment to the payments in the face of uncertainty? As Wunder 
(2005, p. 3) put it, “the less realistic the scientific basis of a PES scheme, the more exposed it 
is to the risk of buyers questioning its rationale and abandoning payments.” 
If environmental outcomes of the conservation practices fall short of expectations or are not 
even detected, then this puts under risk (a) the trusting relationships among the actors built to 
support the PES schemes, (b) the reputations of the organizations involved, and (c) the long 
term conservation efforts (Fisher and Brown, 2014; Muradian et al., 2010). Therefore, 
neglecting uncertainty in PES schemes can ultimately lead to a decrease in funding and a 
potential failure of the schemes in the long term. If the reputation of the PES proponents is 
damaged as well, then the funding for alternative conservation programs beyond PES may be 
at risk too (Fisher and Brown, 2014; Lele, 2009). Therefore, the confidence actors have in a 
particular scheme, their support, and permanence are fundamental for the long-term 
continuity of such projects. 
In this context, one could ask if the ultimate origin of the “impact evidence problem” is just a 
matter of lack of proper science, as it appears to be conveyed in Naeem et al. (2015). Another 
possibility would be that this ‘evidence-based thinking’, these promoted scientific best 
practices, and the very conceptual roots of PES, are quite distant from the reality conditions. 
This way of framing conservation appears to assume that there is a way of doing the ‘right 
science’ (Barnaud and Antona, 2014), that we can separate desired components of the 
environment as pieces of a machine (Robertson, 2012), and that we can control field conditions 
almost as in a laboratory in order to produce the desired evidence. On the basis of these issues, 
this dissertation extends this debate with the objective of exploring the role of scientific 
uncertainty on the effectiveness of water-related PES (PWS) schemes, i.e. on the actual 
achievements in terms of the goals of improving or maintaining the target ecosystem services. 
It also addresses the role of evidence in the permanence of stakeholders, such as ES providers 
and payers, in the scheme. 
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1.2.1 Research Questions 
Considering all these aspects, this dissertation focuses on three general research questions that 
are addressed in each of the three scientific papers that compose this dissertation: 
(1) What are the sources and types of uncertainty that affect and may undermine the evidence 
of expected environmental outcomes of payments for watershed services? 
With this research question, the potential sources of uncertainty that may be typical of 
the knowledge production process, and the practical constraints commonly found in 
the field are objects of inquiry, in addition to the lack of knowledge on land-water links. 
(2) Why most PWS schemes reported in the literature have been unable to provide evidence 
of the effectiveness of their schemes so far? 
This research question concerns the conditions in which current PWS schemes operate 
to produce evidence of their environmental impacts and the challenges that 
practitioners may face in the field that constrain their ability to demonstrate the 
impacts.  
(3) What are the expectations and perceptions that different actors have regarding the 
effectiveness of PWS schemes? 
This research question is centered on the potential effects that the evidence of 
effectiveness or its absence could have on involved actors and how it could modulate 
their participation in the scheme. Additional potential motivations to participate are 
also part of this inquiry as a way to verify if the presence of those motivations could 
change the value placed on the evidence of effectiveness. 
In order to address these questions, this dissertation explores four PWS cases in Colombia and, 
in one specific study, includes three other cases from Brazil as a comparative in Latin America, 
using data collected by one of the co-authors of the referred study (Chapter 4). In the following 
sub-section, the context of the studied PWS initiatives in Colombia is briefly described.  
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1.2.2 Case studies 
Latin America is known worldwide by the large number of PWS cases, and has pioneered 
several of these projects (Echavarria, 2002; Echavarria et al., 2004; Pagiola, 2008). In a review, 
Martin-Ortega et al. (2013) found 40 cases of PWS in Latin America from 1984 to 2011. The 
first Latin-American PWS cases, although not named this way at the time, begun to appear in 
the early 1990’s in Colombia. In the beginning of the 1990’s, several water users associations 
were created in the Valle del Cauca, Colombia, with the intention to promote conservation of 
upstream catchments that release water used in the large sugarcane plantations of this valley 
(Echavarria, 2002). The users organized themselves in associations supported by the local 
environmental authority (Corporación Autónoma Regional del Valle del Cauca – CVC) and 
started paying a regular voluntary fee that would be then used to implement conservation 
practices in the upstream areas (Lima et al., 2017; Munoz Escobar et al., 2013; Rodriguez-de-
Francisco and Budds, 2015). Landholders in the upstream catchments would also engage in a 
voluntary basis receiving incentives that would improve farm conditions and help them 
producing more sustainably. Nowadays, there are around 15 associations of the same kind in 
the Valle del Cauca (Moreno-Padilla, 2016). 
During the mid-2000’s another approach to gather funds to protect watersheds based on 
similar ideas started to gain strength in Latin America through joint efforts between 
government bodies and civil associations: the water funds. A water fund is a concept widely 
promoted by the non-governmental organization (NGO) The Nature Conservancy, and it is 
defined as a financial mechanism involving multiples sectors in a form of a trust fund to 
promote watershed conservation (Calvache et al., 2012). Interested organizations and water 
users engage voluntarily and the funds that are collected are reinvested in order to have a self-
sustained mechanism in the long-term. The funds are used for conservation activities in the 
upstream areas of the watersheds that are strategic for the water provision of large cities (R. 
L. Goldman et al., 2010). In Colombia, this model was initially implemented in the city of 
Bogotá. Launched in 2009, the “Agua Somos” fund was the first of what are now four funds 
currently working in different Colombian regions, with several others under development 
(Goldman-Benner et al., 2012). The association of sugarcane producers in the Valle del Cauca 
Department (ASOCAÑA), together with the above-mentioned water user associations, created 
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their own water fund in 2009, called Fondo Agua Por la Vida y Sostenibilidad (FAVS) (Moreno-
Padilla, 2016). 
In this dissertation, four Colombian cases are explored in a series of three studies. These cases 
include the above-mentioned “Agua Somos” (Goldman-Benner et al., 2012); a conservation 
scheme led by the water users association of Bolo River – “ASOBOLO” (Asociación de Usuarios 
de Agua del Río Bolo), which is supported by FAVS (Munoz Escobar et al., 2013); “CSAH Cali”, 
an environmental services compensation scheme (Compensación por Servicios Ambientales 
Hídricos de la Cuenca del Río Cali) (Fondo Patrimonio Natural et al., 2014); and “CuencaVerde”, 
another conservation scheme following the water fund model (de la Ossa-Posada and 
Montoya-Velilla, 2017; Gómez-Ochoa, 2016). Because each PWS scheme is carried out in a 
large area encompassing more than one watershed, one or two watersheds were selected per 
scheme for the purposes of this doctoral research. The selected area in each case is the 
following (Figure 1-1): 
 Agua Somos: watersheds of the rivers Chisacá and Mugroso, tributaries of Tunjuelo 
river; located in Usme, Bogotá D.C.; 
 ASOBOLO: Aguaclara watershed - tributary of Bolo River; located in Pradera and 
Palmira municipalities, Valle del Cauca Department; 
 CSAH Cali: watersheds of the rivers Felidia and Pichindé, tributaries of Cali River; 
located in the municipality of Cali, Valle del Cauca Department; 
 CuencaVerde: watershed of Chico River, tributary of Riogrande River; located in 
Belmira municipality, Antioquia Department. 
 
Technical and institutional details for each scheme, such as watershed area, activities 
performed, types of payments, number of providers, etc. are presented in the second and third 




Figure 1-1: Location of the four Colombian PWS cases under study 
The large number of early experiences of this kind in Colombia makes it an excellent study area 
to explore what has been done so far and what are the environmental outcomes of such 
initiatives.  
In order to contrast experiences, the study aiming at exploring question 2 (presented in 
Chapter 4) includes Brazilian cases using secondary data obtained from published reports and 
papers, and data collected by Dr. Rafael Chiodi, a co-author in the referred study. The Brazilian 
cases illustrate how similar mechanisms have been developed in a Colombian neighbour 
country, and are valuable to explore similarities and differences between close contexts. 
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1.2.3 Fieldwork and data collection 
In order to explore the four cases in Colombia, a preliminary field visit of two weeks was done 
in January 2015 to the cities of Bogotá and Medellín, followed by 6 months of fieldwork from 
January to July 2016 divided between the four case study sites. The preliminary field visit aimed 
at establishing a network of contacts and potential collaborators for the fieldwork. The 
fieldwork received support from the Faculty of Environmental and Rural Studies of the 
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, where a 2-months research stay served as support 
for the data collection in the field. In addition, logistical support for the fieldwork was received 
from Fundación Patrimonio Natural, Asociación de Usuarios de Agua del Río Bolo (ASOBOLO), 
Asociación de Cultivadores de Caña de Azúcar de Colombia (ASOCAÑA), Centro de 
Investigación de la Caña de Azúcar de Colombia (CENICAÑA), Ecoforest SAS, and The Nature 
Conservancy (TNC). 
Three stakeholders group were targeted in this research: PWS providers, also called ‘sellers’, 
i.e. rural landowners receiving payment for conservation; PWS payers, also called ‘buyers’ 
(Wunder, 2005), PWS managers and technicians. Managers and technicians are grouped into 
‘intermediaries’, here understood as “those actors who take on roles that connect and 
facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers” (Huber-Stearns et al., 2013, p. 105). The 
fieldwork methods included semi-structured interviews, informal interviews, participant 
observation, and literature review of reports and related documents from the organizations 
managing and/or supporting the schemes, in addition to scientific papers describing the cases. 
Participant observation was done while following intermediaries work in the field (Figure 1-2) 
and by attending a major conference of PWS stakeholders involving 5 of the studied schemes 
among others from other countries (June 13th to 17th, 2016, Bogotá D.C.). All interviews were 
recorded, transcribed and had their content qualitatively analysed using NVivo software (QSR 
International Pty Ltd.) for coding. Following interviews, specific questionnaires based on the 
answers for the interviews were applied for each group, structured in questions that combined 
open and closed questions, selection of options, ranking, and degree of agreement with some 
statements. A Likert scale was applied for the agreement statements with a scale of 1 (mostly 
disagree) to 5 (mostly agree). The total number of interviews and applied questionnaires is 
reported in the study presented in Chapter 5.  
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Interviews involving PWS managers included questions regarding the reason why the scheme 
was created; the main actors involved in the initial design; motivations; and the status of the 
scheme in number of providers, activities performed, and total area committed for 
conservation so far. In addition, several questions were centred in the arguments used to 
engage both payers and providers; and then on the assessment of the effectiveness of the 
scheme, including the methods used for it, e.g. monitoring systems, case control and baseline 
data. Questions also included topics related to difficulties managers and technicians were 
facing in order to engage providers and payers, overcome institutional problems, obtain 
collaboration, and audit the scheme.  
Questions that composed informal interviews with providers were related to their 
participation, contract conditions, satisfaction with the payments received, environmental 
perception of their territory and perceived changes connected with the PWS scheme. They 
were also questioned about their motivations to enter the scheme and their expectations 
regarding the environmental outcomes. Preliminary interviews were used to produce a 
questionnaire that was later applied to the providers. Payers of the related schemes were 
interviewed whenever possible; however, their availability for interviews was limited. 
Most of the respondents from the intermediaries’ group were from NGOs. Other respondents 
of this group included: representatives from local water users associations, representatives of 
other types of civil associations, researchers and technicians belonging to local research 
centres involved in monitoring PES schemes, and representatives from environmental 




Table 1-1: Characteristics of intermediaries’ questionnaire respondents and their 
organizations. Individual and Organizations’ non-exclusive roles in the scheme (n = absolute 
number of cases, % = percentage in terms of 25 respondents). 
     
Individual Role in the Scheme n (%)  Organizational Roles in the Scheme n (%)* 
Supporting Technician 9 (36)  Design 15 (60) 
Manager 6 (24)  Support 14 (56) 
Scientist in charge of research 5 (20)  Implementation 10 (40) 
Mixed role: scientist/technician 2 (8)  Management 4 (16) 
Mixed role: manager/technician 2 (8)  Evaluation 1 (4) 
Other 1 (4)    
     
     
Professional Background n (%)  
Organizational Roles related to  
Monitoring 
n (%)* 
Biologist 7 (28)  Funding 15 (60) 
Economist 4 (16)  Getting secondary data from third parts 15 (60) 
Agricultural engineer 4 (16)  Direct monitoring of env. Indicators 14 (56) 
Forest engineer 2 (8)  Logistics for monitoring in the field 13 (52) 
Agronomy engineer 2 (8)  Processing monitoring data and report 13 (52) 
Sanitary engineer 1 (4)  No role on monitoring 1 (4) 
Environmental engineer 1 (4)    
Social worker 1 (4)    
Environmental manager 1 (4)    
Oceanographer 1 (4)    
Environmental technician 1 (4)    
     
 
Questionnaire and interview respondents belonging to the payers group were representatives 
of several types of organizations/firms: public water supply companies, private companies, 
government agency, and one development foundation. Among private companies, 
respondents were from: beverage, sugarcane and dairy production sectors, a restaurant, a 
health clinic, a lawyers firm, an infrastructure company and one service company. Respondents 
reported that their organizations provided payments of different kinds, including cash, 
materials, logistics and technical assistance to the schemes. Most of them are users of the 




Table 1-2: Use of water from the watershed and type of payment by PWS payer; non-exclusive 
categories; n = absolute number of cases, % = percentage in terms of 15 respondents. 
Use of water from the watershed n (%)  Type of payment provided for the scheme n (%) 
Incorporated in products 7 (46.7)  Cash 13 (86.7) 
Public water supply 4 (26.7)  Materials (e.g. construction, technology) 3 (20) 
Private water supply 3 (20)  Logistic Services (e.g. transportation) 2 (13.3) 
Use of water for industrial 
processes 
4 (26.7)  
Technical assistance (e.g. laboratory, GIS 
support) 
4 (26.7) 
No use of water 2 (13.3)  Other types 3 (20) 
Other 1 (6.7)    
 
The providers group is composed mainly by landowners living in family farms inherited from 
relatives. Few respondents are not owners but long-term tenants. Most of the landowners 
have lived their entire life in the region, some of them in the nearby city. They are usually 
farmers who depend on their production as the main economic source. Cattle ranching is the 
most common use of land (Table 1-3). 
Table 1-3: Characteristics of questionnaire respondents from the providers’ group. 
Scheme, 
Watershed 












Main land use 
Avg. number of 












































Table 1-3: continuation. 







of years living 
in the region 
Agua Somos 61.8 male 3 55 
ASOBOLO 54.0 Male 3 35.2 
CSAH Cali 56.1 male 2 31.3 






Figure 1-2: fieldwork in Colombia. Observation of monitoring practices of PWS schemes. 
Source: Letícia Santos de Lima, Jan-June 2016. 
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“It is widely held that policymakers expect scientists to provide certainties and hence dislike uncertainty in the 
scientific knowledge base. But, uncertainty is a fact of life and a better understanding of the different dimensions 
of uncertainty and their implications for policy choices would be likely to lead to more trust in the scientists 
providing decision support, and ultimately to better policies.” 
- Walker et al., 2003, p. 6 
2 Theoretical Background 
 
This chapter presents an overview of important concepts that permeate the dissertation. It 
starts with a brief description of basic concepts in Hydrology, and some concepts related to 
management of natural resources; then moves to the origins of the ES concept and PES; and 
finally reviews basic concepts associated to policy evaluation, uncertainty and ignorance, and 
the role of uncertainty on impact evaluation and PES. 
2.1 Intricate links between land and water 
The amount of water that flows in a river can be estimated through the water inputs and 
outputs in the area delimited by the geomorphological divisions that converges the 
precipitation for a common river network, i.e. a watershed (Gupta, 2011). Precipitation and 
groundwater inputs feed the watershed, while evapotranspiration and groundwater outputs 
decrease the water availability. This balance would provide the conditions for the existence of 
springs, rivers, lakes, swamps, aquifers and other water bodies. The energy of the Sun is the 
main driver of the water cycle (Shaw et al., 2011), while the gravitational force and the physical 
properties of the environment, e.g. structure of rocks, soils, geomorphology and vegetation, 
modulate the water cycling. The solar energy is behind a large number of processes composing 
the weather patterns, and therefore, influences the inputs of water in a watershed through 
condensation and subsequent precipitation, and the outputs such as evaporation (Shaw et al., 
2011). When precipitation reaches the surface, part of it is intercepted by the vegetation and 
other obstacles and can evaporate from there or accumulate and flow to the surface through 
trunks and other paths (Ward et al., 2015). Land cover also influences evapotranspiration: 
surface physical properties such as albedo and roughness will affect how solar radiation is 
absorbed or reflected by the surface and will have microclimatological effects (Bruijnzeel, 
2004). Consequently, the water content of the vegetation, water bodies and first layers of soil 
is also affected. 
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When precipitation reaches the soil, geomorphological features together with edaphic 
conditions and vegetation cover will influence how much water will infiltrate to the ground, 
how much will flow through the surface, and what will be the water velocity during runoff 
(Araujo et al., 2005). Several physical properties play a role in these processes: types and 
position of rock layers; mineral composition, porosity and structure of the soil; amount of 
organic matter in the soil column; depth of plant roots; terrain slope and land cover; type of 
vegetation; microorganisms, etc. (Ward et al., 2015). The same properties also influence the 
water quality, enriching it with minerals, particles, ions, organic acids and other organic 
compounds, and microorganisms (Drever, 1997). 
Water that infiltrates the soil can flow through different paths. Depending on soil and rock 
properties together with the volume of water that percolates in a certain amount of time, part 
of the water volume would occupy rock pores and may flow towards deeper rock layers by 
gravity (Ward et al., 2015). Part of the water would be retained in the soil and rock pores due 
to tension forces with the surface of the pores. The presence of plant roots or rock ruptures 
can create preferential paths for the water. The water can also reach a saturated or 
impermeable layer and then flow in parallel with the surface until it reaches the surface again 
due to slope changes creating springs (Gupta, 2011). 
As per the above accounts, it is expected that by changing the land cover and using the land 
for different purposes will change certain properties that will affect water flows (e.g. Harden 
et al., 2013). Land conversion from forest to bare soil, for instance, can have strong effects on 
evapotranspiration patterns due to a sharp decrease in water uptake by plants and 
transpiration (Coe et al., 2013; Davidson et al., 2012). Removing plants from a certain area may 
also have implications on the erosive impact of water on the ground as the interception effect 
decreases and the water can hit the soil more directly (Araujo et al., 2005). The impacts of 
heavy rainfall on a bare soil is directly linked with soil decreased permeability and erosion 
(Renard et al., 1997). Deforestation also affect how the solar radiation reaches the surface as 
the absence of trees open more space for direct exposure of the ground to sunlight. This may 
have a microclimatological effect on the lower atmosphere humidity and air temperature and 




Several soil properties may change depending on the use of land after deforestation. Cattle 
ranching, for instance, may induce soil compaction by the pressure of the cattle trampling on 
the ground (Araujo et al., 2005; Ward et al., 2015). However, this process would certainly 
depend on the herd density in each case. The reduced amount of soil pores due to compaction 
may decrease its infiltration capacity leading to more runoff than otherwise. Poor agricultural 
practices can lead to an increase in erosion processes and in sedimentation loading on 
lowlands and water bodies. Increased turbidity caused by sediments may reduce the 
possibilities of water use for certain purposes (Bilotta and Brazier, 2008). Degraded soils and 
erosion also lead to higher losses of soil nutrients by runoff that would be previously used by 
plants (Pimentel et al., 1995). The loss of soil nutrients can lead not only to water quality 
problems due to high concentration of nutrients in rivers and lakes, but also to a decrease in 
agricultural productivity (Pimentel et al., 1995). To overcome problems of productivity, farmers 
would end up using more fertilizers that would be eventually washed from soil surface leading 
to higher nutrient concentrations in water bodies. Nutrient in excess can also percolate the soil 
column and contaminate groundwater (Oenema et al., 1998). Additional common problems 
found in intensively used lands for agriculture and cattle ranching are water contamination 
with pesticides and animal defecation (Bragina et al., 2017). When farmers allow their animals 
to ranch close to streams and springs, the animals may destroy the riparian vegetation and soil 
structure by stepping into it, and contaminate water by defecating making it inappropriate for 
human consumption (Bragina et al., 2017). 
In order to tackle such complex problems, there is a need for institutional arrangements. We 
proceed by briefly reviewing a few of them in the context of the land-water links. 
2.2 Institutional arrangements in the land-water context 
Given the complexity portrayed so far, the land-water link management can be deeply complex 
when many individuals or groups share the same area and use the same resources (Niasse and 
Cherlet, 2014; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012). As the water can flow long distances throughout a 
watershed, every action undertaken in upper lands may have consequences for the 
downstream water users (FAO, 2006). It is not just a matter of what upstream users do with 
the water itself that may interfere in the water available for those downstream but also what 
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they do with the land as previously explained (Bragina et al., 2017; Coe et al., 2013; Harden et 
al., 2013). 
Water flowing on rivers when used for consumptive purposes can be considered as a good 
characterized by high subtractability, i.e. the more is extracted from the river, the less remains 
to others to use it (Ostrom, 2005a). Non-consumptive uses of water does not imply 
subtractability, such as for tourism, however certain types of use can generate contamination 
which reduces the possibilities for others to use it. It is very hard to exclude or prevent users 
from accessing rivers because rivers usually flow across large areas. Therefore, taking into 
consideration consumptive uses, water from rivers can be called a common pool resource 
(Ostrom, 2005a). 
The challenges to manage common pool resources, such as water, have led government 
authorities and technicians, civil associations, socio-environmental practitioners and 
researchers to propose several institutional arrangements in a variety of governance levels, 
e.g. integrated river basin management plans (FAO, 2006; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012), riparian 
buffer width regulations (Lee et al., 2004), fees based on the polluter-pays principle (Howarth, 
2009), etc.  
Among the main challenges in these arrangements, there are the transaction costs. Due to 
inherent complexity, environmental policies may have high transaction costs of policy 
implementation, monitoring, and sanctioning (McCann, 2013; Thompson, 1999). Transaction 
costs can be understood as costs incurred in establishing, maintaining and changing 
institutions3 and organizations (Marshall, 2013). McCann (2013) explores several factors that 
may affect transaction costs of environmental policies, such as number of agents (e.g. farmers 
in a watershed), scale of intervention, measurability, external effects, uncertainty, etc. High 
transactions costs may compromise the efficiency of a policy choice or even impede it to be 
fully implemented (Thompson, 1999). 
                                                     
3 Institutions can be understood as: ““...the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and 
social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) (North, 1991, p. 97)” 
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Claims of government inefficiency always make some voice for the proposition of different 
institutional arrangements.  Partnerships between government and third sector have been one 
of these varieties since the 1980’s (Salamon, 1987), and some examples can be found in the 
conservation sector (e.g. Moreno-Padilla, 2016). During the last decades, an increasing 
emphasis has been put on community-level approaches (e.g. Peters, 1998) managed by 
intermediary organizations, often NGOs or civil associations of different kinds, and market-
based schemes for the management of natural resources (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012). 
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are among the most advocated institutional 
arrangements for conservation on a community-level nowadays. The idea behind such 
schemes is that landowners living in areas from where others usually obtain ecosystem 
services, called ES “providers”, should be paid by ES users to maintain or improve such ES by 
changing their land use or implementing some conservation practices (Wunder, 2005). These 
schemes can be classified in two types (Wunder, 2007): (a) public schemes, in the form of 
governmental programmes, and (b) private schemes, with a more local focus. In public 
schemes, the state represents the ES users and pays the landowners living in strategic areas 
for conservation to reduce the impact of their activities on the natural resources. In private 
schemes, an intermediary organization is usually in charge of setting the transactions between 
ES users and the so-called “providers”. In what follows, we review the concepts of ES and its 
origins and explore the current PES practices with an emphasis on water-related cases (PWS 
schemes). 
2.3 The Ecosystem Services paradigm and its origins 
Ecosystem services (ES) is a widely used concept nowadays, and it could be understood as a 
new paradigm, not only in environmental sciences and ecology, but also in the science-policy-
practices interface (Fisher and Brown, 2014; Kull et al., 2015). Its most cited definition is the 
one proposed in the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment - MA (2003, p. 49): 
“Ecosystem services are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems. These include 
provisioning services such as food and water; regulating services such as flood and 
disease control; cultural services such as spiritual, recreational, and cultural benefits; 
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and supporting services, such as nutrient cycling, that maintain the conditions for life 
on Earth.” 
Another definition for ES, closely related, was previously proposed by Daily (1997, p. 3): 
“Ecosystem services are the conditions and processes through which natural 
ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfil human life. They 
maintain biodiversity and the production of ecosystem goods, such as seafood, forage, 
timber, biomass fuels, natural fibber, and many pharmaceuticals, industrial products, 
and their precursors. In addition to the production of goods, ecosystem services are the 
actual life-support functions, such as cleansing, recycling, and renewal, and they confer 
many intangible aesthetic and cultural benefits as well.” 
The MA report proposes a definition for ecosystem: 
“An ecosystem is a dynamic complex of plant, animal, and microorganism communities 
and the non-living environment, interacting as a functional unit. Humans are an integral 
part of ecosystems (Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003, p. 49).” 
Gómez-Baggethun et al. (2010) presented an overview of the history of ecosystem services 
from the perspective of the economic theory. Based on their timeline (p. 1213), this section 
unfolds some of the key events and publications that were directly related to the origins of the 
concept and to its widespread uptake by decision makers, academics, and conservation 
practitioners. 
According to Mooney and Ehrlich (1997) the first known time that the idea of nature as a 
provider of services to society appeared was in Marsh’s book “Man and Nature”, 1864. Marsh 
noted, “The carnivorous, and often the herbivorous insects render an important service to man 
by consuming dead and decaying animal and vegetable matter...” (Marsh 1864, p. 95 cited in 
Mooney and Ehrlich 1997). Following a list of other references, Mooney and Ehrlich mentioned 
William Vogt (in ‘A Road to Survival’, 1948) as a pioneer of the related concept of ‘natural 
capital’: “By using up our real capital of natural resources, especially soil, we reduce the 
possibility of ever paying off the debt (Vogt 1948, p. 44 cited in (Mooney and Ehrlich, 1997)”. 
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As for ‘ecosystem services’, several definitions followed until it gained a mainstream use: 
‘environmental services’ (Study of Critical Environmental Problems, 1970); ‘public services of 
the global ecosystem’ (Ehrlich et al., 1977); ‘nature’s services’ (Westman, 1977); and finally 
‘ecosystem services’ (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1981). A series of studies followed in the subsequent 
years focusing on the services provided by ecosystems and the role of biodiversity in the 
ecosystem’s structure.  
Costanza and Daly (1992) explored the early notions of ‘natural capital’, a concept intimately 
related to that of ecosystem services. Natural capital was then defined as “the stock that yields 
sustainable flows” while the sustainable flows would be called ‘natural income’ (Costanza and 
Daly, 1992, p. 38). They argued that society could not afford decreasing their stock of natural 
capital given the uncertainty about the sustainability of this potential situation. This publication 
was one of the first to explore the idea of quantifying natural capital and helped promote the 
ecosystem services approach. 
By 1996, ‘environmental services’ were already incorporated in the federal law of some 
countries; e.g. Costa Rica’s Federal Law n. 7575/1996 recognized four types of environmental 
services provided by forested areas, including carbon sequestration and hydrological services 
(Postel and Thompson, 2005). 
In 1997, the book edited by Gretchen Daily, “Nature’s Services – Societal Dependence on 
Natural Ecosystems” was published. This book became one of the cornerstones of the history 
of the ecosystem services concept and one of the first ones to advocate clearly for an economic 
valuation of these services. In the same year, Costanza et al. (1997) published an influential 
paper on Nature in which they estimated the ecosystem services value of the entire biosphere 
to be 33 Trillion US Dollars per year on average. Their attempt to estimate this value in 
monetary units was followed by subsequent updates (e.g. de Groot et al., 2012). 
In 1998 an international effort begun to develop the conceptual framework of the MA 
(Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003, p. xiii). A number of development cooperation 
agencies, financial institutions, and scientific councils provided financial support to perform 
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this large study. The main goal of the report published in 2003 was to provide an updated 
global assessment of the state of ecosystems around the world and their services. 
In 2007, ministries of the G8+5 countries launched an initiative to study the economic benefits 
of biodiversity and ecosystems – The Potsdam Initiative. This process further established the 
“The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity” (TEEB) with support from the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) (European Communities, 2008). The central idea was to 
highlight the values of biodiversity and ecosystems and propose ways to incorporate a 
valuation framework into policy making (European Communities, 2008). The initiative 
launched further studies in the subsequent years. 
In 2012, the Intergovernmental Science-policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
(IPBES) was launched bringing together initially 94 governments to improve scientific 
information to support policy processes about ecosystem services and biodiversity (Díaz et al., 
2015). IPBES is supported by several United Nations bodies and is managed by the United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). In the same year, the Ecosystem Services journal 
was launched (Braat and de Groot, 2012). 
In the following section the origins, definitions, practices and status of PES are reviewed. 
2.4 Payments for Ecosystem Services 
During the 1980’s and 1990’s one type of conservation approach became popular among 
practitioners and international donors aiming at investing on environmental projects in 
developing countries: the integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) 
(Newmark and Hough, 2000). The main idea was to reconcile biodiversity conservation and 
local development through a series of activities in protected areas and their surrounding 
inhabited zones (Peters, 1998; Wells et al., 1999). ICDPs proponents were concerned with 
reducing the socio-economic impact of protected areas by generating opportunities for 
sustainable resources use. According to Wells et al. (1999) the concept gained strength due to 
an emphasis on participation of local communities on design and implementation, the idea of 
combining concerns with conservation and poverty relief, and finally because it was attracting 
a large amount of international investments in biodiversity conservation. 
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However, after one or two decades of ICDP attempts, some researchers and development 
practitioners were pointing to a failure in several projects. Wells et al. (1999) published a World 
Bank report in which they reviewed 21 cases of ICDP projects in Indonesia and concluded that 
the majority of them were not achieving satisfactory results. According to them, the observed 
ineffectiveness was not actually related to the ICDP concept itself, but rather to lack of 
management capacity, poor law enforcement, and the influence of powerful actors outside 
the realm of protected areas. Peters (1998) presented the case of a national park in 
Madagascar in which the ICDP attempt was considered deficient. One of the points made was 
that a large amount of money supposedly intended for these projects were actually being 
diverted to U.S. based administrative overheads and technical consultants from abroad. Only 
2% of the initial amount would reach the target population. Additional he calls “to redistribute 
money or other resources directly to the poor people living in and around the protected areas” 
and to focus on local education and organization (Peters, 1998, p. 17). By taking these 
arguments, some researchers, mainly economists, have strongly made the case for direct 
payments for conservation to replace such projects (Ferraro, 2001; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; 
Ferraro and Simpson, 2002). According to Ferraro (2001): 
“Conservation contracting can (1) reduce the set of critical parameters that 
practitioners must affect to achieve conservation goals, (2) permit more precise 
targeting and more rapid adaptation over time, and (3) strengthen the links between 
individual well-being, individual actions, and habitat conservation, thus creating a local 
stake in ecosystem protection (Ferraro, 2001, p. 990).” 
In sum, the arguments in favour of payments were centred on the idea that they would be 
more direct, simple, target-oriented, less costly, and therefore, more efficient. In a highly cited 
opinion paper that influenced conservation funding in the last 15 years, Ferraro and Kiss (2002, 
p. 1719) argue that: 
“The basic principle is that the cheapest way to get something you want is to pay for 
what you want (e.g., protected rain forest), rather than pay for something indirectly 




Apparently, the authors assumed a very narrow perspective over human behaviour in their 
attempt to justify the advocacy made in favour of direct payments: 
“However, people will generally do what is in their own interest, particularly their short-
term interest. If they can receive more benefits from clearing an area of habitat than 
they could from protecting it, they will clear it (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002, p. 1719).” 
These arguments paved the way to popularize PES among development agencies, international 
foundations for conservation, and non-government organizations. A Payment for Ecosystem 
Services (PES) is an institution designed to reach conciliation of interests among individuals or 
groups whose activities may cause impact on the goods shared with or used by others 
(Muradian et al., 2010). As a previously mentioned example, in the case of a watershed, the 
use of land by some individuals in upper catchments may decrease the quality of the water 
that is used by others downstream. When the costs of monitoring and law enforcement are 
high, financial incentives may be used to convince land users to adopt certain practices that 
would guarantee that water users would not be impacted (Lu and He, 2014). Proponents of 
PES sustain that economic incentives or compensations in voluntary agreements that at least 
can cover the opportunity cost of land use can induce a change of behaviour that would favour 
reaching a fair deal for all stakeholders (Wunder, 2007). 
While several scientific papers have been devoted to PES definitions and its implications 
(Derissen and Latacz-Lohmann, 2013; Muradian et al., 2010; Sommerville et al., 2009), for now 
the most cited definition up to date should be enough to understand its origins and context. 
Wunder (2005), p. 3) proposes that a Payment for Environmental Service would be: 
(1) “a voluntary transaction in which… 
(2)  a well-defined environmental service (or a land use likely to secure that service) 
(3)  is ‘bought’ by a buyer 
(4)  from a provider 
(5)  only if the provider continuously secures the provision of the service.” 
Apparently, the U.S. has a long tradition on payments for land retirement by farmers. According 
to Claassen et al. (2008), since the 1930’s several voluntary payment schemes were 
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undertaken by the federal government for a variety of purposes. Although much intended to 
increase crop prices and to support farmers during the economic recessions, it was also applied 
to incentivize soil conservation practices motivated by episodes such as the dust bowl. The 
Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) established in 1936 supported farmers on the 
implementation of several soil conservation structures, and from 1996 onwards integrated also 
requirements from the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (Claassen et al., 2008). 
According to Ferraro and Kiss (2002), during the year 2001 around 1.7 billion dollars were spent 
by the U.S. government in incentives for farmers to protect land. Not only goverments were 
engaging in direct incentives but also large non-government organizations (NGOs). By the end 
of the 1990’s not only governments and development agencies but also international NGOs, 
such as World Wildlife Foundation (WWF), Conservation International (CI) and The Nature 
Conservancy (TNC), were already investing largely in direct incentives for conservation (Ferraro 
and Kiss, 2002). 
In Europe, the so-called agri-environment measures started to be implemented in the early 
1980’s by some of the European Union member States, it was adopted in a voluntary basis by 
the European Community in 1985 and formally introduced in the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) reform in 1992 (European Commission, 2005). The introduction of agri-environment 
measures was a consequence of growing environmental concerns and complemented a series 
of actions to assist farmers on landscape conservation and sustainable agricultural production, 
with practices such as reduced use of fertilizers and maintenance of forest cover. Farmers 
would be stimulated to adopt conservation practices through direct aid payments: 
“Agri-environment measures are designed to encourage farmers to protect and 
enhance the environment on their farmland. It provides for payments to farmers in 
return for a service – that of carrying out agri-environmental commitments that involve 
more than the application of usual good farming practice. Farmers sign a contract with 
the administration and are paid for the additional cost of implementing such 
commitments and for any losses of income (e.g. due to reduced production) which the 
commitments entail (European Commission, 2005, p. 3).” 
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PES programs reached the policy agenda in Latin America in the early 1990’s. The most iconic 
one was the Costa Rica national PES programme in 1997 aiming at protecting the forests based 
on the argument of provision of several environmental services (Pagiola, 2008). The payments 
were funded through a National Forestry Fund (FONAFIFO) that was fed by taxes on fossil fuels 
and loans and grants from The World Bank and Global Environmental Facility (GEF) (Postel and 
Thompson, 2005). This national program was based on a 1996 federal law (Law n. 7575) that 
recognized four types of environmental services provided by forests, one of them being the 
hydrological services (Postel and Thompson, 2005). According to Pagiola (2008), similar efforts 
for forest conservation in Costa Rica started earlier than the national program with a series of 
incentive program attempts, e.g. the Forest Protection Certificate in 1995 that supported the 
replacement of timber production by forest protection. In these projects, land users receive 
an economic incentive to change their activity for a more sustainable one or to conserve 
remnant vegetation in their farms. 
A classic case frequently reported in the literature is that of Quito, Ecuador, with a trust fund 
for watershed conservation proposed in 1996 and established in 2000, called FONAG (Postel 
and Thompson, 2005). This was the first of a series of what has been named water funds, a 
conservation scheme promoted by the NGO The Nature Conservancy (Calvache et al., 2012). 
The implementation of FONAG received support from US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), among other organizations. Frequently mentioned cases are those from 
Vittel and the New York City (NYC). The Perrier Vittel Company (France), sold to Nestlé Inc. in 
1992 established a conservation project with local communities in 1993. The company pay 
farmers directly in order to protect the springs that are sources for its bottled water (Perrot-
Maître, 2006). In the beginning of the 1990’s, the New York City adopted a similar approach 
for upper catchment protection (Smith and Porter, 2010). 
Several types of “services” have been considered in PES projects: atmospheric carbon removal, 
water resources protection, biodiversity, scenic beauty, etc. (Wunder, 2005). The number of 
schemes reported in the literature has been increasing. Grima et al., (2016) reviewed 40 cases 
of PES in Latin America. In their analysis, 50% were cases related to water resources, 28% 
included several services, 12% were related to landscape, 8% to carbon, and 2% to biodiversity. 
In a paper aiming at a global meta-analysis of PES patterns, Ezzine-De-Blas et al. (2016) 
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identified 584 records of PES schemes in an online database research from which they analysed 
55. Their results showed that public sector PES schemes are in large number in Europe and 
Asia, while Latin America would have a diversified set of schemes. 
In what follows, a review of the recent trends towards impact evaluation is presented and its 
influence on conservation projects is briefly discussed. The quest for impact evidence is then 
linked to the efforts being done to demonstrate additionality of PES schemes. 
2.5 Impact Evaluation and its influence in conservation projects 
The efficient use of funds destined to solve collective problems has always been a key issue in 
policymaking and is of concern for governments, development agencies, and NGOs alike 
(Gertler et al., 2011). Programmes and projects should not only be effective, but also efficient. 
While the concept of effectiveness has been associated with achieving the desired aims, the 
concept of efficiency goes further and refers to the relation between investments and 
outcomes (Mandl et al., 2008). Since the 1980’s, best practices for efficient policies have been 
associated with a growing trend towards what has been called “evidence-based policy 
making”4 (Mceldowney, 1997; Sanderson, 2002).  
“Evidence-based policy-making represents a contemporary effort to reform or re-
structure policy processes in order to prioritize evidentiary or data-based decision-
making. Like earlier efforts in the ‘policy analysis movement,’ its aim is to avoid or 
minimize policy failures caused by a mismatch between government expectations and 
actual, on-the-ground conditions through the provision of greater amounts of policy-
relevant information (Howlett, 2009, p. 153).” 
Evidence-based policy-making became strong in the UK public health sector in the early 1990’s 
and from there it was promoted towards other spheres, such as in education and criminology 
(Hammersley, 2005; Sanderson, 2002). This trend promoted certain types of research 
methods, such as systematic reviews, in detriment of others (Gertler et al., 2011), and of 
scientific knowledge in detriment of ‘non-scientific’ knowledge (Hammersley, 2005). The 
                                                     
4 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, evidence means “the available body of facts or information 
indicating whether a belief or proposition is true or valid (Oxford University Press, 2017).” 
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evidence-based policy making trend also strengthened the use of performance indicators, 
experimental and quasi-experimental research designs in both governmental and non-
governmental spheres. 
The World Bank has been promoting evidence-based policymaking in the form of training 
workshops to government officials in many countries (Gertler et al., 2011): 
“Our hope is that if governments and development practitioners can make policy 
decisions based on evidence – including evidence generated through impact evaluation 
– development resources will be spent more effectively to reduce poverty and improve 
people’s lives (Gertler et al., 2011, p. xii).” 
As part of this effort towards effective or even efficient policy decisions, Impact Evaluations 
(IE) became one of the central tools: 
“Impact evaluations are part of a broader agenda of evidence-based policy making. This 
growing global trend is marked by a shift in focus from inputs to outcomes and results. 
From the Millennium Development Goals to pay-for-performance incentives for public 
service providers, this global trend is reshaping how public policies are being carried 
out. Not only is the focus on results being used to set and track national and 
international targets, but results are increasingly being used by, and required of, 
program managers to enhance accountability, inform budget allocations, and guide 
policy decisions. Monitoring and evaluation are at the heart of evidence-based policy 
making (Gertler et al., 2011, p.2).” 
Impact evaluation focuses on attribution, i.e. it seeks to verify if the changes observed in a 
target group are attributable to the program or project being evaluated or to confounding 
factors (Baylis et al., 2015; Ferraro, 2009; Gertler et al., 2011). A key element of Impact 
Evaluation is Additionality. Assessing additionality means comparing interventions' effects with 
the null hypothesis or counterfactual (Baylis et al., 2015; Georghiou, 2002). A counterfactual, 
in this case, refers to what would have happened in the absence of the intervention that is 
being evaluated. Usually, it requires a comparison with a case control, being it an area without 
the project intervention or a group of individuals without the project treatment (Gertler et al., 
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2011). The logic follows that of a lab experiment: with treatment, without treatment, while all 
other conditions are kept constant for both. In sum, “the essence of counterfactual thinking is 
elimination of plausible rival interpretations of observed outcomes (Ferraro, 2009).” 
Initial conditions of both groups (treatment and control) are represented in terms of a baseline 
for each variable of interest (Figure 2-1). Therefore, a baseline refers to the situation before 
treatment. At the same time, monitoring is used to observe and register the changes that those 
variables will suffer along the time. Monitoring is also important to verify if the project is 
actually achieving the goals by comparing observed variables with the established targets. 
 
 
Figure 2-1: four elements of additionality assessment. Baselines to describe initial conditions; 
Monitoring to track changes along the intervention; Case-control and a Treatment case under 
similar conditions. 
 
This increasing trend towards evidence-based policymaking has been putting a strong 
emphasis on the integration of science in the policy process. While imposing new challenges 
to those who are in charge of producing the evidence, it also gives room to critical questions 
about what would constitute evidence and what types of methods should count as appropriate 
to generate evidence (Hammersley, 2005): 
“The ideal model of evidence-based policy making is predicated upon certain 
assumptions relating to: the nature of knowledge and evidence; the way in which social 
systems and policies work; the ways in which evaluation can provide the evidence 
needed; the basis upon which we can identify successful or good practice; and the ways 
in which evaluation evidence is applied in improving policy and practice (Sanderson, 












Recently, voices from the conservation research community pointed to the need to 
incorporate such evidence-based policy in the environmental agenda (Baylis et al., 2015; 
Ferraro, 2009). It is said that the environmental conservation science and policy are far behind 
several other fields such as public health and education (Baylis et al., 2015; Ferraro, 2009). 
Promoters of impact evaluation argue that this evidence-based approach would help to 
achieve more cost-effective conservation and support assessment across several projects. 
However, there are considerable barriers in producing evidence of conservation projects 
impacts. These hindrances are related to a number of factors: lack of evaluation culture among 
conservation practitioners, institutional conditions, funding scarcity, scale issues, and the high 
complexity of the ecological processes (Baylis et al., 2015; Ferraro, 2009). 
Despite the difficulties of implementing impact evaluation in conservation projects, PES 
advocates incorporated it in their ideal conceptualization of a PES scheme. The additionality 
has been expressed in the literature as a pre-condition for PES schemes to be considered 
effective (Boerner et al., 2017; Wunder, 2005) and now several researchers are dedicated to 
the task of assessing effectiveness based on impact evaluations (e.g. Martin et al., 2014). In the 
context of the mainstream definition of PES (Wunder, 2005), more science would be needed 
to demonstrate ‘service delivery’ and the additional effects of such projects. While economists 
set up the rules of what should be considered effective and what should count as evidence, 
environmental practitioners dig desperately into monitoring techniques and field control 
conditions to satisfy these demands. Whenever the evidence of effectiveness is not found, the 
problem is not thought to be the framing itself but rather the lack of proper science; therefore, 
more science should be pursued to support this quest (see Naeem et al., 2015). The strong 
emphasis that is put on scientific methods for impact evaluation that would rather resemble 
laboratory conditions than the real environment is clearly shaped by a positivist mentality 
(Sanderson, 2002). The evidence is taken for granted; it is just a matter of doing proper science. 
It seems to have a blind faith in the scientific process disregarding subjective aspects of the 
knowledge production (Barker and Kitcher, 2014). However, scientific uncertainty is always 
present and can challenge such approaches.  
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In order to understand the influence of uncertainty on impact evidence applied to conservation 
projects, such as PES, some basic concepts about ignorance and uncertainty are presented in 
the following section. Further details are presented in Chapter 3. 
2.6 Ignorance and Uncertainty 
Ignorance is popularly understood as “something in need of correction, a kind of natural 
absence or void where knowledge has not yet spread” (Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008, p. 2). 
At a more subjective level, ignorance has always been an object of reflexion even among the 
ancient Greek philosophers ("I know that I know nothing" – attributed to Socrates), and in a 
more instrumental error calculation has been a regular scientific practice since centuries ago 
(Stigler, 1990). However, concerns about the impact of uncertainty in policy decisions 
increased exponentially with the emergence of debates about technological and 
environmental risks in the last decades (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990a). In addition to technical 
approaches such as risk assessments emerging from quantitative disciplines, sociology and 
philosophy have been also increasingly interested in the study of what is not known and its 
impacts in society (Gross, 2010). Even a new name to aggregate the studies about ignorance 
has been recently proposed: agnotology (Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008).  
Discussions about nonknowledge or ignorance frequently end up in a paradox: 
“... whenever new knowledge arises, the amount of nonknowledge that is perceived 
can increase proportionally since every set of newly generated knowledge can open up 
a wider horizon of what is not known (Gross, 2010, p. 52).” 
The paradox of increasing ignorance by increasing knowledge leads us to assume that nothing 
can be ever completely known. This idea matches the definition of uncertainty given by (Walker 
et al., 2003, p. 5): uncertainty is “any deviation from the unachievable ideal of completely 
deterministic knowledge of the relevant system.” Uncertainty is, therefore, an intrinsic aspect 
of knowledge and may grow with it: 
 “New knowledge on complex processes may reveal the presence of uncertainties that 
were previously unknown or were understated. In this way, more knowledge 
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illuminates that our understanding is more limited or that the processes are more 
complex than thought before (Walker et al., 2003, p. 8).” 
Several authors came to understand uncertainty in very different terms and there is no unique 
definition or frameworks for its study (Beven, 2009; Brown, 2010; Gross, 2010; Morgan and 
Henrion, 1990; Walker et al., 2003). Some scholars tend to concentrate on technical aspects 
of uncertainty, in the context of policy analysis of risk (Morgan and Henrion, 1990; Walker et 
al., 2003), or modelling exercises (e.g. Beven, 2009). Others look at uncertainty as a more 
holistic concept in the process of knowledge production (e.g. Gross, 2010). Still, what seems to 
be a unanimous opinion among scholars is that uncertainty has different sources, dimensions 
and magnitudes (Walker et al., 2003). 
Gross (2010, p. 68) made an extensive review of concepts related to ignorance and their 
definitions in the literature. He proposes the following terminology (Table 2-1): 
Table 2-1: “Categorization of different unknowns and extended knowledge” (Gross 2010, p. 
68). 
Nescience Lack of any knowledge: a prerequisite for a total surprise 
beyond any type of anticipation; can lead to ignorance and 
nonknowledge but belongs to a different epistemic class. 
Ignorance Knowledge about the limits of knowing in a certain area: 
Increases with every state of new knowledge. 
Types of specified ignorance  
Nonknowledge Knowledge about what is not known but taking it into 
account for future planning. 
Negative Knowledge Knowledge about what is not known but considered 
unimportant or even dangerous; can lead to nonknowledge 
(related to undone science). 
Extended knowledge Alternatively, new knowledge: based on planning and/or 
research with nonknowledge; can lead to new ignorance by 
uncovering limits of the newly gained knowledge. 
 
This section is complemented by the conceptual analysis presented in the Chapter 3 
concerning the sources and types of uncertainty in PES. In the following paragraphs, we 
proceed by reviewing some attitudes towards uncertainty in the science-policy interface in 
order to provide a background to subsequent chapters and to explore to which extent scientific 
methods can support claims of effectiveness in conservation projects, such as PES. 
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2.7 Attitudes and approaches towards uncertainty 
Uncertainty, as an inherent feature of research, is not a problem per se, but becomes 
particularly problematic when decisions need to be taken, as in the case of pressing policy 
issues regarding technological risk, public health, etc.: 
“The point is that scientific knowledge proceeds by exogenizing some significant 
uncertainties, which this become invisible to it: as Kuhn noted, this is not a pathology 
of science but a necessary feature of structured investigation. The built-in ignorance of 
science towards its own limiting commitments and assumptions is a problem only when 
external commitments are built on it as if such intrinsic limitations did not exist (Wynne, 
1992, p. 115).” 
Therefore, the perceptions and attitudes of actors in charge of taking collective decisions 
towards scientific uncertainty become important. Some scientists tend to assume that 
uncertainty should not simply be presented to decision makers when they ask for scientific 
advice (e.g. Todini and Mantovan, 2007). Others believe that an open debate about 
uncertainties and the ways to cope with them are the best approach (e.g. Brown, 2010; Walker 
et al., 2003). In an interesting debate about this issue, hydrologists pointed their own concerns 
about uncertainty and the use of scientific products by practitioners and other stakeholders 
(Beven, 2008, 2006; Hall et al., 2007; Hamilton, 2007; Sivakumar, 2008; Todini and Mantovan, 
2007). Beven (2006) was criticized in conferences because of his emphasis on model 
uncertainty and the risk of undermining the confidence of model users and stakeholders on 
science. Among other points made, Todini and Mantovan (2007) argued that decision-makers 
in use of hydrological forecasts were still not prepared to properly benefit from the information 
derived from uncertainty analysis and utility functions should rather be preferred instead of 
plain uncertainty numbers. Beven (2006) argued that the assumption that stakeholders are not 
ready to deal with uncertainty in decision-making processes is outdated as decision-makers 
deal with uncertainty on a daily basis. Hall et al. (2007, p. 985) supported this perspective by 
saying that “decision-makers and members of the public have a greater capacity to cope with 
probabilistic information than is often assumed”. The heated debate also unveiled concerns 
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about poor scientific practices and a call for transparency for the sake of the young generations 
of hydrologists: 
“... gradually I have come to the realization that I have a history of parameter-abuse. 
(...) The signs of addiction are subtle but recognizable. Hydrographs that are just a little 
too good, where the uncertainty in model predictions is less than the uncertainty in the 
driving force data. Axis-scaling that is a little too compressed, hiding inconsistencies in 
the model fit. You may recognize these symptoms in your colleagues but deny that you 
too... (Hamilton, 2007, p. 1979)” 
Many researchers assume that decision-makers on policy debates are not interested in 
knowing about scientific uncertainty, but would rather prefer scientists to come up with 
straight numbers. As Walker et al. (2003, p. 6) put it, “It is widely held that policymakers expect 
scientists to provide certainties and hence dislike uncertainty in the scientific knowledge base.” 
One example of this perception is given by Todini and Mantovan (2007, p. 1634):   
“End-users and stakeholders are NOT interested at looking at the uncertainty bounds. 
They are interested in receiving scientific support to corroborate their decisions, which 
may have dramatic consequences.” 
In his study about the use of science at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Powell 
(1999, p. 148) made a similar claim: “...more often than not, policymakers are disappointed 
because they want definitive answers from uncertain science and they cannot avoid making 
value-laden policy judgments.” 
The need for scientific inputs on the decision-making processes combined with this complex 
interaction between those in charge of “producing science” and those in charge of using 
scientific information have led to the predominance of certain approaches to uncertainty and 
risk. Quite often, quantitative methods aiming at “reducing uncertainty” or focusing only on 
those types of uncertainty that can be quantified are preferred (Brown, 2010; Wynne, 1992). 




“Here is relevant simply to note that conventional risk assessment methods tend to 
treat all uncertainty as if they were due to incomplete definition of an essentially 
determinate cause-effect system. In other words, they suggest that the route to better 
control of risks is more intense scientific knowledge of that system, to narrow the 
supposed uncertainties and gain more precise definition of it (Wynne 1992, p. 116).” 
There are certainly several reasons for the prevalence of quantitative and reductionist 
methods to assess uncertainty. Psychologically, such methods may be preferred because they 
support a sense of control and predictability over risky situations (Brown, 2010). Critical 
perspectives on philosophy of science also consider that this is a consequence of the 
predominance of natural sciences approach in science in detriment of other ways of inquiry 
(Barker and Kitcher, 2014). According to Barker and Kitcher (2014), the emphasis on 
reductionist strategies is guided by a quest towards objectivity and universality. Under this 
perspective, any property that cannot be measured based on a known unit cannot be entirely 
defined and therefore is subjective and not objective. By analysing objects focusing on 
measurable properties and disaggregating it in its component parts, scientists aim at reaching 
universality by looking at mathematical patterns that could be defined and replicated in other 
contexts (Barker and Kitcher, 2014). 
Barker and Kitcher (2014) propose an answer to why such approaches are so attractive. Science 
has been increasingly demanded and paid by governments, companies, development agencies, 
financial institutions. These different social actors have their own agenda and are seeking to 
fulfil certain interests and demands that are somehow always associated with intervention and 
control over processes in the world. Numbers, associated with a sense of predictability and 
control, allow them to provide accountability reports to their peers or shareholders, justify 
public expenditure, show results to their voters, and provide useful and tractable information 
to obtain or provide funds. 
“Expert advice is often thought most useful to policy when it is presented as a single 
‘definitive’ interpretation. Even when experts acknowledge uncertainty, they tend to 
do so in ways that reduce unknowns to measurable ‘risk’. In this way, policy-makers are 
encouraged to pursue (and claim) ‘science-based’ decisions (Stirling, 2010, p. 1029).” 
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An additional reason for the preference for quantitative approaches has deep implications: 
numbers are more easily understood and managed by economists and those who take 
decisions regarding fund allocation. Because monetary value is also expressed in numbers, 
there is a supposedly easy association of economic approaches with whatever other numeric 
ones. To add to this, Funtowicz and Ravetz (1994) brilliantly expressed: “Economics has 
traditionally been able to maintain its credibility by relegating uncertainties in knowledge and 
complexities in ethics firmly to the side-lines.” Maybe for the same reason, the ecosystem 
service approach gained so much prominence now that monetary values can be artificially 
attached to measurable natural processes (now services) and materials (now goods) (see 
arguments from Robertson, 2012). 
Risk assessments, although widely adopted to deal with complex problems such as 
environmental ones, were developed to deal with well-designed mechanical structures under 
highly controllable circumstances which is definitely not the case of environmental systems 
(Wynne, 1992). Efforts to reach precision, control and predictability through risk assessments 
in complex circumstances are certainly in great mismatch with the complexity not only of 
natural processes but also of social ones: 
“Risk assessment invites precision and even quantification, but by its nature is 
imperfect. Given the mobile character of modern institutions, coupled to the mutable 
and frequently controversial nature of abstract systems, most forms of risk assessment, 
in fact, contain numerous imponderables (Giddens 1991, p. 4).” 
Luckily, philosophers and social scientists have been shedding light on those debates with 
contributions in the fields of philosophy of science, sociology of science, and science and 
technology studies (e.g. Barker and Kitcher, 2014; Beck and Bonss, 2015; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 
1990; Giddens, 1991; Gross, 2010; Velody, 1995). An interesting statement is given by 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990): 
“Previously it was assumed that Science provided ‘hard facts’ in numerical form, in 
contrast to the ‘soft’, interest-driven, value-laden determinants of politics. Now, policy-
makers increasingly need to make ‘hard’ decisions, choosing between conflicting 
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options, using scientific information that is irremediably ‘soft’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 
1990, p. 1).” 
A more than welcome example to illustrate this issue is a study by Stirling (2010, 2008) in which 
he compares a series of studies that aimed at providing measures of risk of adopting certain 
energy sources. The idea was to support policy-makers in taking decisions about energy 
options. He showed that although the individual and independent scientific studies provided 
very narrow ranges of uncertainty, there was absolutely no consensus when taken altogether 
(Figure 2-2). Therefore, any random sample of these studies could support very different 
ranking of energy technology options: 
 
Figure 2-2: “the perils of science-based advice.” Economic risk of energy technology based on 
an assemblage of studies showing no consensus among scientists. Source: (Stirling, 2008, p. 
101) 
Importantly, among natural scientists and economists wanting to reach definite numbers and 
reduce uncertainty to manageable risk (and attribute utility functions and monetary values 
wherever possible) there are some critical voices. These voices raise attention to alternative 
ways of seeing and interpreting the world and to other forms of quantitative and qualitative 
inquiry. For example, although Morgan and Henrion (1990) presents a whole book on 
quantitative methods to support policy analysis, they explicitly recognize that these methods 
are only supportive but not definitive and this is due to a large amount of uncertainty sources 
that cannot be treated by quantitative methods. Gross (2010) studied ecological restoration 
projects and explored how scientists and practitioners have been coping with uncertainty and 
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surprise in such projects. He pointed to the importance of surprises in the learning process and 
offered some perspective on adaptive and transdisciplinary approaches. Stirling (2010, 2008), 
based on many years of scientific advisory work, proposed a very transparent treatment of 
uncertainty by confronting the scientific advice and its ambiguities inside the scientific 
community.  He wanted to offer an overview of potential approaches to uncertainty that policy 
makers could use when choosing paths regarding new regulations involving risk and for that 
elaborated what he called the “uncertainty matrix” (Stirling, 2010, 2008). 
According to Stirling (2010, p. 1029), most scientists in the position of giving advice to policy 
makers when confronted with uncertainty would avoid expressing broad doubts and 
acknowledging unknowns and would rather reduce uncertainty to measurable risk. Thus, 
alternative methods are usually neglected by policy-makers because they do not provide round 
numbers and conduce to definitive solutions. By supporting risk measurement approaches, 
policy makers would tend to claim that their decisions are “science-based”. However, in 
neglecting sources of uncertainty that cannot be quantified, decision-makers may be engaging 
in even more uncertain pathways. As pointed by  Stirling (2010, p. 1030), “the absence of 





 “Frequently in public discussion, policy analysis, regulatory decision making 
and other contexts, we proceed as if we understand and can predict the world 
precisely. While a moment's reflection is sufficient to persuade anyone that this 
is not true, a number of political, behavioural, and analytical factors combine 
to promote the continuation of this practice.” -  Morgan and Henrion, 1990, p. 
1 
2.8 Evidence, uncertainty, and PES 
The scientific and technological achievements of the last three to four centuries have 
supported increased expectations about what science can offer. Science has been seen by 
many as the most reliable way of accumulating knowledge (Barker and Kitcher, 2014).  This 
based on the supposed reliability of the so-called “scientific method” (Velody, 1995). The 
scientific method, according to a perspective influenced by the work of prominent scientists 
such as Galileo, Bacon, Newton, Boyle, and Descartes, is centred in systematic observations 
that would be then generalized to reach conclusions (Barker and Kitcher, 2014; Velody, 1995). 
Hypotheses should only be accepted if supported by proper evidence. Although a large 
literature on critical perspectives over science and its limitations exists (e.g. Barker and Kitcher, 
2014; Kuhn, 1970; Latour, 1987; Velody, 1995), there are still influential discourses that 
support the idea that “science-based” decisions are more trustworthy, and that policy 
decisions should be based on evidence (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990b; Hammersley, 2005; 
Sanderson, 2002). 
Evidence, as a basis for science, refers only to what has been somehow observed. However, 
observation, as the ground for evidence, does not exist without the observer. It is therefore 
important to question what the features from the observer are that could affect the 
observation. In their search for evidence, scientists do not start from scratch but observe things 
from a reference point (Velody, 1995). This reference point include a series of pre-conditions: 
cultural origins of the scientist, gender, age, neurological and psychological structure and 
health, beliefs, moral values, preferred theories, and so on (Barker and Kitcher, 2014). In 
addition, the scientific process is embedded in a whole universe of social interactions and 
demands where influence, competition, individual interests, institutional arrangements, 
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collaboration, power and conflicts all co-exist (Brown, 2010). Nowadays, one may also ask what 
the influence of the funding sources on the scientific production would be (Barker and Kitcher, 
2014). The researcher depends on funds coming from companies, governments, development 
agencies, and so on, and therefore, she/he must somehow respond to the interests of those 
who pay for science. As Velody (1995, p. xii) put it, “once the majority of science is paid for by 
companies, by governments and by the military, it becomes far less easy to see science as 
disinterested.” 
One may say that there is no neutral product in science. The qualities of the observer, the 
means and tools to observe, and even the researcher’s social circumstances influence the 
observation process. It is expected that all of these conditions will frame the observation, 
including in aspects such as scope, sample, goal, justification, hypothesis, research question, 
etc.  Whenever a scientist draws the boundaries of the observed object, this is “detached” 
from the universe of possible sets of conditions and objects to observe.  The scientist 
consciously (or not) ignores the rest and by doing so is able to handle certain objects to study 
(Brown, 2010). According to Brown, time, financial resources, technical assistance, available 
instruments, expertise..., all of these also constrain the set of potential observations, and 
therefore, the evidence that can be gathered.  
On the light of these arguments, and the recent efforts to demonstrate additionality and 
conditionality of PES schemes, one could question how far scientific methods can actually go 
on supporting this quest and how feasible it is to proceed under such perspective. What has 
been pointed by many critics of ES and PES is that there is an uncountable number of 
uncertainties of various kinds, some of them linked to technical issues, others to lack of 
knowledge about the environment and its processes, and others created by the narrow 
framing (i.e., one based on monetary payments) of human-environment relationship (Barnaud 
and Antona, 2014; Kull et al., 2015; Lele, 2009; Norgaard, 2010; Robertson, 2012). 
The next chapter of this dissertation explores the sources and types of uncertainty in PES 
schemes, including a discussion of technical aspects as well as concerns about the lack of 
knowledge the uncertainties that are inherent to the production of knowledge per se. 
Propositions about an adaptive approach to PES are presented.  
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3 Uncertainties in demonstrating environmental benefits of 
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ABSTRACT 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) have become the flagship of conservation organizations 
in recent years. However, PES schemes are as much criticized as they are acclaimed in the 
literature. Researchers have pointed that many PES schemes, particularly water-related ones, 
are based on unreliable assumptions and lack strong causal links between land use and 
ecosystem services. Evidence of outcomes is hardly demonstrated. This uncertainty in PES 
schemes arises not only from practical difficulties, but from the complexity of the human-
environment systems (HES), and the limits of current knowledge about HES. Many scientists 
and practitioners have proposed that more research is needed to improve the scientific basis 
of PES. Here we argue that this research should be complemented with a deeper 
understanding of the uncertainties involved in PES, an explicit treatment of these in the whole 
process of PES negotiation, design and monitoring, and clear uncertainty communication 
among the actors involved. Neglecting uncertainties could lead to unfounded expectations and 
poor assessments of PES outcomes. If recognizing and accounting for uncertainties are to 
threaten the success of PES, then uncertainty can be seen as an opportunity to open up the 




Ecosystem Services (ES) have been considered one of the most prominent approaches towards 
conservation nowadays (Kull et al., 2015). With roots in the late 1970s and strong influence 
from neoclassical economics (Barnaud and Antona, 2014; Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010), the 
concept has travelled in the hands of economists and ecologists and reached policy spheres by 
means of concrete practices (Costanza et al., 1997; Costanza and Daly, 1992; Daily, 1997; de 
Groot, 1992; Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003). Accordingly, mechanisms derived from 
the ES concept - like Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) - have become the flagship of many 
conservation organizations and have been pitched, among other things, as solutions for lack of 
funding and inefficiency (Ferraro and Simpson, 2002; Postel and Thompson, 2005). 
While, on the one hand, PES schemes have been positioned as an alternative solution for 
conservation, on the other hand, increasing criticism ranging from the very conceptual roots 
of ES to the social and environmental trade-offs found in practice has paralleled the increasing 
trend of implementation of PES projects (Dempsey and Robertson, 2012; Kosoy and Corbera, 
2010; Kull et al., 2015; Muradian et al., 2010; Norgaard, 2010; Peterson et al., 2010). The 
criticism rests in part on the observation that many PES schemes are based on untested 
assumptions, e.g. related to the role of vegetation on hydrological services (Lele, 2009; 
Ponette-González et al., 2014), and have critical information gaps, such as baseline data and 
definition of the target ecosystem service (Carpenter et al., 2009; Martin-Ortega et al., 2013; 
Naeem et al., 2015; Ojea and Martin-Ortega, 2015). PES projects have also been criticized for 
a lack of robust monitoring and evaluation processes (Echavarria et al., 2004; Muradian et al., 
2010; Porras et al., 2008; Postel and Thompson, 2005). 
In sum, there are considerable uncertainties in demonstrating the environmental benefits of 
PES promised on paper. Uncertainty is here understood as  “any deviation from the 
unachievable ideal of completely deterministic knowledge of the relevant system” (Walker et 
al. 2003, p.5). If, as a consequence, environmental benefits fall short of expectations or are not 
even detected, then this puts under risk the trusting relationships among the actors built to 
support the PES schemes, the reputations of the organizations involved, and the long term 
conservation efforts (Fisher and Brown, 2014; Muradian et al., 2010). 
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To some, the solution to uncertainty is straightforward: More scientific research (Kaimowitz, 
2005; Kosoy et al., 2007; Naeem et al., 2015). Accordingly, Naeem et al. (2015) have written a 
set of guidelines to “get the science right” in PES schemes; baseline data to document initial 
conditions and a monitoring system are among its fundamental principles. However, 
uncertainty will not disappear with more science, and we might even create uncertainty as we 
discover new limits to our knowledge or leave whole research strands unexamined by focusing 
narrowly on the “right science” (Brown, 2010; Gross, 2010; Wynne, 1992). The transaction 
costs of “getting the science right” may also prove prohibitive for a scheme to work properly 
(Muradian et al., 2010; Wunder, 2008). 
PES schemes will thus have to "live with uncertainty", and a thorough evaluation and 
communication of uncertainty seems mandatory. With this paper we take a step towards these 
goals with respect to water related PES by inventorying the sources and types of uncertainty 
according to three fundamental uncertainty factors (Norgaard 2010, Muradian et al. 2010, 
Barnaud & Antona 2014): (a) the complexity of human-environment systems (HES); (b) the 
limits of knowledge about these systems; and (c) practical constraints, such as the high cost of 
measuring and monitoring system variables. We thereby complement the existing political 
economy/political ecology critiques of ES governance by bringing in literature on uncertainty 
in Hydrology and more general ignorance studies, and draw on a case study in Colombia to 
illustrate our points. 
The article proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses how HES complexity may preclude evidence 
of environmental benefits of PES; section 3 reviews the limits of available scientific knowledge 
regarding the links between land cover and hydrological services, and explores the sources of 
uncertainty in knowledge production itself; section 4 details several practical constraints of PES 
schemes; section 5 presents the illustrative case study; and in section 6 and 7 we discuss the 
previous points and conclude with some propositions on how to consider uncertainty in PES 
schemes and the prospects of adaptive approaches. 
3.2 Complexity 
PES schemes are part of complex HES that are composed of a myriad of elements and 
subsystems interacting dynamically and exhibiting non-linear and emergent properties that 
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can only be properly observed and understood when taking into consideration the system as 
a whole (Liu et al., 2007; Ostrom, 2009). HES are constantly evolving through exchanges of 
energy, matter, and information (Liu et al., 2015). They are open, multidimensional, dynamic, 
multi-scalar, spatially distributed, multi-agent, multi-causal, and therefore exhibit conditions 
that are very site-specific (Biggs et al., 2009; Brown, 2010; Liu et al., 2015, 2007; Ostrom, 2009). 
All these features render HES predictions inherently uncertain and make PES schemes, like 
other conservation initiatives, difficult to be designed, implemented and successfully managed 
in practice. 
As HES are open systems, any boundaries established to study and manage HES are artificial. 
Drawing these boundaries is informed by the perceived problems and solutions and will, in 
turn, reinforce these very same problems and solutions (Brown, 2010). Examples of such 
artificial boundaries are the “area of influence” of PES schemes (theoretically, the area in which 
both service users and providers are located), and even economic boundaries like “ES provider” 
and “ES user”. As designing conservation interventions inevitably draws boundaries, schemes 
like PES will always face external influences or surprises due to unexpected system behavior or 
neglected processes.  
HES involve interacting processes in a multidimensional setting. Groundwater flows are 
connected to surface water flows, conditioned by climate inputs and controls in the form of 
precipitation, wind, temperature, and other factors. These flows are mediated by soil 
conditions and land cover, subject to human influence. Land use is a product of social-cultural, 
institutional and economic conditions together with geomorphology and soil characteristics, 
like fertility and porosity. PES schemes may fail if these dimensions are not considered 
together.  
Because HES are multi-scalar, i.e. they are temporally dynamic and spatially distributed (Liu et 
al., 2015, 2007), PES schemes are subject to the timing, frequency, amplitude, and nested 
scales of processes in these systems. It is often difficult to detect and investigate environmental 
changes at the scale of interest (Biggs et al., 2009). For instance, in a watershed context, river 
discharge and its sediment load are products of cumulative processes involving the entire 
watershed as well as the climate system, which means the ES in this case cannot be framed in 
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terms of land units like farms (Barnaud and Antona, 2014). It will be difficult to assess the 
overall impact of conservation if only part of the land owners in a watershed engages in the 
conservation practices. In a voluntary scheme, those land owners whose properties contribute 
most sediment or contaminant loads to the streams might be completely missed. And if 
monitoring is only carried out at the mouth of the main river in the watershed, it is difficult to 
isolate the effect of conservation practices from other human interventions or natural effects 
taking place in the different tributaries.  
As HES are multi-agent systems, different types of individuals, groups and social networks 
interact with each other and change the system through competition, cooperation, 
hierarchies, association, etc. (Barnaud and Antona, 2014). Not accounting for the social 
networks, power relations and conflicts in place can negatively influence PES effectiveness. For 
instance, the conservation practices of farmers may not be effective in guaranteeing water 
quality if local industries, even acting as payers for on-farm schemes, continue to act as a 
source of water pollutants (e.g. Rodriguez-de-Francisco & Budds 2015). In some cases, the 
dichotomy “provider-payer” may create unbalanced power relations, with payers or 
intermediaries defining rules disregarding providers’ standpoints, which may be used for short 
term gains, e.g. political power or green marketing, rather than improving ES.  
As most of the processes occurring in HES are multi-causal and not all the causes are controlled 
by human intervention, it does not make sense to assess causes in isolation (Biggs et al., 2009). 
For instance, high levels of arsenic in water can be a result of geochemical site characteristics 
(Nordstrom, 2002). And certain river basins can produce impressive amounts of sediment 
purely as a result of their geomorphology and precipitation patterns (e.g. Restrepo et al. 2006). 
If causal links are not well understood, especially biophysical processes generating ES (Palmer 
and Filoso, 2009), PES schemes may propose solutions based on processes that are not actually 
under human control and, therefore, end up being considered ineffective and mistrusted 
(Ponette-González et al., 2014). 
The aspects of HES complexity discussed in this section make ES provision extremely site-
specific (Biggs et al., 2009). We now proceed by exploring how the limits of our current 
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understanding of HES and the uncertainties related to knowledge production may affect our 
ability to predict and verify environmental outcomes of PES in particular places.  
3.3 Limits of Knowledge 
3.3.1 PES step-by-step and perceptual models 
A typical PES scheme would be implemented in five major steps usually performed linearly (Fig. 
1): (1) Proposition; (2) Studies; (3) Design; (4) Execution; and (5) Monitoring (Calvache et al., 
2012; Engel et al., 2008; Ruiz-Agudelo et al., 2013; Salzman, 2009; Wunder, 2005). Negotiation, 
Evaluation and Reporting would go alongside steps (1) to (5) and support adjustments needed 
along the way, although frequently in a limited form.  
 
Figure 3-1: Steps and components of implementing a typical PES scheme performed linearly 
with limited feedback through evaluation and adjustments. Source: elaborated by the authors. 
 
The proposition of a PES scheme (Figure 3-1, item 1) frames an environmental issue together 
with the causes of that issue. Hence, from the beginning, there is an idea of the HES in question 
and how it works, a “perceptual model” in the terminology of Beven (2009) or a “mental 
model” as referred to by Ostrom (2005) and others. Proposing a PES scheme also indicates that 
a specific problem-solving mindset is present, since other solutions for the same environmental 
issue could have been proposed instead. The studies conducted to characterize the system in 
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question (Figure 3-1, item 2) are conditioned by this perceptual model, which dictates how and 
with what focus the system should be studied (Brown, 2010). The conservation activities 
proposed for the PES scheme (Figure 3-1, item 3.A) then are equally based on assumptions 
about how the system will behave under new conditions. In sum, the way we understand and 
conceive the HES, i.e. our perceptual model, shapes the way we “see” environmental issues 
and conduct decisions to solve them (Bardwell, 1991). 
Our perceptual model is the product of a particular cultural, political and economic context, 
including the prevalent knowledge about the HES in question or, vice versa, what is not known 
(Krueger et al., 2016; Ostrom, 2005). Hence, some reflection upon the uncertainties of the HES 
will be helpful (not expecting that all of the following questions can be answered directly): 
(a) What do we know? – referring to the current state of knowledge about the system 
(b) What do we not know? –referring to lack of knowledge, unknowns, and scientific 
knowledge gaps; if we can answer this question, then we are in the domain of perceived 
non-knowledge or, as expressed by Gross (2010, p. 9), “acknowledgment of ignorance” 
(c) What do we think we do not need to know? – asking if we consciously leave a 
knowledge gap, called “negative knowledge” by Gross (2010) 
(d) What can be known? – referring to the perceived potential to know and the limits of 
knowledge 
(e) How much time, effort and resources does something require to be known? – referring 
to the practical feasibility of coming to know 
(f) What do we not know that we do not know? – referring to what Gross (2010) calls 
“nescience”, unawareness of unknowns, a pre-condition for total surprise 
The process of learning that is behind any decision-making process, therefore, ideally extends 
in several directions: towards surprises; towards perceived non-knowledge; and towards 
reviewing current knowledge to check for errors not detected previously. We learn when 
surprises turn nescience into new knowledge and perceived non-knowledge (Gross 2010). We 
look at past experiences and take lessons from our previous unawareness. While using current 
knowledge we can also face situations in which what was consciously left unknown (negative 
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knowledge) turns out to be an important part to be taken into account in the future. The limits 
of knowledge that bound the way we perceive HES are a major source of uncertainty in PES 
schemes. 
3.3.2 Scientific knowledge gaps 
Arguably, assumptions connecting conservation practices and desired outcomes in PES 
schemes should be in accordance with available scientific knowledge (Palmer and Filoso, 2009). 
However, current scientific knowledge gaps may prevent some assumptions from being 
validated. Palmer & Filoso (2009, p. 575) argued that the “flurry of interest in ecosystem 
markets supplied by restoration” are “out of step with the science and practice of ecological 
restoration”. In practice, many PES schemes have been implemented without clear causal 
relationships between land use practices and ES (Barnaud and Antona, 2014; Kosoy et al., 2007; 
Lele, 2009; Muradian et al., 2010). Instead, proxies such as “total forest area under protection” 
or “number of trees planted” have been used by practitioners to provide some evidence of 
environmental benefits (Ponette-González et al., 2014; Porras et al., 2008; Quintero et al., 
2009; Wunder, 2005). For instance, it is common to see conservation projects based on the 
assumption that “a tree-dominated land cover will provide similar hydrologic services 
regardless of its structural or ecological properties” (Ponette-González et al. 2014, p. 4). 
Hydrological service provision, however, will depend critically on the hydrological properties 
of the system such as the extent of surface vs. groundwater catchment, hydrogeology, soil 
properties, geomorphology, microclimatology, etc. As Kosoy et al., 2007; Tallis et al., 2008; and 
Wunder, 2007 noted, the lack of demonstrable foundations made many PES schemes – 
especially water-related ones – based more on “faith" than on empirical knowledge. 
Kosoy et al. (2007) compared common perceptions among PES payers regarding the links 
between land cover and hydrological services with the correspondent scientific positions. They 
found a frequent mismatch in the evaluations of forest cover effects on water quantity and 
regulation (when it came to the role of forest cover in water quality the payer and scientist 
positions where more aligned). Beyond this mismatch between public and scientific 
understanding, the science itself is far from settled. For instance, Lele (2009) emphasized the 
knowledge gaps regarding the forest-soil-water link and the related misconceptions behind ES 
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related schemes, like PES. The author referred to lasting controversies in Hydrology regarding 
the effects of land use change on river discharge, floods, dry seasons, erosion, and 
sedimentation as discussed by Bruijnzeel (2004) and Calder (2004). As summarized by 
Montanari et al. (2009, p.1), “Hydrology is a science that is highly uncertain. The main reason 
for this uncertainty is that we still do not know the intrinsic dynamics of many hydrological and 
water quality processes”.   
Under-researched components and processes, controversies over concepts, and clashing 
frameworks may interfere with the contributions science can make to support PES schemes 
and hence must be taken into account. However, not only knowledge gaps as such are 
potential sources of uncertainty, but also the practice of knowledge production itself. 
3.3.3 Knowledge production underpinning PES and uncertainty sources 
Because there is an increasing trend towards supposedly “science-based” projects and policies, 
like PES schemes, it is of extreme importance to consider the constraints of scientific methods 
and the sources of uncertainty inherent in the knowledge production process, e.g. in 
modelling, measurement and data analysis (Figure 3-2). 
 
Figure 3-2: The production of knowledge underpinning PES with related sources and types of 
uncertainty. Perceptual models constrain the way we design data gathering and modelling. 
Several technical sources of uncertainty are present in the process of producing knowledge in 





Knowledge production always involves some sort of modelling and, in general, qualitative 
and/or quantitative data analysis (Figure 3-2). Here we refer to models as any representation 
of human-environment processes; every attempt to describe a system or frame a specific 
problem is, fundamentally, a modelling exercise. The first level of modelling, here called a  
“perceptual model” (Beven, 2009) (Figure 3-2, item i.M), would be a conceptual 
representation, i.e. a qualitative description we create when we try to conceptualize processes. 
At this first level, uncertainty sources relate to framing, perception, understanding and 
reasoning, and, therefore, potential error, non-knowledge, nescience and negative knowledge. 
Our perceptual models are constrained by the previous theoretical frameworks, mindsets or 
beliefs we carry, be they scientific or otherwise (Krueger et al., 2016; Ostrom, 2005). In general, 
there will be multiple ways to model a given system, i.e. there will always be model structural 
uncertainty (Beven, 2005). Model structural uncertainty is modulated in a conscious manner 
through negative knowledge, i.e. what we consider can be left out from the model for the 
purposes of a given study. When we establish the boundaries of our perceptual model we are 
creating uncertainty by actively ignoring parts of the system (Beven, 2009; Brown, 2010). 
At the second level of modelling, in the “formal model” (Figure 3-2, item ii.M), representations 
acquire a more systematized description, leading to mathematical formulations of the 
system/processes under study (Beven, 2009). Of course, not all knowledge production will lead 
to this step – some will remain at the first level of model abstraction, i.M., and others will use 
data types not intended for mathematical processing. Once processes are being represented 
in mathematical terms, however, the formal model can be influenced not only by model 
structural uncertainty, but also by negative knowledge and parameter uncertainty: 
mathematical formulations can constrain what aspects of the system/processes are left in or 
out; and precise values for all system parameters will, in general, be impossible to obtain by 
estimation or measurement. 
The third level of modelling refers to the implementation of the “procedural model” (Figure 
3-2, item iii.M) using computational resources (Beven, 2009). The procedural model can be 
influenced by the previous sources of uncertainty and two additional ones related to data: 
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representational and discretization errors. The first is linked to how representative the data 
used are with respect to the processes of interest. The second is linked to the fact that 
hardware and software have numerical precision limits so that numbers may be truncated 
while performing calculations. In addition, many problems cannot be solved analytically, 
requiring so called numerical methods, the choice of which can strongly influence the final 
results of a model and thus is an important source of uncertainty (Kavetski et al., 2006; Seppelt 
and Richter, 2005). 
3.3.3.2 Measurement and data analysis 
Data uncertainty refers to a set of potential errors affecting the data used to represent the 
processes of interest, either directly or via input into models. Whenever data are used to drive 
or evaluate a procedural model or to test a hypothesis (derived from a perceptual model), 
another chain of analysis will usually be performed (Figure 3-2): data gathering (item i.D), 
processing (item ii.D), analysis (item iii.D), interpretation (item iv.D), and communication (item 
v.D). Any output from a procedural model will also constitute new data and may follow the 
same path. In each of these steps, additional sources of uncertainty matter. 
Data gathering (Figure 3-2, item i.D) will be subject to the uncertainties of the perceptual and 
formal models used to define what and how much data to gather, and where and when to 
obtain it. In addition, data gathering is always subject to measurement error (McMillan et al., 
2012). This error has a variety of components: sampling technique used, transport (e.g. water 
samples, microorganisms), handling (material loss, microbial or other decay, audio recording 
noise, unreadable field notes, and instrument damage), laboratory preparation (e.g. 
contamination of samples), instrument error (intrinsic precision, calibration error, and 
systematic error), and operation (e.g. human mistakes). Precision and sampling design, 
including spatial and temporal coverage, are linked to what is called representational error. 
This source of uncertainty is prevalent, for instance, in gridded spatial data based on the 
interpolation of sample points (Eigenbrod et al., 2010; Heritage et al., 2009; Phillips and Marks, 
1996; Robinson and Metternicht, 2006; Sun et al., 2009), or in water sampling schemes sought 
to represent spatially and temporally aggregated processes (Gentine et al., 2012; Krueger, 
2017; McMillan et al., 2012), or when a survey has a high nonresponse rate (Groves, 2006). 
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Data processing (Figure 3-2, item ii.D) is needed when raw data are in a format that is not 
suitable for analysis or to feed procedural models. Data processing would include conversion 
to different data formats, mixing different data sources, filling data gaps, classifying and 
eliminating outliers, transcribing interviews, coding texts, rearranging numerical data in 
spreadsheets, resampling raster maps, etc. Errors derived from these procedures are of a 
variety of types and a large literature has been devoted to their analysis in different disciplines 
(Biemer, 2010; Hunter et al., 1995; Kim and Ahn, 2009; Lunetta et al., 1991; Teegavarapu and 
Chandramouli, 2005). 
Data analysis (Figure 3-2, item iii.D), in turn, refers to the choices made when using statistical 
procedures and methods to assemble, organize and present the data. Basic statistical metrics 
(e.g. mean and standard deviation), distributions and intervals are used to organize large 
amounts of observations and corresponding uncertainties, and graphics and formal statistical 
tests are used to compare values. The statistical assumptions are a common source of 
uncertainty in this step (Cooper et al., 2014; Zuur et al., 2010). 
Data analysis is followed by data interpretation (Figure 3-2, item iv.D) and communication 
(Figure 3-2, item v.D). Both steps are subject to uncertainty due to flaws in reasoning, cognitive 
bias, and misuse of scientific information, which may include: overgeneralization, unsupported 
claims, oversimplification, deriving causation from correlation, strategically selecting 
information to support arguments, etc. (Brown, 2010). Data communication in particular is 
subject to an additional source of uncertainty, linguistic imprecision (Carey and Burgman, 
2008). 
3.4 Practical Constraints 
The final uncertainty factor we explore in this paper is the practical constraints that may 
prevent environmental outcomes from PES to be proven. Here we refer to specific difficulties 
that may arise while implementing projects in the field. These difficulties permeate every step 
of a PES scheme (Figure 3-1) and may also be one of the drivers of model and data uncertainty 
(Figure 3-2). They are well known by practitioners, although frequently disregarded by 
theorists and decision makers proposing top-down policies. Here we discuss difficulties related 
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to time resources, field accessibility, trained staff, data availability and accessibility, and 
transaction costs. 
PES schemes are time consuming for the intermediaries in charge. Developing ES research for 
the scheme, negotiating with different actors, gaining acceptance in the field, building a 
network of trust, getting funds from payers, installing monitoring instruments, verifying 
contract compliance, and regularly monitoring indicators of PES impacts; all of these tasks 
require a lot of time. How much time is available to perform them effectively depends on the 
commitments made by the intermediaries towards both providers and payers. For instance, 
when a government body or public company is engaged as payer they may pressure 
intermediaries with deadlines to deliver results in order to match the timing of political or 
business processes. Development agencies may also require schemes to be adapted to a set 
of progress indicators to be reported annually. Providers, on the other hand, may demand 
implementation of activities to be in time as agreed on contract. Conservation projects are also 
subject to the difficulties of matching the delivery of expectations with the timing of natural 
processes as the latter might be much slower, e.g. the release of legacy pollutants from the 
system long after inputs have stooped (Powers et al., 2016). 
Accessibility issues in the field may further decrease the chances of providing evidence of 
environmental outcomes of PES. These issues include physical difficulties, e.g. inaccessibility 
due to topography, difficulties in the installation and manipulation of monitoring instruments 
due to river morphology or seasonal floods, instrument damage by natural events, etc. They 
may also include social aspects, e.g. practitioners not being accepted in the field by locals, 
closed communities, presence of armed conflicts, etc. Although not regularly cited as 
obstacles, these issues can make field work unsafe or impede it completely. 
When designing a PES scheme, stakeholders must be aware that it is not only a matter of time 
and funds, but also of having trained technical staff available to keep track of the changes in 
the field and be able to monitor and detect the desired outcomes. Although it may sound 
simple in theory, in practice designing and managing a monitoring system to provide rigorous 
ES data usually require experts and well trained staff.  
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Another common practical constraint is the availability of secondary data managed by 
government bodies, local associations, companies and universities. With the need to prove PES 
outcomes, there is a need for a baseline (Naeem et al., 2015). However, developing countries, 
where most PES projects take place, often do not have enough environmental data to properly 
characterize the initial conditions of the system upon which to detect the effects of the 
conservation practices. As pointed out by Ponette-González et al. (2014, p. 2) for the case of 
water-related ES, “the opportunity to measure water flows often arises simultaneously with 
the opportunity for intervention”. 
In addition to data availability issues, there is the data accessibility issue. Secondary data are 
seldom easily accessible as they may not be organized, or in a proper format, or open for public 
use. Authorities or other data holders might not want to share their data due to conflicts of 
interest. For instance, a water supply company could consider providing data to third parties a 
business risk. A government authority may not want to share data due to a perceived risk to 
sovereignty over natural resources. Local research centers, if they are privately owned, may 
consider that data gathering had a cost for them, and may thus refuse to share data free of 
charge. Lastly, academics may not want to share their data due to publication issues and 
authorship.  
Most of the practical constraints reported here can be translated into different types of 
transaction costs: (a) information search; (b) negotiation; (c) contract enforcement (Dahlman, 
1979). These costs are present in all steps of PES design and implementation (Figure 3-1) (Phan 
et al., 2017; Vatn, 2010); there are costs behind every data gathering effort, every contact 
made, every trust relationship built, every repair of a monitoring instrument (Jack et al., 2008). 
All of these demand time, money and expertise, and they must not be ignored (Muradian et 
al., 2010). However, payers may be willing to pay for conservation practices that can be 
measured and reported, e.g. number of trees planted, but they may not want to pay for 
research and monitoring systems. Monitoring is often the first function to be cut down under 
budget limits (Williams & Brown 2016).  
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3.5 Illustrative Case Study 
In order to illustrate the points made in the previous sections, we explore the case of the Bolo 
River watershed (Valle del Cauca department, Colombia), focusing on conservation practices 
carried out in one of its tributaries, Aguaclara (Pradera and Palmira municipalities). This case 
was one of four cases studied during a 6-months doctoral research stay of the first author in 
Colombia from January to June 2016. The study aimed at understanding how uncertainty 
regarding environmental benefits of water related PES schemes were perceived and assessed 
by PES practitioners. The study was based on key informant interviews, informal interviews, 
questionnaires, non-participant observation, and review of reports and related documents 
from the organizations managing directly and indirectly the scheme (e.g. Calvache et al., 2012; 
Moreno-Padilla, 2016; Munoz Escobar et al., 2013; Uribe et al., 2009). In total, 12 key informant 
interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded for qualitative analysis using NVivo (QSR 
International Pty Ltd.). Fieldwork notes were processed through the same system. Participant 
observation was conducted while following the practitioners in their daily work, during 
hydrological monitoring campaigns and while negotiating with local actors. This study also 
includes information collected during a regional conference of water funds held in Bogotá, 
Colombia, in June 2016. 
Interviewees were approached by the researcher by phone and email upon which the context 
of the doctoral project in which the collected information would be used was introduced. Most 
interviews were undertaken face-to-face, a few used teleconferencing. Questions started with 
topics related to the origins of the scheme; the main actors involved in the initial design and 
their motivations; and the status of the scheme in number of providers, activities performed, 
and total area committed for conservation so far. Subsequent questions were focused on the 
assessment of the effectiveness of the scheme and related methods. Topics such as practical 
constraints in the field and institutional problems were covered. 
3.5.1 Description of the Bolo River watershed case 
Public-private partnerships aiming at the protection of water resources through conservation 
practices became common in Colombia in the early 1990s with the creation of water user 
associations in several tributaries of the Cauca River (Echavarria, 2002). Conservation projects 
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carried out by these associations have been regarded in the literature as PES or “PES-like” 
projects (R. L. Goldman et al., 2010; Grima et al., 2016; Munoz Escobar et al., 2013; Rodriguez-
de-Francisco and Budds, 2015): water users from the downstream area of the watersheds, 
mainly sugarcane producers, pay a voluntary fee to fund conservation practices in the upper 
watersheds in order to protect the water resources upon which the downstream users depend. 
The associations are the intermediary entities between the payers and the providers and they 
have established voluntary conservation agreements directly with landowners upstream 
(Munoz Escobar et al., 2013). 
The Bolo River water users association (ASOBOLO) is one of these cases, established in 1993 
with the support of the local environmental authority (Munoz Escobar et al., 2013). Its main 
remit is to improve and maintain water flow regulation, and at the same time avoid sediment 
overloads to water bodies. Funding has been provided by water users, local companies, the 
local environmental authority, non-governmental organizations and international cooperation 
agencies. Engaged landowners receive in-kind payments, e.g. through improvements of the 
farm systems and through materials and resources to implement the conservation activities. 
River fencing, protection of springs, small-scale biodiversity corridors, and agrosilvopastoral 
systems are among the main conservation interventions in upstream areas. 
In 2008, the Colombian sugarcane production sector boosted the creation of a water fund (R. 
L. Goldman et al., 2010) called “Fondo Agua por la Vida y Sostenibilidad” (FAVS) aimed at 
supporting the ongoing conservation activities by water users associations (Moreno-Padilla, 
2016). The fund was launched in 2009 through a cooperation agreement involving the 
sugarcane production sector, The Nature Conservancy (TNC) as the main promoter of water 
funds (Calvache et al., 2012), two local companies, and 13 local water user associations. FAVS 
provides the funding and technical support, while relying on the water user associations like 
ASOBOLO carrying out the conservation interventions. TNC had an important role in the design 




3.5.2 Challenges in producing evidence of environmental benefits 
When FAVS came into force, ASOBOLO was asked to follow new technical guidelines promoted 
by TNC, e.g. monitoring guidelines (Higgins and Zimmerling, 2013) and hydrological studies to 
define priority areas for conservation. For instance, TNC arranged modelling studies for the 
FAVS watersheds through consultancy with a local research center (Uribe et al., 2009) and 
received funding from USAID in 2010 to design and implement a hydrological monitoring 
system in one of the watersheds. A successful monitoring scheme would allow TNC and 
partners to communicate results to payers, attract new potential funders and support the 
expansion of the water fund model to other regions (Hoyos-Villada et al., 2016). 
The science-based approach encouraged by TNC through the water fund model brought 
funding and technical assistance for the water user association; however it brought new 
challenges too. The hydrological modelling study arrived at ASOBOLO in the form of a report 
indicating the priority areas for ES conservation. It turned out that most of the priority areas 
identified by the report coincided with the higher lands of the watershed which had been 
strongly affected by armed conflicts since the 1990s and were still unsafe for fieldwork due to 
remnants of mistrust among the different actors. It was clear for the association that it was 
impossible to accomplish this prioritization defined solely on biophysical variables. 
The presence of armed conflicts in the region also affected the possibilities for hydrological 
monitoring. Technicians looked for different watersheds to install the monitoring system but 
struggled to find one that was safe enough to work in. Eventually, the Aguaclara watershed 
(tributary of the Bolo River) was chosen. ASOBOLO made it clear that they did not have any 
technical staff available to maintain the sophisticated monitoring system that was going to be 
installed. So FAVS made an agreement with CENICAÑA, the Colombian research center for 
sugarcane production, to get their technical support. Since 2014, CENICAÑA has run the 
monitoring system consisting of several climatological stations, pluviometers, river stations 
with automated water level recorders and suspended solids measurements (Hoyos-Villada et 
al., 2016). The total implementation costs were USD 194,319 and the total annual operating 
costs were USD 46,880 between 2013 and 2014 (Hoyos-Villada et al., 2016). To date, this is the 
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best case of a monitored water related PES scheme in Colombia ever documented. Still, a 
number of technical challenges exist. 
Before the installation of the hydrological monitoring system by TNC, the Bolo River watershed 
had practically no local data on river discharge besides two stations managed by the local 
environmental authority in the lowest part of the watershed. The downstream location of the 
available stations makes them unsuitable for measuring any impact of conservation practices 
implemented along the middle to upper reaches. Climatological data relied on old stations 
from neighboring watersheds, although the high elevation gradient in the Bolo River watershed 
would require local stations to properly capture spatial precipitation variability. No data related 
to groundwater were available in the watershed apart from wells located in the downstream 
part. No extensive soil characterization was available apart from a soil classification map for 
the whole Valle del Cauca department made on a 1:500,000 scale (Uribe et al., 2009). In sum, 
it was practically impossible to establish an adequate baseline of the climatic, hydrologic and 
edaphic conditions prior to the commencement of the PES scheme. 
The Aguaclara monitoring system was intended to be a pairwise watershed study; one 
watershed was taken as the control case while conservation practices were implemented in 
another (Hoyos-Villada et al., 2016). However, there was no way to guarantee that the control 
watershed would remain under any expected land use, since it was not owned by FAVS or its 
associates. Meanwhile, in the other watershed where conservation agreements had been 
made, the CENICAÑA monitoring staff found that external influences could have had an impact 
on their data analysis: an unexpected point contamination by a local chicken slaughterhouse 
happened to interfere with the suspended solids sensor creating odd patterns in recorded 
data; unexpected suspended solids spikes were misinterpreted until the staff found out that a 
local farmer was crossing his cows in the creek every day; flash floods were continuously 
bringing debris and sediments to the gauging station making it impossible to record the water 
level during such events; a local landowner who took part in the project decided to open the 
area he had set aside for conservation to his horses releasing a considerable amount of 
sediments close to the monitoring station. In addition, the strong 2015 El Niño event affected 
several conservation schemes in the region. There was a high percentage of mortality among 
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seedlings and young trees planted and several forest patches set aside for recovery were taking 
much more time than expected to regain strength. 
3.5.3 Uncertainty sources in the Bolo River watershed case 
For more than 20 years, ASOBOLO has worked in the Bolo River watershed based on trust and 
reputation built over time. Landowners upstream were engaged largely thanks to the 
environmental awareness created during those two decades. The payers, in turn, demanded a 
report with indicators related to the activities performed with their money, like total number 
of trees planted, total area under recovery, and so on. Most of them were not expecting 
concrete numbers related to the effects of those activities on river discharge, sediment load, 
nutrient concentration, etc. However, evidence of ES improvement became important with 
the implementation of the water fund model, and uncertainties suddenly started to play a 
bigger role. 
As described previously, the Bolo River watershed did not have enough environmental data to 
characterize its hydrological and ES baseline (non-knowledge), a common case in many Latin-
American watersheds. Without this information, it is hard to describe the initial conditions of 
the biophysical system with confidence and to calibrate a model capable of representing its 
behavior (leading to model structural/parameter uncertainty). Local information on specific 
vegetation-soil-water dynamics is not available, and neither are studies of these dynamics 
under varied land cover/land use categories or vegetation types/stages of recovery (parameter 
uncertainty). Effects of land use change on hydrology are usually extremely site-specific and 
general assumptions can be misleading (non-knowledge/knowledge error) (Bruijnzeel, 2004; 
Calder, 2002; Porras et al., 2008).  Therefore, without local data it is difficult to predict to which 
extent farm conservation practices or forest recovery would affect water flow during dry and 
wet seasons, and sediment transport and loads. Even with this information at hand, it would 
still be difficult to extrapolate point information to the entire watershed (representational 
error). Land use and cover maps, regularly used in models for ES valuation, are known to have 
significant  representational and discretization errors (Dong et al., 2015). 
In addition to data issues, defining conservation priority areas solely by biophysical factors and 
disregarding social ones may lead to irrelevant results. In the presented case, as social 
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conditions were not integrated in the prioritization model, it turned out impossible to target 
the indicated areas due to the presence of armed conflicts (negative knowledge). Social factors 
also influence many other aspects of a PES scheme, for instance: social norms behind farm 
lease, tenure and irregular occupation trends influence the degree of engagement of actors 
(leading to high transaction costs of negotiation); lack of trust and confidence among actors 
due to the armed conflict legacy may constrain field studies (model structural uncertainty); 
local behavioral patterns influence the risk of having monitoring equipment stolen or damaged 
(leading to measurement errors).  
The influence of external variables on the PES scheme (consequence of an open system) in the 
form of omitted processes is associated with nescience or non-knowledge that may lead to 
several measurement errors, e.g.: the El Niño influence on the rate of mortality of planted 
trees; non-compliance by landowners and its effect on monitoring signals; intense rainstorms 
generating floods that damage monitoring equipment; unexpected influence of chicken tissue 
contamination on the sediment sensor. 
Lastly, uncertainty in the administrative domain, including legal and financial uncertainty, is a 
common practical constraint associated with high transaction costs. In this case, by being a 
voluntary initiative with budgets calculated on an annual basis, it has been unfeasible for the 
association to offer continuous payment and even pay farmers proportionally to their 
opportunity cost. The same uncertain financial future did not allow the association to afford 
the sophisticated monitoring system or to pay the technical staff to manage it. The possibility 
of implementing one in Aguaclara watershed only became reality through a development 
agency grant and the partnership with TNC and local research centers, which are favorable 
conditions not found in most other cases. 
3.6 Propositions for Uncertainty Management in PES 
As a conservation mechanism that deals with complex HES and is, at least in theory, subject to 
evidence of “service provision” (Wunder, 2005), PES are highly demanding in terms of data and 
models, and hence vulnerable to the associated uncertainties. Even the “simple yet rigorous” 
scientific principles and guidelines proposed by Naeem et al. (2015) are, in practice, not so 
simple if uncertainty and transaction costs are taken into account. 
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 Specifically, if stakeholders frame their expectation of PES as improvements of ES in terms of 
supposedly “factual numbers”, then uncertainty affecting data gathering, processing, analysis 
and interpretation should be a major concern for PES effectiveness. In practice, procedural 
models, like hydrological and sediment transport models, have been used in PES schemes to 
define where, when, what types of and how much conservation interventions will be needed 
to achieve some environmental outcome (Crossman et al., 2013; Quintero and Estrada, 2006; 
Ruckelshaus et al., 2015; Tallis and Polasky, 2009). If practitioners then expect to achieve the 
numbers provided by the models and manage to convince potential payers based upon them, 
then model uncertainty may compromise the effectiveness of the schemes. 
In order to manage uncertainty, we propose a modification of the typical step-by-step PES 
process (Fig. 1) towards an adaptive management cycle (Haasnoot et al., 2013; Murray and 
Marmorek, 2004; Smith and Porter, 2010; Williams and Brown, 2016) including considerations 
of how to tackle uncertainty issues (Fig. 3). 
 
Figure 3-3: A modification of the typical step-by-step PES management taking into 
consideration uncertainty and adaptation strategies. Step 1 and 2 follow descriptions made for 
Figure 3-1; entering the loop of management, step 3 refers to the design of strategies, 
negotiation and project adaptation stressing the need for greater stakeholder participation; 
steps 4 and 5 emphasize that execution ideally should be done in parallel with monitoring; step 
6 stresses the importance of an assessment of uncertainty sources in a transparent way among 
stakeholders; step 7 refers to a general evaluation of the scheme ideally by stakeholders; new 
sources of external data are continuously feeding the loop and should be incorporated to 
update information about the system; step 8 stresses the importance of a co-produced and 




Moving from a linear model of a typical PES (Figure 3-1) to an adaptive version (Figure 3-3) 
requires stakeholders to be committed to a transparent and participatory process. In this 
adaptive model, tackling the environmental issue at hand is recognized as a loop that is 
continuously permeable to new information and surprises shared among the stakeholders. 
Whenever possible, there is an explicit assessment of uncertainty sources and an emphasis on 
a collective project evaluation. This adaptive model implies that PES goals and therefore 
contracts can be re-negotiated in a participatory manner according to new knowledge about 
the HES. 
If environmental monitoring is feasible, it should be done in tandem with PES implementation. 
However, relevant knowledge about the HES is produced not only by scientific methods, but 
also by non-scientific knowledge through participation of those who actually live in the area 
under management (Krueger et al., 2012). For instance, there are several explanations for 
environmental events in a watershed that could be easily understood through communication 
with locals instead of obtaining data from sophisticated monitoring equipment. In our 
illustrative case, a local land owner was the one who found out that the turbidity peaks 
observed at the monitoring point was being caused by the cows crossing one of the tributary 
streams every afternoon. Involving the local community in the actual environmental 
monitoring can also increase the sense of participation and ownership of the process which 
could in turn increment the chances of acceptance and long-term survival of the scheme. An 
adaptive approach to PES that accounts for uncertainty through an open dialogue with 
stakeholders and integrates providers’ standpoints, instead of a top-down measure set up 
among only intermediaries and payers, may produce a more legitimate process (Kwayu et al., 
2014; Petheram and Campbell, 2010). 
Taking uncertainty seriously means that expectations of PES schemes should be balanced 
against the costs of monitoring and predicting the outcomes. There is a need to discuss among 
the stakeholders the “value of information” (Williams and Brown, 2016), i.e. how much we gain 
from investment in getting more information about the system under management. In this 
context it is important to recognize that adaptive management would imply other types of 




A potential risk of the uncertainty-inclusive PES management strategy outlined so far is that 
the uncertainties exposed become so large that payers would not be willing to pay for such 
uncertain services anymore. If this is the case, then perhaps uncertainty can be used as an 
opportunity to open up discussion about alternative conservation strategies. However, we 
should not forget that payers may not engage in PES schemes only to see proof of 
environmental benefits, but following other motivations or preferences. For instance, 
companies could engage just to fulfill their corporate socio-environmental policies. Citizens 
acting as payers may participate motivated by a sense of community belonging. Governments 
might engage just to be seen to be “doing something” about environmental issues. 
Nevertheless, in these cases too, being explicit about uncertainty will help to expose alternative 
motivations and lend transparency to the conservation debate in those particular places. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Conceptualizing PES as transactions of “units of service” is unrealistic; the complexities of HES 
defy such simple compartmentalization. Nevertheless, the ES paradigm led to the privileging 
of PES schemes over other conservation strategies, while the considerable uncertainties 
related to demonstrating environmental benefits have been downplayed. But there is no 
escape from uncertainty, with the potential for losses, harm or undesired consequences when 
outcomes are not as expected. In designing PES schemes, we should therefore explicitly 
address uncertainty in order to have a clearer picture of potential ways to progress, cope with 
and adapt to unforeseen circumstances, and eventually ensure the long term viability of the 
conservation projects. However, we must not forget that uncertainty may be used selectively, 
downplayed or amplified in politics to suit vested interests or keep unequal power relations. 
We propose that PES stakeholders should invest time and effort in understanding 
and exchanging knowledge about the complexity of the HES they are dealing with, and make 
uncertainties openly explicit in the process of proposing, bargaining and designing PES 
mechanisms. Arguably, transparent treatment of uncertainty is fundamental to managing 
expectations, build trust among actors and maintain credibility of PES practitioners. If 
recognizing and accounting for uncertainty is to threaten the success of PES schemes, then 
uncertainty can be seen as an opportunity to open up dialogue about alternative ways of 
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The effectiveness of Payments for watershed services (PWS) has been put into question due 
to very scarce evidence of impact so far. There is now a growing international call for impact 
evaluation, and a core component of it has been additionality, for which baselines, monitoring 
and case-control are considered essential. The literature is still poor on empirical studies 
describing the causes behind the lack of evidence of additionality. Here we empirically explore 
and discuss technical and institutional aspects of seven PWS schemes in Colombia and Brazil 
that reflect the efforts made and the constraints faced to assess their impact. We found that 
PWS intermediaries are gradually responding to this increasing demand for impact evaluation. 
Almost all schemes are implementing monitoring systems of varied technical quality. The 
collaborations between intermediaries and local research centres in the monitoring and 
evaluation systems are indicators of this increasing concern. However, in the majority of the 
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schemes studied, no baselines of important environmental variables and no monitoring 
protocols were established at beginning, which is now severely compromising evidence of 
additionality. Assessing additionality as promoted in the literature, i.e. clearly defining 





Environmental conservation has seen the rise and fall of several worldwide conservation 
paradigms. Since the mid-2000s, payments for ecosystem services (PES) became the most 
recent trend and its rise was supported by claims of PES being more effective and efficient than 
previous modes of intervention (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Muradian et al., 2013; Wunder, 2005). 
The efficiency claim is based on the argument that direct payments are less costly and more 
direct towards conservation targets than other conservation strategies (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; 
Ferraro and Simpson, 2002). However, almost two decades of PES projects worldwide calls into 
question their efficiency as well as their effectiveness in delivering the target ecosystem 
services (Boerner et al., 2017; Naeem et al., 2015). 
The call for evidence of effectiveness is relatively new in environmental conservation (Baylis et 
al., 2015; Ferraro, 2009; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006), but has some history in the Public 
Administration sector. Beginning in the 1970s, a trend towards more accountable and efficient 
policies and projects in several fields led to the emergence of “evidence-based policy making” 
(Mceldowney, 1997; Sanderson, 2002). Under this paradigm, the evaluation of the impacts of 
policies and projects is of central importance, including one of its key aspects, additionality, i.e. 
the effect of an intervention against the null hypothesis or counterfactual (Georghiou, 2002). 
In order to assess additionality, baselines are essential (Gillenwater, 2012) along with a 
monitoring system and case-control that are able to capture the changes in the target system 
and the benefits gained through intervention (Naeem et al., 2015). The core idea is to be able 
to establish unequivocal causal links between the observed changes and the intervention, and 
more specifically to be able to differentiate which part of those changes can actually be 
attributed to the intervention and which to other (external) factors (Gertler et al., 2011). 
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Assessing additionality has been a long struggle among those working with Clean Development 
Mechanisms - CDM (Ellis, 2003; Gillenwater, 2012; Schneider, 2009); and more recently also 
among those working with PES schemes in general (Boerner et al., 2017). Particularly in the 
case of water-related PES schemes, here called payments for watershed services (PWS), 
evidence of their impact in terms of water provision and water quality has been very scarce or 
missing completely (Ponette-González et al., 2014; Ina Porras et al., 2013).  
There are many reasons for the lack of impact evidence in the PWS context. The literature on 
PWS has identified several challenges in demonstrating additionality, ranging from the 
complexity of human-environment systems and the related lack of knowledge about these 
systems to the most basic problems of technical capacity, cooperation, and transaction costs 
(Barnaud and Antona, 2014; Boerner et al., 2017; Lima et al., 2017; Muradian et al., 2010; 
Norgaard, 2010; Phan et al., 2017; Vatn, 2010). In addition, many studies have increasingly 
raised awareness of poor monitoring strategies, absence of baseline data and absence of a 
comparable ‘non-intervention’ scenario in most PWS schemes (Carpenter et al., 2009; 
Echavarria et al., 2004; Martin-Ortega et al., 2013; Naeem et al., 2015; Postel and Thompson, 
2005). 
Raising evidence for demonstrating additionality in PWS requires a complex methodological 
design, mainly due to the large number of variables to be considered and the multi-
dimensional scale (both spatial and temporal) of the problem at stake. An additional 
complication is that these interventions deal with the relationship between land use and land 
cover (LULC) and hydrological dynamics (Guswa et al., 2014). The assessment of the impacts 
on such relationship therefore requires the measurement of changes at these two components 
(LULC and hydrologic variables). Since watersheds are complex systems, with high levels of 
spatial and temporal heterogeneity, the assessment of aggregated impacts (at the watershed 
level) depends also on the spatial distribution of measurements points (of water flows and 
quality) and the frequency of data gathering. There are three main dimensions (associated with 
scales) relevant for the assessment of additionality in PWS: (a) the evaluation of compliance at 
the property level; (b) the assessment of land use changes (at the watershed level) and (c) the 
assessment of hydrological features (at the watershed level). The latter two require the 
establishment of control groups. The dimension (c) is the most complex, therefore, technical 
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aspects regarding choice of variables and representativeness of measurements are of strategic 
importance for detecting the expected system changes. 
Although these technical challenges are well discussed, the literature is still poor on empirical 
studies describing the efforts made by practitioners so far, the institutional reasons for these 
efforts, and the constraints found in practice that hinder the evidence of additionality. In this 
paper, we empirically explore and comparatively discuss the technical and institutional aspects 
of seeking to demonstrate additionality in seven PWS schemes in Colombia and Brazil. We 
describe and compare the institutional context of each scheme, along with the status of key 
technical components. We discuss the influence of the political-institutional arrangements on 
the quality of the schemes’ technical design and, therefore, on their potential to demonstrate 
additionality in the long-term. 
4.2 Methods 
This study draws together material from seven PWS schemes in Colombia and Brazil, including 
government and non-government driven initiatives (Table 4-1). In Colombia, four schemes 
were studied: “Agua Somos” (Chisacá and Mugroso river watersheds - tributaries of Tunjuelo 
river; located in Usme, Bogotá D.C.); Asociación de Usuarios de Agua del Río Bolo – “ASOBOLO” 
(Aguaclara river watershed - tributary of Bolo River; located in Pradera and Palmira 
municipalities, Valle del Cauca Department); Compensación por Servicios Ambientales Hidricos 
Cuenca del Río Cali - “CSAH Cali” (Felidia and Pichindé rivers watersheds – tributaries of Cali 
River; located in Cali municipality, Valle del Cauca Department); and “CuencaVerde” (Chico 
river watershed - tributary of Riogrande River; located in Belmira municipality, Antioquia). In 
Brazil, three schemes were studied: “ProdutorES de Água” (Benevente river watershed, located 
in Alfredo Chaves municipality, Espírito Santo state); “Conservador das Águas” (Posses and 
Salto rivers watersheds, Extrema municipality, Minas Gerais state); “Projeto Piloto Produtor de 
Água no PCJ” (Cancã and Moinho rivers watersheds, in the municipalities of Joanópolis and 





Table 4-1: Description of the seven PWS schemes. Literature references, watershed location, actors involved in political mobilization, managers, 
major payers, funding source, year in which conservation interventions started, and number of contracts signed as of the end of the fieldwork 
(only in the referred watershed). 
Scheme, 
Main References 








Funding Source Year 




et al., 2012) 
Chisacá and Mugroso Rivers, 
tributary of Tunjuelo River, 


























Escobar et al., 
2013) 
Aguaclara river, tributary of 
Bolo River, Palmira 
Municipality, Dept. of Valle 





ASOCAÑA, CVC, Syngenta, 














Chico River, tributary of Río 
Grande Reservoir, Belmira 
municipality, Dept of 
Antioquia, Colombia 
TNC, EPM CuencaVerde 
EPM, Medellín 
Municipality, TNC, Coca-
Cola FEMSA, IADB, GEF, 
AMVA, CORNARE, 
Nutresa, Postopon, Grupo 
Argos (2) 
private 









Natural et al., 
2014) 
Felidia and Pinchindé rivers, 
tributaries of Cali River, Cali 
Municipality, Dept. of Valle 





















Posses and Salto Rivers, 
tributaries of Jaguari River, 
Extrema Municipality, 
Minas Gerais, Brazil 
Extrema 








Tax payers through 
municipal fund; Minas 









(as of end of 
2013) 
Projeto Piloto PCJ 
(Padovezi, 2013) 
Moinho River, tributary of 
Atibainha River, Nazaré 
Paulista Municipality; Cancã 
River, tributary of Cachoeira 
River, Joanópolis Municipality, 









Water users through the 
watershed committee, 
GEF 













Benevente River, Alfredo 
Chaves Municipality, 









Water Resources Fund of 








(as of end of 
2014) 
Abbreviations: CVC - Corporación Autónoma Regional del Valle del Cauca; FPN - Fundación Patrimonio Natural; TNC - The Nature Conservancy; 
ASOCAÑA - Asociación de Cultivadores de Caña de Azúcar de Colombia; ASOBOLO – Asociación de Usuarios de las Aguas Superficiales y Subterráneas 
de la Cuenca del Río Bolo; EAAB – Empresa de Acueducto, Alcantarillado y Aseo de Bogotá; SDA - Secretaria Distrital de Ambiente; IADB – Inter-
American Development Bank; EPM – Empresas Públicas de Medellín; GEF – Global Environmental Facility; EMCali – Empresas Municipales de Cali; 
ANA – Agência Nacional de Águas; DSUMA – Departamento de Serviços Urbanos e Meio Ambiente, Prefeitura de Extrema; PCJ – Comitê das Bacias 
dos Rios Piracicaba, Capivari e Jundiaí; UGP – Unidade de Gestão do Projeto PCJ; IEMA – Instituto Estadual de Meio Ambiente e Recursos Hídricos 
do Espírito Santo.  (1) Refers to the year in which activities started in Aguaclara watershed only. ASOBOLO itself was launched in 1993 and started 




4.2.1 Field work 
The study was based on semi-structured interviews, informal interviews, participant 
observation, and literature reviews of reports and related documents from the organizations 
managing and/or supporting the schemes, in addition to scientific papers describing the cases. 
Two field campaigns were conducted in order to collect primary data: July to December 2013 
in Brazil; and January to June 2016 in Colombia. Participant observation was done while 
following intermediaries in the field and while attending a major conference of PWS 
stakeholders involving five of the studied schemes among others (June 13th to 17th 2016, 
Bogotá D.C.).  Interviews were done with PWS managers and technicians working in the field 
(Table 4-2). They were recorded, transcribed and qualitatively analysed through coding.  
Interviews started with questions regarding the reasons why the scheme was created; the main 
actors involved in the initial design; motivations; and the status of the scheme in terms of 
number of providers, activities performed, and total area committed for conservation so far. 
Subsequent questions revolved around the arguments used to engage payers and providers; 
and then focussed on the methods used to assess the scheme’s effectiveness, including 
monitoring systems, case control and baseline data. Questions also touched upon the 
difficulties managers and technicians were facing in engaging providers and payers, overcoming 
institutional problems, obtaining collaboration, and auditing the scheme. 
Here we consider PWS intermediaries as “actors who take on roles that connect and facilitate 
transactions between buyers and sellers” (Huber-Stearns et al., 2013, p. 105). We divided 
intermediaries in two groups in order to clarify their roles: those in charge of political 
mobilization for the adoption of the PWS scheme on the one hand, and managers of the 
scheme on the other hand (Table 4-1). Political mobilization here refers to building momentum, 
motivating and gathering stakeholders, and raising initial funds to design and establish the PWS 
scheme. Managers are those intermediaries in charge of running and managing the scheme, 
performing activities such as marketing, enlisting actors, negotiating, paying, and monitoring. 
In the schemes studied, providers are usually small-scale landowners living in the upstream 






























































































































*Comprising visits to the conservation sites, farms with PWS contracts, authorities’ offices, and 
other stakeholders’ offices. ‡Five of those refer to all schemes under the Water Funds 
Partnership, including Agua Somos, CuencaVerde and ASOBOLO, i.e. the same interviews are 
used to explore each of the three schemes in these five cases. Abbreviations: IEF/MG – Instituto 
Estadual de Florestas de Minas Gerais; CATI – Coordenadoria de Assistência Técnica Integral; 
SEAMA – Secretaria de Estado de Meio Ambiente e Recursos Hídricos do Espírito Santo;  
INCAPER – Instituto Capixaba de Pesquisa, Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural; IDAF – Instituto 





Table 4-3: Target ES, activities performed in the field, type of payment and payments for each PES scheme in the specified watershed (these 




Target ES Conservation interventions Types of Transfer 







Water quality and provision, 
sediment retention 
River fencing, tree planting, cattle 
rotational grazing systems 
Energy saving wood stoves, cattle drinking fountains, 
materials for fences, seedlings 
 Labour for fencing; no 
disturbance in forest 





Water flow regulation, 
sediment retention, water 
provision 
River fencing, spring protection, 
tree planting, forest protection, 
farm septic tanks, biodigesters, 
agrosilvopastoral systems, cattle 
rotational grazing systems, live 
fences and conservation strips 
Material for fences, seedlings, septic tanks, 
biodigesters, financial support for implementing forest 
reserves, community vegetable gardens, fruit trees, 
environmental education in schools, capacity building 
with local associations, technical assistance, farm 
mapping 
 Labour for fencing; no 
disturbance in forest 
recovery area; maintenance 
of conservation strips and 





River fencing, forest protection, 
spring protection, forest 
restoration, tree planting, farm 
septic tanks, live fences 
Cattle drinking fountains, materials for fences, bridges 
for cattle, seedlings, ‘wood banks’ for fuel, energy 
saving wood stoves, domestic sewage treatment 
systems 







Water quality and provision, 
sediment retention 
River fencing, forest protection, 
spring protection, conservation 
strips, live fences 
Cash, materials for fences, seedlings, technical 
assistance, biodigesters, farm mapping, fruit trees, 
‘protein banks’ for cattle  





1,200&   
Salto 
4,500& 
 Water quality, biodiversity 
conservation, CO2 uptake 
Forest protection, vegetation 
recovery, conservation barriers and 
terraces, biodigesters for waste and 
water supply tanks 
Cash, labour and material for fences, seedlings planting 
and plant maintenance 








Improved water yield and 
controlled diffusive 
pollution from agriculture 
Forest protection, vegetation 
recovery, conservation barriers 
Cash, labour and material for fences, seedlings planting 
and plant maintenance 
No disturbance in forest 





Water quality and provision, 
biodiversity, soil erosion 
reduction, CO2 uptake 
Forest protection Cash 




Sources: *Calculated from digital elevation map, upstream Chisacá reservoir; ‡Calculated from 
digital elevation map, upstream confluence with El Hato stream; †Calculated based on 
watershed shapefile provided by CENICAÑA; §Fondo Patrimonio Natural et al., 2014; &(Pereira, 
2013); #(Padovezi, 2013); @(Instituto Estadual de Meio Ambiente do Espírito Santo, 2014)
 
 
4.2.2 Brief description of case studies 
Agua Somos is a private-public partnership for conservation launched in 2008 in Bogotá 
(Goldman-Benner et al., 2012). It is a “water fund”– a water-related PES based on trust funds 
widely promoted by the NGO “The Nature Conservancy” (TNC) and its partners (Bremer et al., 
2016a; Calvache et al., 2012; R. L. Goldman et al., 2010). Agua Somos was established through 
a cooperation agreement among TNC, the local water supply company (Empresa de 
Acueductos y Alcantarillado de Bogota – EAAB), Bavaria Foundation, the National Parks 
Authority (PNNC), and the NGO Fundación Patrimonio Natural (FPN). The goal of Agua Somos 
is to protect and manage the watersheds that feed the water supply system of Bogota (Agua 
Somos and Alianza Latinoamericana de Fondos de Agua, 2014), focusing specifically on 
watersheds connected to the two major páramos in the region: Sumapaz and Chingaza. Agua 
Somos is managed by FPN and technically supported by TNC. 
ASOBOLO is a water user association (WUA) concerned with the conservation of water 
resources and irrigation management among sugarcane producers of the Bolo River 
watershed, Valle del Cauca Department, Colombia (Echavarria, 2002; Lima et al., 2017; Munoz 
Escobar et al., 2013). ASOBOLO works as the intermediary entity between payers and 
providers. Voluntary conservation agreements have been made with the landowners in the 
upper watersheds in order to protect springs and creeks. Water users from the downstream 
area pay a voluntary fee to fund the conservation practices (Munoz Escobar et al., 2013). 
ASOBOLO was established in 1993 and has been supported by the local environmental 
authority (CVC) ever since. It also receives funds and technical support from local companies, 
NGOs and international cooperation schemes, such as the Latin-American Alliance for Water 
Funds (Lima et al., 2017). Since 2009, ASOBOLO has been associated with the water fund 
“Fondo Agua por la Vida y Sostenibilidad” (FAVS) (Moreno-Padilla, 2016). The scheme has the 
technical support of the local sugarcane research centre (Centro para la Investigación de la 
Caña de Azúcar de Colombia – CENICAÑA) and TNC. 
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CuencaVerde is a private-public partnership following the water fund model, created in 2013 
in Medellín and aiming at promoting conservation in the watersheds that feed the water supply 
system of the city (Bremer et al., 2016a; de la Ossa-Posada and Montoya-Velilla, 2017). It is the 
only water fund case in Colombia that was established as a legal entity with its own 
administrative body, while the other cases are managed by existing organizations, such as 
associations or NGOs. The scheme was initially promoted by the local public services company 
(Empresas Públicas de Medellín – EPM) and TNC. In addition to the two initial actors, the 
partnership now includes the Medellín City Hall, the local environmental authority (CORNARE), 
the metropolitan public authority (Area Metropolitana Valle de Aburrá - AMVA) and five other 
companies (Gómez-Ochoa, 2016). It also receives support from the Latin-American Aliance for 
Water Funds. Since mid-2014, CuencaVerde has been working in watersheds that provide 
water for the city of Medellín. 
CSAH Cali: concerns with potential water shortages led local stakeholders in 2010/2011 to 
design a PES instrument that was locally named “compensation for hydrologic environmental 
services” (CSAH in Spanish) in order to protect the Cali watershed (Fondo Patrimonio Natural 
et al., 2014). Main institutional actors which took part in the process were the regional 
environmental authority (CVC), the environmental bureau of Cali City Hall (DAGMA), Farallones 
de Cali National Park (PNNFC), the local public services company (EMCALI) and the energy 
supply company (EPSA). Design and implementation of the scheme was supported and 
stimulated by FPN through Dutch funding for a 5-year project called "Conservation Incentives". 
A local research centre (Centro para la Investigación en Sistemas Sostenibles de Producción 
Agropecuaria – CIPAV) was engaged in the process as technical support. The group of initial 
stakeholders later invited the representatives of the local community aqueducts to take part 
as the central managers of the scheme (Fondo Patrimonio Natural et al., 2014).  
The project Conservador das Águas originated from a series of previous conservation intents 
dating back to 1996 when a group of municipalities from the South of Minas Gerais State came 
together to implement local actions for water resources protection using federal funding from 
the Ministry of Environment. With accumulated experience from these previous intents and 
with the support from ANA’s "Water Producer" programme, the Conservador das Águas begun 
to be designed (Chiodi, 2015) and was launched in 2005 by the Extrema municipality. It was 
the first law to regulate water-related PES schemes in Brazil. The project is managed by the 
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municipal environmental authority which is in charge of the definition of priority areas, setting 
contracts with farmers, monitoring and implementing interventions (Chiodi, 2015; Zanella et 
al., 2014). The goals of the project are: to increase forest cover; to implement ecological 
corridors; to decrease the level of rural diffuse pollution; and to disseminate the concept of 
integrated management of vegetation, soil and water (Chiodi, 2015). 
Projeto Piloto Produtor de Águas no PCJ: the project was initially proposed by one of the 
technical groups of the PCJ watersheds committee (PCJ stands for the names of the rivers: 
Piracicaba, Capivari and Jundiaí). The project was created in 2006 (Chiodi, 2015). The idea was 
to implement, with certain flexibility, the model design of ANA’s Water Producer programme. 
Three organizations were key actors in the creation of the Projeto Piloto PCJ: TNC, ANA, and 
the Secretary of Environment of the São Paulo state, SMA/SP. Other important actors were 
representatives from the local municipalities of Joanópolis, Nazaré Paulista and Extrema. The 
payment for ES providers is funded with the water user fees and additional funding was 
obtained through different sources, including GEF. TNC also supports the project. The goal of 
this pilot project is to incentivize the rural landowners to support the protection and recovery 
of local springs through cash payments. Interventions are focused on practices aiming at 
protecting forest fragments, restoring forest cover and protecting the soil (Gebara et al., 2012). 
The ProdutorES de Água project was proposed in 2005 by representatives of the Environmental 
Institute of the Espírito Santo state, linked to the local Secretary of the Environment 
(IEMA/SEAMA). It had a strong incentive from two NGOs, Instituto BioAtlântica (Ibio) and TNC. 
While an initial proposal for GEF funding was submitted through the World Bank, another one 
was put in practice sooner with great interest from regional politicians. In 2008 the programme 
was officially launched together with a specific fund for water resources protection, 
FUNDÁGUA, by the Espírito Santo State Law n° 8995 (23/Sept/2008). The programme paid 
farmers with significant forest fragments in their lands with the intention of recognizing and 
rewarding the farmers due to the provision of ES. However, no actual additionality was created 
as the project paid farmers that already preserved good vegetation cover on their properties. 
The project was coordinated by the state environmental agency and ended in 2012 (Chiodi, 
2015; Zanella et al., 2014). Three types of ES were considered: water availability and quality 
maintenance and improvement; biodiversity maintenance and increment; reduction of erosive 
processes; carbon emissions uptake. 
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Table 4-1 and Table 4-3 provide additional details about the actors involved, number of 
contracts, contract conditions, type of transfer, and type of conservation practices. Although 
these schemes may be present in other local watersheds, for the purpose of this study we only 
consider the watersheds mentioned in Table 4-1 and Table 4-3. 
 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Current efforts to demonstrate additionality 
Contract Compliance: Contract compliance (CC) implies that landowners maintain the 
conservation interventions undertaken during the projects. CC monitoring emerged as an 
important component in almost all schemes studied. Typical indicators of CC monitoring are 
the frequency of intermediaries’ visits to intervention sites and the quality of mapping the 
interventions. In the Colombian cases, the frequency of visits was at least 1 per month (Table 
4-4). In the Brazilian cases, it varied: Conservador das Águas, every 2 months; Projeto Piloto 
PCJ, twice per year; and ProdutorES de Água, once per year. Six of the seven cases studied 
produced maps of the properties with conservation contracts with scales from 1:4,000 to 
1:2,000 (Table 4-4). Several cases used aerial photography to characterize the LULC at the 
property level before interventions. Whenever aerial photography was not available, the 
intermediaries made use of images obtained from Google Earth combined with GPS 
measurements in the field. The number of feature types mapped varied in each case. Updates 
were usually done by using information collected during field visits. The most important 








of field visits 
for CC 
monitoring 
Conservation intervention map at 
property scale? 
(scale) 
Conservation interventions mapped at 
property scale 
Agua Somos 
1-2 times per 
month 
No, only a map of properties with 
contracts and priority areas for 





Yes, updated with information from 
field visits 
Riparian buffer area, protected and recovering 





Yes, updated with information from 
field visits 
Riparian buffer area, protected and recovering 
forest patches 
CSAH Cali 
2 times per 
month 
Yes, updated with information from 
field visits 
(1:2,000) 
Riparian buffer area, protected and recovering 
forest patches, agroforestry systems, live 
fences, conservation strips, tree planting, 
biodigesters, silvopastoral systems, springs, 





Yes, updated with information from 
field visits 
(1:2,500) 
Forest, riparian vegetation and other 
protected areas according to Brazilian Forest 
Law, crop and pasture land, water bodies, 
farm facilities, local roads 
Projeto Piloto 
PCJ 
2 times per 
year 
Yes Riparian buffer area 
ProdutorES de 
Água 
Once per year 
Yes, but only forest already present; 
updated with information from 
field visits 
As there was no intervention for ES 
improvement, features that were mapped 
were only forest remnants on each property 




Land Use and Land Cover (LULC): Categorical LULC maps were used by all seven schemes to 
define the watershed LULC baseline conditions (Table 4-5). These maps help compare and 
quantify different classes of land use before and after interventions. In all cases, intermediaries 
used LULC maps from external sources, mostly from government organizations but also from 
non-profit research centres. In three cases, the reported map scale was 1:25,000, while one 
was 1:80,000, and in the remaining cases the intermediaries did not provide this information 
(Table 4-5). The available LULC maps from the external sources commonly referred to a year 
different to the one in which the conservation project started. For example in the ASOBOLO 
case, although interventions started in 2011 in Aguaclara, the available LULC map is from 2005. 
The map was updated with local community members by visual recognition in the field. 
Some of the LULC maps include a differentiation among types of local vegetation, e.g. the one 
used by Agua Somos, while others divided vegetation in stages of recovery, e.g. the one used 
by Projeto Piloto PCJ. Cropland categories were also diverse, with some maps detailing types 
of crop, e.g. the one used by ASOBOLO, and others reporting only one category, such as the 
one used by Conservador das Águas (Table 4-5). The reason for this variability in terms of 
precision of categories relies on the fact that those LULC maps were produced for other 
purposes and, therefore, may not be entirely suitable for the purposes of the PWS schemes. 
The frequency of updates in the LULC map at the watershed scale may indicate how well the 
links between the observed variability in streamflow and water quality with the actual land use 
change can be identified. From the seven cases under study, three cases reported 1 update 
after the baseline map, one case reported a sequence of 3 updates based on field visual 
observation, while two cases did not report any updates. In the PCJ case, in addition to the use 












LULC map categories for the 
watershed 




1:80,000   
Shrub, fragmented forest, 
secondary forest, riparian 
vegetation, reservoir/lake, mixture 
of crop and pasture land, paramo, 







 Natural grassland, coffee, stubble 
field, permanent crop, 
infrastructure, semi-permanent 
crop, transient crop, natural forest, 
planted forest 
1 update in 2016 by visual 







Riparian vegetation, natural dense 
forest, natural fragmented forest 
with shrubs, natural fragmented 
forest with grazed land and crops, 
paramo and subparamo 
vegetation 
Updates in 2015, 2016, 2017 
with aerial images at 





 Mixed forest, urban, pasture, 
summer pasture, deciduous forest, 
agriculture land/row crops, 
agriculture land/close-grown 









Forest, riparian vegetation and 
other protected areas according to 
Brazilian Forest Law, crop and 
pasture land, water bodies 










Agriculture, sparse human 
settlement, bare soil, secondary 
vegetation (two classes), anthropic 
area, reforestation 







Riparian vegetation No updates 
Abbreviations: UNAL – Universidad Nacional de Colombia; CVC - Corporación Autónoma 
Regional del Valle del Cauca; CIPAV – Fundación Centro para la Investigación en Sistemas 
Sostenibles de Producción Agropecuaria; SEAMA/ES – Secretaria de Estado de Meio Ambiente 
e Recursos Hídricos do Espírito Santo; (1) Source: (Vargas et al., 2013). (2) Source: Fondo 




Climate: the studied schemes often rely on climate data, e.g. precipitation, radiation and air 
temperature, produced by local authorities, such as environmental agencies. The advantage of 
these datasets is that they can constitute long-term historic series that allow a better 
understanding of the regional climate patterns. Climate data from these sources are either 
used for describing the environmental conditions of the watershed, e.g. Agua Somos and 
Cuenca Verde, or for hydrologic modelling, e.g. ASOBOLO and CSAH Cali. ProdutorES was the 
only case that did not report the use of climate data. The number and density of climatological 
stations in the project areas varied. Official climate data cover large areas, but are usually 
poorly distributed and scarce, and, therefore, typically insufficient for representing hydrologic 
processes in small watersheds. In addition, the monitoring frequency may not be enough to 
detect meteorological events of local importance, particularly in tropical watersheds where 
storms can be fast but voluminous. In response to these shortcomings, some of the schemes 
started a collaborative effort to install hydroclimatological stations in the watersheds under 
intervention. Some of these stations register all important variables such as radiation, 
precipitation, wind direction and intensity, air pressure, humidity, and air temperature, while 
others may be of a compact type, measuring a reduced set of variables. Pluviometers alone 
are also used. ASOBOLO, for example, now counts 1 complete station installed in the Aguaclara 
watershed, 3 compact climate stations and 8 pluviometers managed by CENICAÑA (Hoyos-
Villada et al., 2016; Lima et al., 2017). In the Conservador das Águas project, 5 pluviometers 
were installed in 2008. 
River discharge: As with climate data, streamflow datasets available from official organizations, 
such as environmental agencies, are usually not in a suitable resolution to characterize local 
processes in a watershed. Therefore, a complementary local monitoring network is often 
needed to observe potential conservation impacts. Among the cases studied, three have 
installed additional instruments for streamflow monitoring: ASOBOLO, Conservador das Águas, 
and Projeto Piloto PCJ; Agua Somos performed river discharge measurements during field 
campaigns (Table 4-6). In the cases of Conservador das Águas and Projeto Piloto PCJ, the 
national water agency (ANA) as a project partner, the state university (USP) and NGOs (e.g. 
TNC) are supporting hydrological monitoring. In the ASOBOLO case, 4 automated water level 
stations were installed at the end of 2013. They also use data from one station managed by 
CVC. The Projeto Piloto PCJ installed 6 monitoring points in 2014 and 11 other points were part 
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of field campaigns for discharge measurements. Stations were installed in the form of 
cemented weirs that allow more precise measurements compared to natural cross-sections. 
Agua Somos hired consultants to measure point river discharge at 3 points, upstream, 
downstream and close to conservation intervention sites. CuencaVerde did not report river 
discharge data produced by themselves, but is waiting for data delivery from third parties, such 
as the local water supply company. ProdutorES did not report any streamflow monitoring or 
use of secondary data. 
Water quality: All PWS cases reported monitoring of water quality parameters, either through 
external consultancy, e.g. Agua Somos, or through technical collaboration, e.g. ASOBOLO Table 
4-7), or directly by the PWS technicians, e.g. CuencaVerde. The latter developed its own 
monitoring protocol with the support of the local water supply company in order to sample 
water close to the intervention sites; ProdutorES is in charge of its own water quality 
monitoring performed by IEMA/SEAMA. CSAH Cali reported water quality data obtained from 
CVC for baseline and modelling studies, and a monitoring protocol consisting of biologic, 
biophysical, and chemical indicators of water quality. In terms of frequency, the projects 
Conservador das Águas and Projeto Piloto PCJ are the ones with the most frequent 
measurements, the former measuring once per month and the latter every 2 months. In the 
Colombian cases, most of the water quality parameters are measured twice per year. 
Control cases: The literature on impact evaluation has pointed out that in order to assess 
additionality, it is important to exclude potential explanations for the observed changes that 
are not related to the scheme (Boerner et al., 2017; Ferraro, 2009; Gertler et al., 2011; Wunder, 
2005). While assessing conservation strategies in watersheds, hydrologists usually propose 
monitoring a neighbouring catchment without conservation interventions for comparison (e.g. 
Higgins and Zimmerling, 2013). The adoption of this strategy was reported in two of the seven 




Table 4-6: River discharge (RD) baseline and monitoring 
Scheme 
Entity in charge of 
RD monitoring data 
used by the scheme 
RD monitoring method 
Nearest distance from 
monitoring point to 











year of local 
RD 
monitoring 
Quality of the cross section 
of RD monitoring points 
Agua Somos Patrimonio Natural 
 Propeller current 
meter; channel cross 
section 
 Not informed 2 per year 3 Not informed  2016 
Natural river bed with 
coarse and fine sediments 
ASOBOLO CENICAÑA 
Automated stage 
recording; Rating curve 
5 m from property with 
intervention 




Stage recording; Rating 
curve 
Not informed not informed 1 17,000 1982 Not informed 
CSAH Cali CVC 
Automated stage 
recording; Rating curve  
Not informed Daily   2 Not informed 
1946 
and 1969  






Stage recording; Rating 
curve 
 
Not informed Daily  
(a) 7 
 (b) 2 
Not informed 
(a) 2012 to 
2014  
(b) 2008 





recording and Rating 
curve (6 points); 
Propeller current meter 
(11 points) 
 Inside property with 
intervention 
5 min to 1 
hour  
 7 201‡  
2012 to 
2014 
Rectangular cement weir 
ProdutorES de 
Água 
-   - -   -  - -   - -  
Abbreviation: ANA – National Water Agency, Brazil. EESC/USP – Escola de Engenharia de São Carlos/Universidade de São Paulo; WWF – World Wildlife 
Foundation; CPRM – Geological Service of Brazil. * Information obtained from Taffarello et al. (2016, 2013). ‡This refers to the smallest upstream area among 





Table 4-7: Water quality (WQ) monitoring 
Scheme 
Entity in charge of 
WQ monitoring data 
used by the scheme 













Agua Somos Patrimonio Natural 
 TEMP, DO, BOD, COD, pH, EC, TDS, TS, AC, 
TOC, color, TH, PHO, NIT, pesticides, TSS, 
turbidity, COL, TS 
 Inside property 
with intervention 
2 times per year  
3 (as of 
2016)  
2012 (external sources), 
2016 (own source) (1) 
ASOBOLO CENICAÑA 
TEMP, DO, BOD, COD, pH, EC, TDS, TS, TSS, 
TH, AC, PHO, NIT, COL, TSED, NO2-, NO3-, 
turbidity  
5 
Turbidity: every 15 
min. Others: 2 times 
per year 
4 




TEMP, EC, TSS, turbidity, TH, TDS, AC, PHO, 
COD, pH, DO, BOD, NIT, COL 
 Inside property 
with intervention 
2 times per year 
11 





Antonio – EMCALI 
CVC 
 TEMP, EC, TH, TSS, turbidity, AC, colour, PHO, 
COD, pH, DO, BOD, NIT, NO2-, NO3-, NH3, COL, 
Mn+2, Mn+4, Cl-, Na+, Fe+2, Fe+3 
 1000 
Turbidity and TSS: 
monthly. Others: 2 
times per year  
Turbidity: 5 
 Others: 7 
Turbidity: 2010. Others: 
1996 (external sources) (3) 
Conservador 
das Águas 
ANA TEMP, EC, DO, turbidity, pH Unknown Monthly 7 2008 
Projeto Piloto 
PCJ* 
ANA, TNC, WWF, 
EESC/USP 
Turbidity, TEMP, EC, TSS, TDS, PHO, COD, pH, 
DO, BOD, NIT, NO2-, NO3-, NH3, COL 
 Inside property 
with intervention 
Every 2 months 6 2013/2014 (own sources) 
ProdutorES de 
Água 
IEMA/SEAMA Turbidity, EC, pH Unknown Not informed 11 Not informed 
Abbreviations: TEMP – temperature, DO – dissolved oxygen, BOD – biochemical oxygen demand, COD – chemical oxygen demand, DOM – 
dissolved organic matter, TS – total solids, TDS – total dissolved solids, TSS – total suspended solids, TSED – total sedimentable solids, TH – 
total hardness, EC – electrical conductivity, AC – alkalinity, PHO – total phosphorus, NIT – total nitrogen, NO2- –  nitrite, NO3- –nitrate, COL – 
coliforms, Mn+2, Mn+4 – manganese, Cl- – chlorine, Na+ – sodium, Fe+2, Fe+3– iron. 
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* Information obtained from (Taffarello et al., 2016b, 2016c, 2013). The project ended in 2014. 
(1) Patrimonio Natural hired external consultants to evaluate WQ in 2016, however, they 
already had WQ data from a study delivered by UNAL (Universidad Nacional de Colombia) in 
2013 (Vargas et al., 2013), and a report on WQ for Chisacá River in 2014 (Empresa de 
Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá and Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2014). It is not clear 
if the sampling points correspond to those of 2016. Here we consider 2016 as baseline because 
it refers exclusively to sampling made for the evaluation of the scheme near the intervention 
sites. (2) CuencaVerde collected WQ information from previous studies for the area with data 
from 2007, however, monitoring near conservation sites started in 2015 (CuencaVerde, 2015). 
(3)Baseline water quality data are available from the regional environmental authority, CVC, 
Source: (Baena-Álvarez, 2007). 
 
4.3.2 Collaborations for impact evaluation 
Interviewed representatives from all projects, except ProdutorES, declared a significant 
network of technical and scientific collaborations for the assessment of project impacts: with 
environmental authorities for the production of primary data or obtaining secondary data; with 
universities and research centres for research purposes; with NGOs that provide technical 
assistance and funds from international cooperation. Few companies participating as payers 
support impact evaluation directly either by providing environmental data or performing part 
of the monitoring. 
The collaborations with environmental authorities are clear in: (1) Agua Somos obtains GIS data 
from the District Secretary of Environment, SDA, which is one of the scheme’s payers; (2) 
ASOBOLO is supported by the regional environmental authority, CVC, from which they obtain 
a considerable amount of environmental data; (3) CuencaVerde collaborates with two regional 
environmental authorities, CORNARE as an associated member, and CORANTIOQUIA, from 
which they obtain environmental data; (4) CSAH Cali obtains hydroclimatologic and water 
quality data from CVC; (5, 6) Conservador das Águas and Projeto Piloto PCJ get strong 
monitoring support from ANA. 
Several schemes have collaborations with – or commissioned studies from – research centres 
and universities for the production of primary environmental data: (1) Agua Somos obtained 
research studies on biodiversity and ecosystem restoration guidelines from the local public 
university, UNAL (Vargas et al., 2013), and on priority areas for landscape conservation from 
Instituto Humboldt Colombia (2014); (2) ASOBOLO obtained a hydrologic modelling study 
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through TNC from consultancy work done by CIAT (Uribe et al., 2009); ASOBOLO has a strong 
partnership with the private research centre CENICAÑA (Hoyos-Villada et al., 2016; Lima et al., 
2017); (3) CSAH Cali relies on an important partnership with the regional research centre CIPAV 
(Fondo Patrimonio Natural et al., 2014; Fundación CIPAV, 2011; Galindo, 2016), which 
performed several studies on the land use, vegetation cover, biodiversity, water 
microorganisms, and monitoring of contract compliance; (4) Conservador das Águas has a 
partnership for hydroclimatologic research with the state university, USP; (5) Projeto Piloto PCJ 
has collaborations with the state engineering school, EESC/USP. 
In one case, CuencaVerde, a technical collaboration ensued with one of the companies 
belonging to the payers group. A local dairy production cooperative conducted the water 
quality analysis in their private laboratories. Other cases found the technical collaboration with 
payers harder. For instance, none of the Colombian schemes has reported obtaining 
streamflow data from the water supply companies that act as payers in these schemes, 
although water supply companies usually have the most detailed data on streamflow and 
water quality at the local level. Some of them reported that due to “sensitivity issues” related 
to data protection there is a long bureaucratic path to get access to this type of data which so 
far they were unable to follow. 
Three international NGOs have been present in one or more schemes: TNC, Fundación 
Patrimonio Natural, and WWF. Through the Latin American Water Funds Partnership, LAWFP 
(The Nature Conservancy et al., 2017), TNC has been supporting the schemes Agua Somos, 
ASOBOLO, CuencaVerde, Conservador das Águas, and projeto piloto PCJ (Bremer et al., 2016b). 
This support has been in the form of technical assistance to develop monitoring protocols, 
technical exchange and learning among practitioners, and by prospecting funds for monitoring 
systems and technical studies (Bremer et al., 2016c; Higgins and Zimmerling, 2013). The LAWFP 
is connected with American universities and research centers through the Natural Capital 
Project, NatCap (Latin America Conservation Council; The Nature Conservancy, 2015). The 
NatCap team develops models and tools to support the water funds. Fundación Patrimonio 
Natural manages Agua Somos and develops technical studies for the case. Patrimonio Natural 
has also supported CSAH Cali with funding and assistance for technical studies and monitoring 




4.4.1 Institutional factors driving the efforts to demonstrate additionality 
PWS schemes are founded on certain assumptions about the interaction between LULC and 
water resources conditions (Kosoy et al., 2007; Ponette-González et al., 2014; Porras et al., 
2008). These assumptions have been extensively debated among environmental scientists, 
particularly among hydrologists (Alila et al., 2009; Bruijnzeel, 1990, 1989, Calder, 2004, 2002; 
van Dijk et al., 2009). There remains considerable uncertainty about how certain types of 
changes in land use may interfere with water quality and hydrological processes such as 
infiltration, evapotranspiration, runoff, and soil erosion. In addition, limited environmental 
monitoring, a common situation in developing countries (e.g. Porras et al., 2013), makes it 
difficult to establish clear causal links between land use and water resources conditions 
(Barnaud and Antona, 2014; Kosoy et al., 2007; Lele, 2009; Lima et al., 2017; Muradian et al., 
2010). Hence, the call for impact evidence of PWS schemes has intensified in recent years 
(Baylis et al., 2015; Boerner et al., 2017; Carpenter et al., 2009; Naeem et al., 2015). 
The schemes studied here are responding to this increasing demand for impact evaluation and 
institutional settings may partially explain these recent efforts. Almost all schemes are 
gradually implementing monitoring systems and control cases. ProdutorES de Água is an 
exception in that it adopted very little monitoring because the goal was not to improve ES per 
se but rather to reward farmers that had already preserved forest on their land. The 
collaborations between intermediaries and local research centres in the design, 
implementation and testing of monitoring and evaluation systems are indicators of the 
increasing concern with impact evidence. The benefits are mutual; intermediaries gain 
technical-scientific capacity while researchers gain access to empirical case studies. 
No funding was actually directed to impact evaluation when most of the studied schemes were 
set up because priorities were directed to political mobilization, negotiation, and 
implementation of the projects in the early phases. Along with the turn to evidence of 
additionality, however, more funding for assessing the impact of the schemes on the target ES 
has started to emerge. For example, USAID has funded a sophisticated monitoring system 
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installed in the Aguaclara watershed were ASOBOLO works (Hoyos-Villada et al., 2016; Lima et 
al., 2017). 
Another oversight of the early phases of PWS schemes is more detrimental; in the majority of 
the schemes studied here, no baselines of environmental variables (apart from land use and 
cover) and no monitoring protocols were established at beginning of the schemes (as also 
noted by Ponette-González et al., 2014), which is now severely compromising evidence of 
additionality. Our empirical material suggests that PWS proponents and managers begun their 
activities relying merely on assumptions that positively associate forest cover with more water, 
flood regulation, better water quality, and less erosion and sediments (Kosoy et al., 2007; 
Ponette-González et al., 2014). Only in some cases were previous environmental studies 
available from other projects of the stakeholders involved. Younger schemes such as 
CuencaVerde and CSAH Cali, undertook greater efforts to gather secondary information about 
the baseline environmental conditions of the watersheds. In the other Colombian cases, 
ASOBOLO and Agua Somos, this was not an early priority, although it came later incentivized 
by TNC. In the Brazilian cases, too, ES baseline conditions were not assessed.  
All schemes studied emerged from very specific institutional circumstances, responding to 
demands from a diverse set of actors, interests and influences. Several schemes were born in 
a “window of opportunity” opened by large and flash funding available for the PES approach. 
A clear example is the CSAH Cali, in which the Dutch funding, together with a five-year timeline, 
was the main driving force behind the scheme. Another case is the ProdutorES de Água, in 
which a strong interest by local politicians enabled the implementation of the project. This 
project is the only case without emphasis on additionality from the beginning and at the same 
time no dependence on international funding that required impact evaluation. The ProdutorES 
case was born from a mix of local political willingness and technical interest from government 
officials, and hence there was no need to respond to external demands of additionality 
evidence or to conform to certain efficiency indicators.  
Most of the schemes, apart from CSAH Cali, are supported by TNC (either since the beginning 
or later), one of the largest international conservation NGOs. TNC has extensively promoted 
the water fund model and is gaining large acceptance in Latin American countries (Bremer et 
89 
 
al., 2016b; Calvache et al., 2012; Goldman-Benner et al., 2012; R. L. Goldman et al., 2010). 
Other water fund partners are development and cooperation agencies, such as IADB and GEF, 
that have been funding PES schemes worldwide. TNC presents itself as a science-based NGO, 
and promoting monitoring best-practices to demonstrate additionality fits with this agenda. 
The concern with providing evidence in order to keep trust among stakeholders and secure 
payers is frequently mentioned in TNC manuals and reports (Bremer et al., 2016c; Calvache et 
al., 2012; Higgins and Zimmerling, 2013), and monitoring impacts was one of the core topics 
of the latest international conference of the Latin-American Water Funds Partnership held in 
Bogotá in 2016. 
Another important driver for raising  evidence on additionality has been the World Bank, 
funder of a large number of PES schemes worldwide (DNP et al., 2013; Engel et al., 2008; 
Pagiola, 2008; Pagiola et al., 2016, 2013; Pagiola and Arcenas, 2013). The World Bank has 
promoted impact evaluation and demanded it from the projects it supports, not only in the 
conservation sector, but in development programmes as well (Gertler et al., 2011). 
4.4.2 Constraints faced by PWS intermediaries to demonstrate 
additionality 
Despite the favourable context towards impact evaluation of conservation projects with 
increasing international incentives, demonstrating additionality remains fraught with 
uncertainties (Lima et al., 2017). In their quest for impact evidence, intermediaries are 
struggling to adjust their in situ measurements to the spatial scale and frequency that will allow 
detecting the conservation impacts on water resources and exclude other potential 
explanations. With very short hydrologic baseline data, it may take years to understand what 
constitutes natural variability of the hydrological processes of the watershed and what is 
attributable to interventions. Even with the correct technical apparatus for detecting 
hydrologic change, it may take several years to see any substantial effect of conservation 
efforts due to the long residence times of water and pollutants (Lima et al., 2017). Moreover, 
if the land use and land cover dynamics are not characterized for the entire watershed, it will 
be hard to detect conservation impacts in the presence of other confounding factors 
associated with land use on properties that are not part of the PWS agreements. It is also not 
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always possible to find catchments suitable to serve as control cases due to biophysical 
features that are unique among catchments (Beven, 2000). 
The measurement challenge of providing evidence of additionality is exacerbated by a series 
of practical constraints, including lack of funding. Schemes based on voluntary engagement are 
always subject to funding discontinuity (e.g. reported by ASOBOLO, Lima et al., 2017), and this 
may compromise the possibilities of long-term continuous monitoring. In the Colombian cases, 
which are managed by civil associations or NGOs, interviewees reported that companies 
funding their schemes are usually not interested in paying for environmental monitoring or 
research, but rather request the funds to be spent directly on conservation practices. In the 
Brazilian cases, interviewees from the Projeto Piloto PCJ declared that there is no funding for 
technical staff dedicated exclusively to monitoring and impact assessment. The strategy 
applied in this case and in the Conservador das Águas is to establish partnerships with local 
universities and research centres so that researchers and students conduct data 
collection/analysis that is useful for the project.  
Problems with data sharing, even among collaborators, were regularly reported in the 
interviews. Interviewees from the Colombian cases reported what they called “institutional 
jealousy”, meaning that although organizations cooperate, they may compete at the same 
time. For instance, partners may share reports but not the original raw data. In other cases, 
data may be retained until scientific publications are completed in order to prevent 
opportunistic behaviour from alleged competitors (Lima et al., 2017). A case in point are the 
complicated data sharing agreements that the water supply companies in Colombia set up in 
order to share streamflow data. 
Access to official data is particularly problematic in Colombia, where the national law on data 
transparency and access is relatively recent, dating back to 2014 (Colombian Law n. 1712). 
Until recently, data access was difficult for those working with conservation, as reported by 
interviewees. Even with the new law, depending on the source, the application process is 
complicated and the data may take more than a month to arrive. As the regional agencies have 
different performance levels, some have accessible websites that provide data, while others 
have not. Notable exceptions are the national agencies in charge of cartographic data (Instituto 
Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, IGAC) and environmental data (Instituto de Hidrología, 
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Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales, IDEAM) which have accessible online databases. In 
Brazil, data access can be slightly easier. The law on transparency and access to official data 
(Federal Law n. 12527) was launched in 2011 and there is already a well-established online 
platform for data requests with procedures clearly explained. Even before 2011, access to 
hydrologic data was already straight forward; the national water agency has an online platform 
with the updated database of streamflow and river morphology for the entire country. 
Similarly, the agency in charge of national statistics and geographic data (Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística, IBGE) provides updated data online in accessible formats.  
In both countries, baseline data for conservation projects in local watersheds may be the 
greatest challenge. Although there is a large network of streamflow, water quality and 
climatologic stations managed by regional and national agencies, this information is seldom 
collected at the small scales required for providing a baseline for conservation projects (Lima 
et al., 2017). Technicians working in all the schemes studied, apart from ProdutorES which does 
not monitor river discharge, reported having a hard time describing the streamflow dynamics 
prior to the schemes’ operation. In most cases, they needed to rely on regional studies to 
describe the behaviour of the watersheds they were working in by way of down-scaling until 
they had the chance to set their own monitoring system. The errors in down-scaling due to the 
loss of important small-scale heterogeneity are severe. When it comes to the land use and land 
cover baseline for the watersheds, the greatest challenge is not data availability, as several 
remote sensing products are now available for public use at no or reduced cost, but rather 
technical capacity and funding to develop a good GIS database and protocols for image 
processing, classification and comparison. If categorical maps are not standardized in terms of 
categories they may allow ex-ante and ex-post comparison. A lack of knowledge on GIS best 
practices is also very common among conservation initiatives in Latin America and even among 
researchers, leading to disorganized collections of maps without proper metadata information 
that would allow reuse of these data. 
Lack of technical capacity for environmental monitoring is another constraint reported in the 
case studies. While some schemes have technicians from government agencies actively 
engaged, e.g. from ANA in Conservador das Águas and PCJ, or have hired environmental 
professionals, e.g. CuencaVerde, others rely on the support of partners, such as ASOBOLO with 
CENICAÑA and CSAH Cali with CIPAV, and some need to pay external consultancies for punctual 
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monitoring, e.g. Agua Somos. Lack of technical capacity also constrains the quality of the 
products, such as geographic information system (GIS) products. Because it is often hard to 
have a GIS professional hired full-time to support PWS schemes, the intermediaries rely on 
maps produced for other purposes by their partners and, therefore, end up using GIS data and 
products that are neither entirely suitable to represent the geographic features that they need, 
nor completely updated. 
The challenges are many. From the unsettled scientific knowledge about the links between 
land use and water resources (Lele, 2009; Ponette-González et al., 2014), to the practical 
constraints, such as high transaction costs (McCann, 2013), and limited budget and technical 
capacity for monitoring (Lima et al., 2017; Muradian et al., 2010), PWS schemes have a long 
road towards additionality evidence, if they ever get there. 
4.5 Conclusion 
PWS schemes are responding to an increasing international demand for impact evaluation on 
the conservation sector. Almost all schemes explored in this study are gradually implementing 
monitoring systems. The collaborations between intermediaries and local research centres in 
the design, implementation and testing of monitoring and evaluation systems are indicators of 
the increasing concern with impact evidence. However, in the majority of the schemes, no 
baselines of important environmental variables and no monitoring protocols were established 
at beginning, which is now severely compromising evidence of additionality. The measurement 
challenge is exacerbated by a series of practical constraints, including lack of continuous 
funding due to the voluntary character of such schemes. Problems with data sharing, even 
among collaborators are frequent. In Latin America in general, baseline data for conservation 
projects in local watersheds may be the greatest challenge. Assessing additionality as 
promoted in the literature, i.e. clearly defining unequivocal effects of interventions has been 
arguably infeasible in most cases so far. 
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ABSTRACT 
The idea of securing ecosystem service (ES) provision through payments for ecosystem services 
(PES) has been present in practical discourses from intermediaries towards potential payers.  
However, demonstrating that PES can actually achieve the intended goals is a hard task due to 
the complexity and uncertainty that characterize the systems involved. Therefore, it is 
expected that, in face of high uncertainty, payers would leave the projects if effectiveness 
cannot be demonstrated and, therefore, providers would not keep their conservation practices 
if no money remains available. Consequently, it is expected that PES proponents would do their 
best to prove ES delivery. Here we explore these hypotheses in the field using data collected 
from water-related PES schemes in Colombia funded by public-private partnerships. Our 
results show that payers have additional motivations for engaging and most of them would not 
leave the scheme if effectiveness is not demonstrated. Still, they require indicators from 
intermediaries, mostly related to the activities performed. Most of the providers declared that 
they would have engaged in the scheme even without economic incentives because they are 
concerned in protecting water resources for themselves. Intermediaries are the ones mostly 




The Ecosystem Services (ES) concept has gained strong rhetorical power (Kull et al., 2015) and 
are shaping practices among conservationists (Fisher and Brown, 2014). Non-government 
organizations and development agencies are increasingly working with instruments derived 
from the ES approach such as Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes (Ezzine-De-Blas 
et al., 2016; Grima et al., 2016). 
Funding from private and public companies has been strategic for several conservation 
schemes in Latin America. In order to communicate better with the business sector so as to 
attract more funding conservation organizations have been adapting their discourses towards 
a more business-like language with the utilitarian arguments of the ES approach (Fisher and 
Brown, 2014). In doing so, several of them have ended up using business jargons, e.g. 
investment portfolio, business case, performance indicator, return-on-investment (e.g. Boyd 
et al., 2012; Hanson et al., 2012, 2011). They also have been putting strong emphasis on cost 
comparison of conservation strategies versus conventional solutions for the same ends (e.g. 
‘green infrastructure’ versus ‘gray infrastructure’, see Bennett and Ruef, 2016; Calvache et al., 
2012; Postel and Thompson, 2005). Recent debates among practitioners also suggest that ES 
payers are increasingly inclined to adopt performance-based payments creating a need for PES 
impact evidence (Gammie, 2016). The growing use of business-like language on ES approaches 
is frequently supported by the use of predictive numbers related to ES goals derived from 
modelling (e.g. Crossman et al., 2013; Quintero et al., 2009; Ruckelshaus et al., 2015; Tallis and 
Polasky, 2009). 
The idea of securing ES provision is not only strongly present in the literature (e.g. Wunder, 
2005), but also in practical discourses towards potential payers; even though being deeply 
criticized in the literature because of the implied simplification of social-ecological systems 
(Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Muradian et al., 2010; Norgaard, 2010) and the practical difficulty 
to prove service delivery (Carpenter et al., 2009; Lele, 2009; Palmer and Filoso, 2009; Ponette-
González et al., 2014). This way of approaching and practicing conservation implies a control 
over a service being sold which may not actually be secured, especially in the case of water-
related PES schemes (Barnaud and Antona, 2014; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010). So far, incomplete 
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knowledge about the processes behind water-related services together with a lack of 
monitoring best practices in most cases have hindered the evidence of PES impacts (Bohensky 
and Lynam, 2005; Carpenter et al., 2009; Lele, 2009; Norgaard, 2010; Palmer and Filoso, 2009). 
Discourses based strongly on economic aspects disregarding scientific uncertainty underlying 
ES provision can lead to unrealistic expectations from actors involved in these schemes. If 
expectations are not fulfilled those schemes may not endure. Under this perspective, a 
question remains empirically under-explored: will PES schemes survive in the long-term if no 
evidence of their impact on the target ES is achieved? A first hypothesis would be that if 
uncertainty is large, practitioners cannot prove PES effectiveness through impact evidence, 
and payers are only looking for returns in terms of ES, then they would leave the PES scheme. 
This hypothesis is sustained by Wunder (2005, p. 3), “the less realistic the scientific basis of a 
PES scheme, the more exposed it is to the risk of buyers questioning its rationale and 
abandoning payments”. Consequently, assuming that landowners are acting solely as 
“providers” of a service based on a rational and utility-maximizer perspective, they would 
abandon the scheme too as no money is left to pay them. At the same time, PES intermediaries, 
e.g. non-government organizations (NGOs), would lose credibility due to their “unfulfilled 
promises” of ES delivery and would have their reputation at risk (Fisher and Brown, 2014). This 
hypothesis implies that ES monitoring, evaluation and reporting are strongly needed to 
produce the right evidence to keep payers and providers on board (Naeem et al., 2015). 
However, if additional motivations, environmental perceptions and values are in place, then 
the assumptions made in theory regarding expectations from each actor and the importance 
of evidence of ES delivery may be questioned. In fact, recent studies have proposed that 
intrinsic motivations, e.g. a desire to “care for the land” (Méndez-López et al., 2015, p. 695), 
or the “warm-glow effect” (Andreoni, 1990), can play a strong role on conservation schemes 
engagement by land owners (Ezzine-de-blas et al., 2015; Kits et al., 2014; Kosoy et al., 2008; 
Zanella et al., 2014). In the same way, a mixture of motivations, e.g. green marketing or to 
maintain reputational capital, may be in place when corporate leaders decide to invest in 
environmental programs (Babiak and Trendafilova, 2011; Chin et al., 2013; Ditlev-simonsen 
and Midttun, 2011; Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004). Therefore, these schemes may last even 
without evidence of achieved ES goals. 
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In this paper, we explore motivations and expectations of actors involved in PES schemes in 
order to assess the importance of impact evidence in the scheme long-term durability. We 
compare the perspectives of three groups involved in four water-related PES schemes in 
Colombia: intermediaries, landowners (providers), and major donors (payers). We focus our 
questions on whether additional motivations from payers and providers would play a role in 
their engagement and permanence in the scheme; if payers demand evidence of PES impacts 
on ES provision; and if intermediaries feel in the need to provide evidence of achievements of 
ES goals through monitoring and reporting. 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Study sites 
This study was conducted in four water-related PES schemes (here also called payments for 
watershed services - PWS) in Colombia: 
1) “Agua Somos” (Chisacá and Mugroso river watersheds - tributaries of Tunjuelo river; 
located in Usme, Bogotá D.C.); 
2) Asociación de Usuarios de Agua del Río Bolo – “ASOBOLO” (Aguaclara river watershed 
- tributary of Bolo River; located in Pradera and Palmira municipalities, Valle del Cauca 
Department); 
3) Compensación por Servicios Ambientales Hidricos Cuenca del Río Cali - “CSAH Cali” 
(Felidia and Pichindé rivers watersheds – tributaries of Cali River; located in Cali municipality, 
Valle del Cauca Department); 
4) “Cuenca Verde” (Chico river watershed - tributary of Riogrande River; located in 
Belmira municipality, Antioquia) (Figure 1-1). 
We conducted a preliminary fieldwork of two weeks in January 2015, followed by a 6-months 
fieldwork from January to June 2016. The study was based on semi-structured interviews, 
questionnaires, participant observation, and literature review of reports and related 
documents from the organizations managing the schemes. We followed intermediaries in their 
daily work in the field and office, and attended a major conference with the presence of PWS 
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managers and payers from three of the studied schemes (June 13th to 17th, 2016, Bogotá D.C.). 
Interviews and questionnaires were applied to three groups: providers, intermediaries, and 
major payers. Here we consider PWS intermediaries as “actors who take on roles that connect 
and facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers” (Huber-Stearns et al., 2013, p. 105). 
Providers in these schemes are usually small landowners living in the upstream area of the 
watersheds; intermediaries are non-government organizations; and payers are mostly private 
companies, public companies and environmental authorities. 
The PWS conservation activities undertaken in the watersheds through the schemes under 
study started quite recently; from 2011 onwards (Table 5-1). In all four schemes, conservation 
practices are mostly concentrated in river and spring fencing for protection against the cattle 
at the upstream lands (Table 5-2). Some of the initiatives (e.g. by ASOBOLO) also include 
implementation of live fences and agrosilvopastoral systems, cattle rotational grazing, and 
other farm practices to reduce the impact of cattle on the soil of mountainous areas. In order 
to set those practices, the intermediaries establish voluntary conservation agreements with 
each upstream landowner, the providers. The agreements include payments to the providers 
that are usually in-kind, including technical assistance in the farm, materials for the 
conservation practices, and farm infrastructure improvement. Among the studied cases, CSAH 




Table 5-1: Description of the four PWS schemes: literature references, watershed location, 
intermediaries involved, major payers, year in which conservation interventions started, and 





















































of Bolo River, 














































































Table abbreviations: AMVA – Área Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá; ASOCAÑA - Asociación 
de Cultivadores de Caña de Azúcar de Colombia; ASOBOLO – Asociación de Usuarios de las 
Aguas Superficiales y Subterráneas de la Cuenca del Río Bolo; CORNARE – Corporación 
Autónoma Regional de las Cuencas de los Ríos Negro y Nare; CVC - Corporación Autónoma 
Regional del Valle del Cauca; PN - Fundación Patrimonio Natural; EAAB – Empresa de 
Acueducto, Alcantarillado y Aseo de Bogotá; EMCali – Empresas Municipales de Cali; EPM – 
Empresas Públicas de Medellín; TNC - The Nature Conservancy; SDA - Secretaria Distrital de 
Ambiente; *Refers to the year in which activities started in Aguaclara watershed only. 
ASOBOLO itself was launched in 1993 and started working in other regions first. §Those 



























River fencing, tree planting, 
cattle rotational grazing 
systems. 
In-kind 
Energy saving wood stove, 
cattle drinking fountains, 









River fencing, springs 
protection, tree planting, 
forest protection, farm septic 
tanks, agrosilvopastoral 
systems, cattle rotational 
grazing systems, farm live 
fences. 
In-kind 
Material for fences, 
seedlings, septic tanks, 




environmental education in 
schools, capacity building 








River fencing, forest 
protection, springs 
protection, forest restoration, 
tree planting. 
In-kind 
Cattle drinking fountains, 
materials for fences, 
















Cash, materials for fences, 
seedlings, technical 
assistance 
Sources: *Calculated from digital elevation map, upstream Chisacá reservoir; ‡Calculated from 
digital elevation map, upstream confluence with El Hato stream. †CENICAÑA (Centro de 
Investigación de la Caña de Azúcar de Colombia) technical staff – personal communication; 
§Fondo Patrimonio Natural et al., 2014. 
 
5.2.2 Questionnaires and Interviews 
Questionnaires were structured in questions that combined open questions, selection of 
options, ranking, and degree of agreement with some statements (see Appendix I, II and III). 
For questions regarding degree of agreement a Likert scale of 0 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally 
agree) was applied. Providers answered their questionnaires in the field. Intermediaries 
answered their questionnaires either directly in the field or online through an internet link sent 
to their email address after permission requested in person or by phone. Questionnaires for 
major payers were applied in the field during the interviews, through teleconference meetings 
or via email after contact by phone, depending on the availability of the respondents. Semi-
structured interviews followed the same topics of the questionnaires in a more flexible 
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approach in order to capture each group's perspectives, differences, opinions, and 
explanations for their choices. 
The structure of the questionnaires started with a session with general information about the 
respondent and followed topics such as: motivations to participate in the scheme, general 
expectations based on their own roles and perceptions about the functioning of the scheme 
and the environmental changes and/or improvements. In addition, the following topics were 
added according to each respondent group: (1) providers: role of the payment as an incentive 
for entering the scheme; (2) intermediaries: importance of environmental monitoring, 
importance of reporting impact evidence, perception of expectations and demands from 
payers; (3) payers: water-related environmental services of interest, importance of evidence 
of the achievement of the PES goals for the maintenance of the payment, expectations on 
impact monitoring and reporting. The initial interviews with the three groups provided the 
statements used for the agreement questions and the list of motivations of providers and 
payers. After selecting the motivations from the list with the option of adding new ones, these 
two groups ranked up to three their most important motivations. We then analyzed all answers 
in a lumped way. 
 
5.2.3 Characteristics of questionnaires' respondents 
Intermediaries group: 25 individuals answered the intermediaries' questionnaire. The 
questionnaire included intermediaries working not only in the study sites reported here but 
also in additional PES schemes in Colombia. Three respondents were involved in schemes in 
Colombia and in other Latin-American countries as part of an international program. Most of 
the respondents were from NGOs (TNC, PN, and Conservation International - CI). Other 
respondents included: representatives of local water users’ associations (ASOBOLO), 
representatives of other civil associations (Cuenca Verde), researchers and technicians 
belonging to local research centers involved in monitoring PES schemes (CENICAÑA - Centro 
de Investigación de la Caña de Azúcar de Colombia, and CIPAV – Centro para la Investigación 
en Sistemas Sostenibles de producción agropecuaria), and one representative from a regional 
environmental authority (Corporación Autónoma Regional del Valle del Cauca, CVC). Table 1-1 
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summarizes the characteristics of the respondents and their organizations in terms of the roles 
played in the scheme in which they are involved as intermediaries. 
 
Payer’s group: 15 individuals answered the payers' questionnaire. Respondents belonging to 
the payers group were representatives of several types of organizations/firms, including: two 
public water supply companies; private companies from the beverage, sugarcane and dairy 
production sectors, a restaurant, a health clinic, a lawyers firm, an infrastructure company and 
one service company; and one development organization acting as payer. Respondents 
reported both in kind a cash payments (Table 1-2). The following types of payments in cash 
were reported: annual payments (n=6); every 3-6 months (n=3); a one-time payment (n=2); 
punctual payments through projects in the form of contracts with the intermediaries (n=3); no 
payments in cash (n=2). Most of them are users of the water from the watershed that they are 
paying for conservation (Table 1-2). 
 
Providers group: 72 individuals from a total of 149 providers (48%) from the four PES schemes 
answered the providers' questionnaire. The distribution of respondents in the four schemes 
was: 12 respondents out of 25 providers from Agua Somos (48%); 30 respondents out of 56 
providers from ASOBOLO (54%); 18 respondents out of 22 providers from Cuenca Verde (82%); 
12 out of 46 respondents from CSAH Cali (26%) (Table 1-3). Landowners living in farms 
inherited from relatives are the majority of respondents. A small fraction is not owners but 
long-term tenants. Most of the respondents have lived their entire life in the region, some of 
them in the nearby city. They are usually farmers who depend on agricultural production as 
their main income. Cattle ranching is the most common use of land. Table 1-3 summarizes the 
main characteristics of the respondents among providers.  
5.3 Results 
This section presents the results grouped in four core topics: (1) motivations to engage in a PES 
scheme from payers and providers’ perspective; (2) importance of reporting PES impacts from 
the intermediaries and payers’ perspectives; (3) payment upon evidence of PES impacts; (4) 
environmental indicators of interest. 
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5.3.1 Motivations to engage in a PES scheme 
Payers: ES improvement was selected as one of the motivations by all respondents from the 
payers group (n=15) (Table 5-3). The second most selected motivation was corporate socio-
environmental policy (n=12). Following, corporate image/green marketing and improvement 
of private-public relations (e.g. with local communities) were selected by 7 respondents each.  
Table 5-3: Motivations selection and ranking by payers (absolute values, n, followed by 
percentage relative to total of answers). First value column refers to the number of times the 
motivation was selected in the list, including when they did not count among the most 
important ones. The following value columns refer to the number of times the motivation was 







# selected 1st 
total=15 
n (%) 
# selected 2nd 
total=12 
n (%) 
# selected 3rd 
total=11 
n (%) 
A ES improvement 15 (100) 10 (66.7) 3 (25) 0 
B Corporate socio-environmental policy (CSR)* 12 (80) 4 (26.7) 4 (33.3) 1 (9.1) 
C Corporate image, i.e. green marketing 7 (46.7) 0 0 5 (45.5) 
D Improvement of private-public relations 7 (46.7) 0 0 2 (18.2) 
E Part of the fundamental goals of the organization 3 (20) 1 (6.7) 0 0 
F Part of a mitigation process of our production chain 3 (20) 0 2 (16.7) 1 (9.1) 
G Restoration of areas affected by the organization. 2 (13.3) 0 1 (8.3) 0 
H Sustainability index  in stock market 3 (20) 0 0 0 
I Taxes deduction 2 (13.3) 0 1 (8.3) 0 
J Demanded by shareholders 2 (13.3) 0 1 (8.3) 1 (9.1) 
K Environmental compensation required by law 1 (6.7) 0 0 1 (9.1) 
L Environmental investment required by law 1 (6.7) 0 0 0 
M Part of the organization' duties according to the law 1 (6.7) 0 0 0 
N ES was already part of their business tradition 1 (6.7) 0 0 0 
O Facilitate environmental certification 0 0 0 0 
P ES is incorporated in business 0 0 0 0 
*Corporate Socio-environmental Policy here is understood as “context-specific organizational 
actions and policies that take into account stakeholders’ expectations and the triple bottom 
line of economic, social, and environmental performance (Aguinis, 2012, p. 855). 
  
In sequence, payers’ respondents ranked the first, second, and third most important 
motivations for them (Table 5-3). The first most important motivations were: ES improvement 
(n=10), corporate socio-environmental policy (n=4), and ES as part of the goals of the 
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organization (n=1). The second most important motivations were: corporate socio-
environmental policy (n=4), ES improvement (n=3), and impact mitigation (n=2). Restoration 
of areas affected by the organization, taxes deduction and shareholders’ demands were 
selected as second most important motivation by one respondent each. The third most 
important motivations were: corporate image/green marketing (n=5), improvement of private-
public relations (n=2), corporate socio-environmental policy (n=1), mitigation (n=1), 
compensation required by law (n=1), and shareholders’ demand (n=1). 
Although not identified as initial motivations by all respondents, the following items were 
indicated by some of the respondents as non-expected benefits gained after their engagement 
in PES schemes: better private-public relations, better corporate image, tax deductions, 
internal sustainability indicators, sustainability index in stock markets, environmental 
awareness. 
Providers: Providers were asked whether they agree with statements connected to their 
motivations and expectations in participating in the scheme (Table 5-4). When questioned 
whether they agreed that the scheme would greatly improve productivity conditions in their 
farm most of them agreed (item A). Almost all providers agreed that they have been always 
interested in water resources conservation (item B). The following item (Table 5-4, item C) 
aimed at capturing the compared importance between individual benefit (the farm) and 
collective (the environment). In this item, opinions were almost uniformly distributed through 
the scale of agreement. Results from items D and E showed that the majority of providers 
would have participated in similar conservation schemes even without direct economic 
benefits for themselves. 
On the selection of motivations, more than half of respondents pointed to the expectation of 
a beneficial effect of the scheme on the water quality/quantity (Table 5-5, item C). Half of 
respondents indicated a concern with water resources conservation as a motivation for their 
engagement (item A). Almost half of the respondents reported the scheme’s potential for 
improvement of farm’s productivity as one of their motivations (item B). 37% of respondents 
also reported to have been concerned with conservation even before the proposition of the 
scheme (item D). Only 6 among 71 providers (8.6%) reported that one of the motivations to 
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engage was that the economic incentives proposed by the intermediaries caught their 
attention (item K). More common motivations than economic incentive were: enjoying the 
idea of having a protected forest in the farm (item E); shadow provided by trees for the cattle 
(item F); and farm’s aesthetics (item G). Concerns with water resources conservation figured 
out as the first most important motivation for 30% of respondents, while improvement of 
farmers productivity assumed the same position for 25.7%. Expectations with improvement of 
water quality/quantity assumed the second place as most important motivation for 20% and 
third place for 27.5% of respondents (Table 5-5). 
Table 5-4: Summary of providers’ answers to agreement questions. 













   n (%) 
A 
This conservation project will 
improve a lot the productivity 
conditions of my farm. 
71 3 (4.3) 0 11 (15.7) 25 (35.7) 31 (44.3) 
B 
I have always been interested in 
water resources conservation, even 
before this project. 
72 2 (2.8) 0 6 (8.3) 12 (16.7) 52 (72.2) 
C 
Environmental concerns are 
important, but it is more important 
to obtain the benefits of the 
scheme for my farm. 
72 12 (16.7) 8 (11.1) 25 (34.7) 12 (16.7) 15 (20.8) 
D 
I would participate in any 
environmental project, even 
without economic benefits. 
71 1 (1.4) 2 (2.8) 5 (7.0) 21 (29.6) 42 (59.2) 
E 
I would have participated in this 
scheme, even without having 
received any economic incentive for 
that. 
72 1 (1.4) 3 (4.2) 5 (6.9) 25 (34.7) 38 (52.8) 
F 
Detection of the desired effects of 
the scheme on water 
quality/quantity will still require 
some years. 





Table 5-5: Ranking of providers’ motivations. First number column shows the total number of 
times the motivation was included among the three most important ones and percentage 
among respondents. Next number columns report the number of times the motivation was 
ranked as first, second and third most important. 












  n (%) 
A 
... I began to feel concerned with water resources 
conservation 
35 (50.0) 21 (30.0) 11 (15.7) 3 (4.3) 
B 
... I thought the scheme would improve my farm’s 
productivity 
30 (42.9) 18 (25.7) 6 (8.6) 6 (8.7) 
C 
... I thought the scheme would improve water 
quality/quantity 
44 (62.9) 11 (15.7) 14 (20.0) 19 (27.5) 
D 
... I was already concerned with conservation before this 
scheme 
26 (37.1) 8 (11.8) 7 (10.0) 11 (15.9) 
E ... I like the forest and I wanted to have a bit in my farm 20 (28.6) 4 (5.7) 9 (12.9) 7 (10.1) 
F ... With more trees my cattle would have more shadow 14 (20.0) 2 (2.9) 6 (8.6) 6 (8.7) 
G 
... I believed the farm would appear more 
organized/beautiful with the interventions proposed 
11 (15.7) 4 (5.7) 4 (5.7) 3 (4.3) 
H ... I like that others are concerned with our community 13 (18.6) 1 (1.4) 7 (10.0) 5 (7.2) 
I 
... In our community we all are interested in participating 
in environmental projects 
3 (4.3) 1 (1.4) 0 (0) 2 (2.9) 
J ... My neighbors were already in the scheme 4 (5.7) 0 (0) 4 (5.7) 0 (0) 
K ... The economic incentives caught my attention 6 (8,6) 0 (0) 1 (1.4) 5 (7.2) 
L ... Of other non-mentioned motivations 3 (4,3) 0 (0) 1 (1.4) 2 (2.9) 
 
5.3.2 Importance of evidence of PES impacts 
Intermediaries: Intermediaries were asked whether they feel it is important to 
report/communicate PES impacts on water-related ES (e.g. water turbidity reduction, river 
discharge increment, etc.) to payers (Table 5-6). 96% of respondents (n=24) totally agreed that 
it is important, while 4% (n=1) mostly agreed. Following, they were asked whether they feel 
that payers expect them to demonstrate PES impacts on water-related ES. The question did 
not include the expectation over indicators of activities performed (e.g. number of planted 
trees), but only indicators regarding water-related ES. 68% of respondents (n=17) totally 
agreed about the payers expectation, while 24% (n=6) mostly agreed, 4% (n=1) neither agreed 
nor disagreed, and 4% (n=1) mostly disagreed. 
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Following, intermediaries were asked whether they agree that demonstrating PES impacts on 
the target water-related ES was important for the reputation of their organizations (Table 5-6). 
68% of respondents (n=17) totally agreed, 20% (n=5) mostly agreed, while 8% (n=2) neither 
agreed nor disagreed, and 4% (n=1) mostly disagreed. Interviews further confirmed the 
intermediaries’ concerns on proving the effectiveness of their schemes in terms of water-
related ES indicators for the sake of their reputation. However, this was not the only reason 
pointed. Interviewees expressed that they are concerned about demonstrating PES impacts on 
ES also because: (1) they want to keep payers on board, (2) they want to attract more potential 
payers by demonstrating the effectiveness of their schemes, (3) they want to keep good 
relations with the providers who entered the scheme motivated by environmental awareness, 
(4) they feel personally engaged with the cause and want the schemes to be successful. It was 
also observed in the field that NGOs and civil associations employ several technicians and 
managers to work in the PES scheme and lack of funding would mean unemployment for many 
of them. Therefore, evidence of an effective conservation scheme also supports more stable 
working conditions. 
Table 5-6: Summary of intermediaries’ respondents answers to agreement questions. 











   abs (%) 
A 
It is important to communicate PES 
impacts/outcomes to those who are 
supporting and paying this scheme 
25 0 0 0 1 (4.0) 24 (96.0) 
B 
Those who are supporting and 
paying this scheme expect us to 
demonstrate PES impacts 
25 0 1 (4.0) 1 (4.0) 6 (24.0) 17 (68.0) 
C 
Those who are supporting and 
paying this scheme only pay under 
the condition of PES impacts being 
demonstrated 
25 6 (24.0) 2 (8.0) 9 (36.0) 4 (16.0) 4 (16.0) 
D 
I think that demonstrating PES 
impacts is important for the 
reputation of those in charge of the 
schemes 
25 0 1 (4.0) 2 (8.0) 5 (20.0) 17 (68.0) 
E 
PES schemes are too new to be able 
to generate impacts that could be 
detected on water-related ES 




Payers: payers’ respondents were asked how much they agree that their organizations 
required regular reports of environmental indicators monitoring from PES intermediaries 
(Table 5-7, item E). 9 respondents totally agreed (60%), 3 mostly agreed (20%), 1 neither 
agreed nor disagreed, 1 mostly disagreed and 1 totally disagreed. In the same line, respondents 
were asked how much they agree that they only require reports about the activities performed 
by the PES intermediaries but not about the impacts of these activities on the environmental 
services of interest (item F). Most of the respondents disagreed (66.7%), while 26,6% agreed 
and 6.7% (1 respondent) neither agreed nor disagreed. 
Table 5-7: Summary of payers’ answers to agreement questions. 











   n (%) 
A 
We believe that ES will improve 
with the PES scheme 
15 0 0 1 (6.7) 5 (33.3) 9 (60) 
B 
The most important motivation 
for engaging was the 
improvement of environmental 
service 




We only pay under the condition 
of PES impacts being 
demonstrated 
15 6 (40) 2 (13.3) 1 (6.7) 5 (33.3) 1 (6.7) 
D 
If PES impacts on environmental 
services are not proven with the 
time, we would stop paying for 
the scheme 
15 4 (26.7) 2 (13.3) 2 (13.3) 4 (26.7) 3 (20) 
E 
We require reports with 
monitoring results of PES impacts 
on environmental services 
regularly 
15 1 (6.7) 1 (6.7) 1 (6.7) 3 (20) 9 (60) 
F 
We only require reports of 
activities performed, not of PES 
impacts on environmental 
services 




5.3.3 Payment upon evidence of PES impacts 
Intermediaries: intermediaries were asked whether they agree that payers pay (or will keep 
paying) under the condition that PES managers provide proofs of PES impacts on ES (Table 5-7). 
This question raised no clear consensus: 36% of respondents (n=9) neither agreed nor 
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disagreed, while those who mostly or totally disagreed summed 32% (n=8), and the same was 
obtained for those who mostly or totally agreed (32%, n=8). During the interviews, questions 
regarding to this point also raised uncertainty among intermediaries. However, most of them 
expressed that although reporting progress in terms of PES impacts on water-related ES was 
important and required by payers, payers do not appear to be willing to leave the scheme in 
case no proof was delivered. When questioned about potential reasons, several interviewees 
pointed that although payers were interested in the ES, they also engaged in the scheme 
because of other motivations. Table 5-8 presents their opinion about potential motivations 
from payers (separated in two categories only, private and public companies). 
Table 5-8: Perception of intermediaries about the payers’ motivations (restricted here to 
private and public companies) to engage in the water-related PES schemes under study (non-
exclusive motivations). 
Id Intermediaries’ Perceptions of Payers’ Motivations 
Count 
(out of 




A ES improvement 19 76 
B Corporate socio-environmental policy 19 76 
C Corporate image. Green marketing 22 88 
D Improvement of private-public relations 12 48 
K Environmental compensation required by law 14 56 
L Other 1 4 
Public Companies 
A ES improvement 18 72 
B Corporate socio-environmental policy 9 36 
C Corporate image. Green marketing 13 52 
D Improvement of private-public relations 13 52 
K Environmental compensation required by law 10 40 
L Other 6 24 
 
Payers: Payer’s representatives were then asked how much they agree that their payments 
were conditional on evidence of ES improvement to be provided by intermediaries (Table 5-7, 
item C). The question divided respondents; 8 out of 15 respondents disagreed (53.3%) and 6 
of them agreed (40%), while 1 neither agreed nor disagreed. Average value for this question 
was 2.53, indicating a trend towards disagreeing. Following, payers were asked how much they 
agree that their organizations would leave the scheme in case no ES improvement is proven 
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over time (item D). 4 respondents totally disagreed, 2 mostly disagreed, 1 neither agreed nor 
disagreed, 4 mostly agreed, and 3 totally agreed. Average value reached for this answer was 
3.0, indicating that respondents answers balanced towards the agreement value. 
During interviews, payers indicated in their answers that ES improvement is important and is 
the main driver for their engagement. However, most of them have entered the scheme for 
additional reasons, confirming the results obtained with intermediaries. Additional reasons 
reported included better relations with local communities, green marketing, etc. Payers 
expressed that most of them would not stop paying in case ES improvement is not proven. 
Reasons for that included: (a) most of the payers understand that water flows in a watershed 
is a result of complex processes and monitoring is costly; (b) payers invest part of their money 
for environmental compensation and other legal requirements and, therefore, engaging in a 
PES scheme fits those requirements; (c) additional motivations pay-off; (d) big companies are 
somehow used to fund risky investments and PES costs are not large enough to compromise 
their budget.  
For some of the payers’ respondents, not achieving the ES goals was not a major concern: one 
beverage company interviewee expressed that they would keep paying because even without 
getting better water quality, that would not be a big issue for the company because any 
additional cost on water treatment for beverage would be passed to consumers through an 
increase in price. For one water supply company, the PES scheme was part of a whole strategy 
on conservation that was already established in the company’s core functioning. Therefore, 
even if the PES scheme does not achieve the expected outcomes, other internal conservation 
projects would play a role on satisfying environmental concerns. Another respondent from a 
beverage company expressed that although the outcomes of such schemes were highly 
uncertain their company already had environmental concerns as part of their core values. 
Moreover, as in any other investment, companies are used to take risks and deal with uncertain 
situations. 
5.3.4 Environmental indicators of interest 
Payers: payers representatives received a list of potential environmental and social indicators 
and were asked to choose the ones that their organization had required reports from 
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intermediaries. In addition, they had the option of adding new ones to the list. In sequence, 
they were asked to choose the first, second and third most important indicators (Table 5-9). 
All 15 respondents selected the indicators, however just 12 indicated their first, and 9 chose 
their second and third most important ones. The most selected indicators were A to F. While 
indicators A to E refer to the conservation practices performed in the field, F refers to a social 
indicator. None of these five indicators is related to the ES outcomes, i.e. the ES maintenance 
or improvement obtained from the conservation practices. However, when asked about their 
first most important indicator, 33.3% of respondents (n=4) said river discharge increment (item 
H), would be their choice. Area under vegetation protection (item A) follows as first choice for 
25% of respondents (n=3). Area under vegetation protection and sediment load reduction 
(item J) were chosen as second most important motivation by 2 respondents each. Number of 
planted trees (item B) was chosen by 4 respondents (44.4%) as the third most important 
motivation. 
The fact that the most important indicators selected by payers are not related to ES outcomes 
but rather to proxies could be due to three potential explanations drawn from interviews: (i) 
Payers strongly believe in a positive interaction between vegetation protection and water-
related ES maintenance; (ii) payers are more inclined to use those indicators as numbers to 
their annual sustainability reports for their clients, government, shareholders or local 
community; for that matter indirect indicators of conservation, i.e. proxies, would be sufficient; 
(iii) at least part of the payers are aware that ES monitoring is not easy to perform and is 
expensive, therefore, they would rely on proxy indicators as metrics for PES effectiveness. 
As one of the payers from a water supply company reported on an interview: “Impact 
indicators are more important, i.e. those who reflect the benefit of the activities performed, 
however it is not always possible to get them due to information availability issues or the cost 
of getting information. Therefore, we should seek a balance in those terms (Bogotá, June 
2016). ” These results apparently contradict a comment made by one PES manager that said, 
“business men who are investing in those payments schemes expect that scientists could come 
with an equation that would tell them for every dollar spent how much water quality 




Table 5-9: Payers’ selection and ranking of social/environmental indicator of interest. 




# selected 1st 
total=12 
n (%) 
# selected 2nd 
total=9 
n (%) 
# selected 3rd 
total=9 
n (%) 
A Area under vegetation protection 12 (80) 3 (25) 2 (22.2) 1 (11.1) 
B Number of planted trees 12 (80) 1 (8.3) 1 (11.1) 4 (44.4) 
C Area under vegetation recovery 9 (60) 1 (8.3) 1 (11.1) 0 
D Number of water springs protected 8 (53.3) 0 1 (11.1) 1 (11.1) 
F Number of families receiving payments 8 (53.3) 1 (8.3) 1 (11.1) 1 (11.1) 
G Length of protected river margins by fencing 7 (46.7) 0 0 0 
H River discharge increment 7 (46.7) 4 (33.3) 1 (11.1) 0 
I Number of individuals trained 6 (40) 0 0 0 
J Sediment load reduction 5 (33.3) 0 2 (22.2) 0 
K Water turbidity reduction 5 (33.3) 0 0 0 
L Regulated river discharge during dry seasons 5 (33.3) 0 0 1 (11.1) 
M Regulated river discharge during wet seasons 3 (20) 0 0 0 
N Families income increment 3 (20) 0 0 0 
O Nitrogen/Phosphorus concentration reduction 2 (13.3) 1 (8.3) 0 1 (11.1) 
P Fertilizer use reduction 1 (6.7) 0 0 0 
Q Pesticides use reduction 1 (6.7) 0 0 0 
R Physical-chemical parameters of water quality 1 (6.7) 1 (8.3) 0 0 
S Other non-mentioned indicator 1 (6.7) 0 0 0 
  
5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Who is interested in evidence of PES environmental impacts? 
Intermediaries are concerned about getting impact evidence of their schemes on ES for several 
reasons, most of them linked to their wish to keep their modus operandi. Evidence of ES 
improvement or maintenance would support keeping payers on board, attract more payers in 
the long term, sustain conservation jobs, and maintain trust relationships with both payers and 
providers. These concerns are seen on interviews, questionnaires and are similar to those 
found in the practitioners literature (e.g. Bremer et al., 2016; Higgins and Zimmerling, 2013). 
Intermediaries are also clearly concerned about their reputation as PES managers and are 
aware that providing evidence of PES impacts on ES is a central issue on this matter. This result 
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is consistent with the one obtained by Fisher and Brown (2014) regarding the use of the ES 
concept and its derived tools by conservation practitioners. The cases analyzed provide some 
evidence that personal values also play a role on the intermediaries’ concerns with the 
evidence of PES impacts. Most of the interviewed representatives feel personally engaged with 
the local communities in which they work and with the environmental issues, and want the 
schemes to be effective. 
Payers do expect evidence of environmental benefits achieved by the scheme in terms of ES 
and expect intermediaries to perform monitoring and report its results. Answers from both 
payers and intermediaries’ perceptions about payers’ demands pointed to this direction. 
However, when it comes to express the most important indicators for them, payers would 
mostly point to proxy indicators, e.g. total area protected or number of planted trees, instead 
of selecting more indicators linked to the target ES, e.g. decrease of nitrogen and phosphorus 
concentration on water. Potential reasons may include the importance of indicators mostly for 
the sake of corporate sustainability reports in which specific indicators are not needed, or due 
to an assumption that proxy indicators are directly related to the desired ES. 
Providers are also interested in the PES impacts. Questions regarding motivation to engage in 
the scheme were able to capture their interest in the ES itself, instead of solely the payment, 
either in cash or in kind, for performing conservation practices in their properties. Most of 
them pointed water resources conservation as one of the most important motivations and 
declared that they would engage in the scheme even without economic incentives. These 
results contradict the simplistic idea of a “service provider” as proposed in the literature 
(Wunder, 2005) and give clear indication that the so-called providers understand themselves 
as ES beneficiaries too and are willing to cooperate for conservation in case they receive 
technical and material support for that. Other recent studies in Latin-American cases have 
pointed to similar results. Bremer et al. (2014) showed that in Ecuador, landowners were 
motivated to participate in the program for a variety of reasons, including a “high value placed 
on the water provisioning services of the páramo [ecosystem] (Bremer et al. 2014, p. 122).” 
Intrinsic motivations have been also found in parallel with utilitarian arguments among 
landowners in other Latin-American cases. For instance, (Kosoy et al., 2008) found that 
indigenous groups participating in conservation schemes in Mexico had religious reasons in 
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addition to the concerns with the forest provision of benefits. They considered forests as 
"sacred" places, with caves and other sites being used as temples (Kosoy et al., 2008, p. 2080). 
In another study, a desire to “care for the land” was found as one of the main motives for 
participation in PES schemes in Mexico (Méndez-López et al., 2015, p. 695). 
In part, the results found in this study could be a consequence of the discourses held in the 
field by intermediaries while negotiating with landowners. Most of the intermediaries in the 
studied cases do not frame the proposed conservation practices as something that would only 
benefit downstream users but most of them emphasize the benefits that conservation will also 
have for those who live upstream. They argue that protecting water bodies, like springs and 
creeks, is fundamentally important for the providers themselves. During interviews, it became 
clear that providers tend to assume that the conservation practices are good for their own 
sake. Interviewed landowners often argued that "a farm without water has no value". In fact, 
the same water resources are shared and used by all, although distributed unevenly 
throughout the watershed.  
5.4.2 Why those schemes keep working if there is no evidence of 
improvement of the target ES yet? 
Most of respondents from the three groups in all four schemes perceive the lack of evidence 
as a matter of time, because the schemes under study are relatively new and that the 
monitoring process is still incipient, as registered in interviews and questionnaires. They 
understand that the watershed would require more time to respond to the conservation 
practices undertaken. Still, most of the respondents from both providers and payers groups 
showed that they believe the scheme will produce beneficial ES outcomes. This may be 
explained by the presence of the common belief that “more forest leads to more water 
quantity” and better water quality (Kosoy et al. 2007, p. 451) in the discourses from both 
providers and payers, according to the interviews. 
An additional explanation for the perseverance of such schemes relies on the extra benefits it 
brings to actors. It appears that PES fit well into the agenda of several of them, mainly of the 
intermediaries and payers. Intermediaries benefit from this approach due to the central role 
they must play to sustain such a scheme as several tasks involved in the PES design and 
115 
 
implementation are required, such as property rights verification, constant visits to the field, 
and one-by-one negotiation with local farmers (Vatn 2010). As noted by Pham et al. 2010, 
intermediaries also act as information providers, mediators, watchdogs, arbitrators and bridge 
builders, among a series of other functions. Vatn (2010, p. 1247) concludes that “this explains 
why in PES schemes the intermediary is the dominant agent — whether the state, firms or 
NGOs of various kinds. The intermediary defines the good, establishes the group of ‘sellers’ 
and ‘buyers’ and even often set a predefined price.” 
At the same time, the strong presence of the ES approach in the global conservation agenda 
since the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment (MA, 2003) means that more funding through 
international cooperation is available for this type of approach (Fisher and Brown, 2014). In the 
studied cases, CSAH Cali received funds from the government of Netherlands, and the Latin 
American Water Funds Partnership received funds from United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). In particular, 
PES have been recently assuming an important position in the environmental institutional 
configuration in Colombia through several laws and decrees (Rojas-Sanchez, 2014). It has been 
promoted as a national conservation strategy that culminated with the announcement (7th July 
2017) of the new “Payment for Environmental Services Policy” by the Colombian Ministry of 
Environment and the National Department of Planning PES schemes are expected to escalate 
(MINAMBIENTE, 2017). Thus, working with the ES approach could mean more funding available 
for the conservation business and, therefore, more jobs. 
From the payers’ side, although ES improvement was the first motivation to enter the scheme 
for more than half of respondents, additional ones play a strong role. Their participation fulfills 
other demands, e.g. corporate socio-environmental policy, improvement of corporate image, 
better local relations, and legal environmental requirements. These additional payers’ 
motivations were clearly identified by both interviewed intermediaries and payers and could 
explain a potential permanence of payers in the schemes even without evidence of PES impacts 
on the target ES. 
Although the literature on why firms engage in PES schemes as payers is almost non-existent, 
there are several papers discussing the reasons behind the adoption of corporate socio-
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environmental policy (CSR), which respondents pointed as one of the main reasons for the 
adoption of PES. CSR can be understood as “context-specific organizational actions and policies 
that take into account stakeholders’ expectations and the triple bottom line of economic, 
social, and environmental performance (Aguinis 2011, p. 855).” 
Hemingway and Maclagan (2004) discussed the hypothesis of managers’ personal values 
influencing the adoption of CSR practices by their companies. They proposed that cultural 
factors, such as religious beliefs and moral values of managers, could play an important role. 
Vives (2006) presented a survey covering more than a thousand small and medium firms in 
Latin America that had implemented responsible practices of a variety of types. The major 
motivations found by Vives were increment profits, but also religion/ethics, motivating 
workforce, and building relationships. In a survey with corporate leaders, Ditlev-Simonsen & 
Midttun (2011) found that branding and reputation were the primary CSR drivers among 
Norway companies. Babiak & Trendafilova (2011) studied the motives behind the adoption of 
environmental management practices as part of CSR among U.S. sports leagues. They found 
that strategic and legitimacy motives, connected to the need to address institutional pressures 
and social expectations, were among the main drivers of the CSR adoption. Executives also 
associated these choices with increasing chances for financial collaborations with sponsors that 
were interested in environmental issues. Thus, although economic motives exist, social norms 
are also important. Indeed, as pointed by organizational sociology scholars, organizations are 
particularly attentive to what other organizations do when adopting certain practices (Aldrich, 
2007). Firms may experience pressure from organizations upon which they depend, emulate 
other organizations because of their success, or just follow the advice of professional 
associations from their sector (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Exploring the extent to which such 
“institutional isomorphism” applies to PES programs may have implications also for our 
understanding of their endurance.     
5.4.3 Will PES schemes survive in the long-term if there is no evidence of 
the expected environmental outcomes? 
The results indicate that providers from the studied cases are willing to take part on some costs 
to adopt conservation practices, e.g. by setting aside part of their arable land for vegetation 
protection, if there is an incentive for that, i.e. if they are not the only ones to bear the costs. 
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As one interviewee expressed, “I have always been concerned with conservation and I expect 
that with the economic incentives I can dedicate my land to protect water springs without 
affecting my income for that”. As most providers are engaging motivated mainly by water 
resources conservation, if the desired environmental impact is not met in the long term, there 
is a chance that they would drop out from the scheme not because of lack of economic 
incentives, but mostly because their expected benefits in terms of ES were not achieved. Under 
this assumption, evidence of PES environmental outcomes is therefore important not only to 
keep payers on board, but also providers. 
When intermediaries were asked if payers would only pay under the condition of PES impacts 
being demonstrated they showed considerable disagreement with a balanced answer rate 
along the Likert scale. This result is consistent with the one obtained from the payers when 
asked if they would only pay under the condition of PES impacts being demonstrated. When 
asked if they would stop paying in case the ES improvement is not achieved with the time, 
payers again showed disagreement, with answers relatively balanced along the scale. Potential 
reasons for the disagreement can be that while improvement of ES remains the most 
important motivation for them to engage in this type of scheme, still the additional motivations 
they have play an important role in their decisions as previously discussed. 
Although the answer for the proposed question remains dependent on additional empirical 
research, the present study demonstrates that several motivations are behind the engagement 
of providers, intermediaries and payers in PES schemes. The perceived additional benefits the 
actors have while participating in such schemes may partly explain the future long-term 
maintenance of this conservation approach even under lack of evidence of their impacts.  
5.4.4 Limitations of this study 
We believe the results presented here can shed some light into the issue of the long-term 
durability of PES schemes; however, it is worth mentioning that the scope of this study is 
limited to the four cases presented and, therefore, more research would be needed to test 
similar hypotheses in the field. In addition, the low response rate obtained among payers is of 
some concern, as in the studied cases they are usually managers of large organizations and 
have a limited time for interviews or questionnaires. However, several firms that responded 
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the questionnaire are among the largest ones in Colombia and their funding for conservation 
is expressive. A second concern refers to the accessibility to the field in this type of scheme. As 
intermediaries are the ones who know exactly who the schemes’ providers are and where they 
live, it is very hard to perform interviews and questionnaires without the presence of at least 
one manager or technician belonging to the intermediaries group. We believe that in occasions 
in which is not possible to avoid their presence while interviewing, answers from providers may 
be partially biased as some of them would be concerned with not threatening the trust 
relationship developed with the intermediaries. Whenever it was possible, questionnaires 
were conducted without the practitioners presence, and double-check of answers was 
performed through interviews. Finally, we are aware that the use of Likert Scale can introduce 
biases to the answers; in order to address this, we built questionnaires based on preliminary 
interviews and additional interviews were undertaken in order to confirm first answers or to 
receive explanations on the choices made. 
5.5 Conclusion 
There is not a straightforward answer for whether PES schemes will survive in the long term in 
the absence of evidence of their environmental benefits. What it is clear is that the lack of 
evidence has been already a matter of criticism from the scientific community and a matter of 
concern among PES intermediaries. In this paper we explored four water-related PES schemes 
in which became clear that the evidence of environmental outcomes is important not only for 
those who pay for the schemes but also for intermediaries and the so-called providers. 
However, as PES schemes have important indirect benefits, mainly for the intermediaries and 
payers, there is a chance that those schemes will survive the lack of effectiveness evidence in 
the long-term if that depends solely on these groups’ wishes. However, as providers 
understand themselves also as ES beneficiaries, the lack of evidence of expected PES 
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6 Synthesis and Conclusion 
6.1 Overview 
After two decades of PES implementation worldwide, doubts have been raised about their 
effectiveness, particularly in the case of payments for watershed services (PWS). The 
assessment of effectiveness is justified given the large amounts of money that governments, 
particularly those from developing countries, have invested in the schemes.. Such assessment, 
however, faces substantive barriers. 
In this dissertation, I have explored the role of uncertainty in the assessment of the 
effectiveness of PWS. Specifically, I have focused on three aspects: (a) the sources and types 
of uncertainties in these schemes that may hinder the feasibility of demonstrating 
effectiveness; (b) the current efforts and practical constraints to produce the evidence of PWS 
impact on target ES; and (c) the role of impact evidence on the enduring participation of 
providers and payers in the schemes and the long term durability of the schemes. To address 
these points, I have applied an interdisciplinary approach focusing on the science-policy 
interface of PWS schemes, and combining disciplinary elements from Ignorance studies, 
Hydrology, Institutional and Ecological Economics, and Public Policy.  
From Ignorance Studies, I have reviewed the literature on uncertainty and knowledge gaps in 
the conservation policy decision-making process. From Hydrology, I have reviewed the core 
literature on land and water interactions, with a focus on the impact of land use/cover on key 
hydrological processes such as runoff, infiltration, erosion, sedimentation and those related to 
water quality. The expertise gained though the revision of ignorance and hydrology scholarship 
allowed me to carry a critical assessment of the uncertainty behind a number of hydrological 
processes that are frequently taken for granted in PWS schemes (Chapter 3). 
From Public Policy scholarship, I used the literature on policy evaluation, which has a relatively 
long tradition in the study of impact evaluation, and evidence-based decision making. 
Specifically, I explored the concepts of additionality, counterfactual evidence, monitoring, 
case-control and baseline, and applied them to analyze the current status of seven PWS 
schemes in Colombia and Brazil regarding the efforts to produce evidence of additionality. Also 
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building on the knowledge gained from hydrology scholarship, I described the characteristics 
of the land use, contract compliance, and hydro-climatological monitoring practices currently 
undertaken by intermediaries in the seven cases and the efforts made and challenges faced to 
obtain baseline data and to set up control catchments (Chapter 4). 
From Institutional and Ecological Economics, I explored key concepts from the literature on 
environmental governance, incentive-based policy tools, transaction costs, intrinsic versus 
extrinsic motivation for conservation, and corporate social responsibility. The knowledge 
gained through those two disciplines constituted the basis to carry a comparative case study 
of four PWS in Colombia with a focus on the expectations of three groups of stakeholders 
(payers, intermediaries, and providers) on the outcomes of the schemes in which they are 
engaged, and their perception about the role of evidence of effectiveness on the long-term 
durability of the schemes. Using literature from corporate social responsibility and from 
motivations for conservation, I explored the motivations to engage from both providers and 
payers, demands from both groups towards intermediaries, and the institutional reasons that 
explain why intermediaries are seeking to demonstrate additionality. I also explored the role 
of external motivations for payers to engage in PWS and the relative importance of evidence 
of effectiveness in their permanence on the scheme (Chapter 5). 
To carry the above-mentioned studies, I combined empirical methods for quantitative and 
qualitative research, such as informal interviews, semi-structured interviews, survey-type 
questionnaires. Participant observation was also key for data collection as it allowed me to 
follow intermediaries in the field, observing their daily activities, their dialogues with both 
providers and payers, and taking notes in the field while observing hydrologic monitoring 
routines. In order to complement the information obtained directly through contact with 
stakeholders, I thoroughly reviewed official documents and reports from the intermediaries, 
such as contracts, regulations, organigrams, technical studies, scenario analyses, project 
proposals, and field visit and monitoring reports. 
6.2 Main insights 
PWS schemes have a long road towards additionality evidence, if they ever get there. Assessing 
additionality as promoted in the literature, i.e. clearly defining unequivocal effects of 
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interventions has been arguably infeasible in most cases so far. In the presented studies, I built 
on previous literature to demonstrate that three major factors interact to produce high 
uncertainty on PES environmental outcomes, particularly on PWS cases: (1) complexity of 
Human-Environmental Systems; (2) lack of knowledge about these systems associated; and (3) 
practical constraints. Eventually, these factors may prevent the demonstration of additionality 
in PWS. 
The schemes studied are responding to an increasing international demand for impact 
evaluation. Almost all schemes are gradually enjoying the implementation of monitoring 
systems as a result of the collaboration between intermediaries and local research centres. 
However, in the majority of the schemes studied, no baselines of important environmental 
variables and no monitoring protocols were established from the start, and this is severely 
compromises evidence of additionality. Additionally, there are a series of practical constraints, 
including most notably the lack of continuous funding due to the voluntary character of such 
schemes and data sharing issues.  
In the context of such efforts to demonstrate effectiveness, it is worth asking to whom impact 
evidence is important and why. Through the four studied cases in Colombia, I showed that 
intermediaries are concerned about getting impact evidence of their schemes for several 
reasons, most of them linked to their wish to keep the business running. Evidence of ES 
improvement or maintenance would contribute to keeping payers on board, attracting more 
payers in the long term, sustaining conservation jobs, and maintaining trust relationships with 
both payers and providers. Intermediaries are also clearly concerned about their reputation as 
PES managers are aware that providing evidence of PES impacts on ES is a central issue on this 
matter. Personal values also appear to play a role on the intermediaries’ concerns with the 
evidence of PES impacts. Most of them feel personally engaged with the local communities 
with which they work and with the environmental issues, and want the schemes to be effective. 
Payers expect evidence of environmental benefits achieved by the scheme in terms of ES and 
expect intermediaries to perform monitoring and report its results. However, when it comes 
to express the most important indicators for them, payers are interested in more proxy 
indicators, e.g. total area protected or number of planted trees, than in a larger number of 
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indicators linked to the target ES, e.g. decrease of nitrogen and phosphorus concentration on 
water. Potential reasons may include the importance of indicators mostly for the sake of 
corporate sustainability reports or due to an assumption that proxy indicators are directly 
related to the desired ES. 
Providers are also interested in the PES impacts. Most of them pointed water resources 
conservation as one of the most important motivations and declared that they would engage 
in the scheme even without economic incentives. These results contradict the simplistic idea 
of a service ‘provider’ or ‘seller’ as proposed in the literature (Wunder, 2005) and give clear 
indication that the so-called providers understand themselves as ES beneficiaries too and are 
willing to cooperate for conservation in case they receive technical and material support for 
that. Providers tend to assume that the conservation practices are good for their own sake. 
Interviewed landowners often argued that "a farm without water has no value". In fact, the 
same water resources are shared and used by all, although distributed unevenly throughout 
the watershed. 
It is not known if the lack of demonstrable effectiveness of PES schemes due to high uncertainty 
will threaten the long term durability of these schemes. I argue that, although producing 
evidence of additionality in terms of ES as preconized in the literature is infeasible in most 
cases, there is chance that PES schemes will endure in the long term due to the extra benefits 
they bring to certain actors. Because of indirect benefits (see Chapter 5), mainly for the 
intermediaries and payers, there is a chance that those schemes will survive the lack of 
effectiveness evidence in the long-term if that depends solely on these groups’ wishes. 
However, as providers understand themselves also as ES beneficiaries, the lack of evidence of 
expected PES environmental outcomes could discourage their permanence in the schemes. 
6.3 Policy Recommendations 
By assuming that the most used definition of PES, together with the increasing calls for 
evidence of additionality, are in conflict with the reality of our complex human-environmental 
systems, I have proposed a model for adaptive PES management (Chapter 3). In this adaptive 
model, PES design is embedded in a loop that is continuously permeable to new information 
and surprises shared among the stakeholders. Whenever possible, there is an explicit 
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assessment of uncertainty sources and an emphasis on a collective project evaluation, 
including the participation of intermediaries, payers, and also providers. By these means, I 
emphasize that relevant knowledge about HES is produced not only by scientific methods, but 
also by non-scientific knowledge through participation of those who actually live in the area 
under management. I argue that an adaptive approach to PES that accounts for uncertainty 
through an open dialogue with stakeholders and integrates providers’ standpoints, instead of 
a top-down measure set up among only intermediaries and payers, may produce a more 
legitimate process.  
Finally, I propose that in designing PES schemes, stakeholders should explicitly address and 
communicate with each other about uncertainty in order to have a clearer picture of potential 
ways to progress, cope with and adapt to unforeseen circumstances, and eventually ensure 
the long term viability of the conservation projects. However, it is important to keep in mind 
that uncertainty may be used selectively, downplayed or amplified in politics to suit vested 
interests or keep unequal power relations. Transparent treatment of uncertainty is 
fundamental to managing expectations, build trust among actors and maintain credibility of 
PES practitioners. If recognizing and accounting for uncertainty is to threaten the success of 
PES schemes, then uncertainty can be seen as an opportunity to open up dialogue about 
alternative ways of achieving the conservation goals. 
6.4 Opportunities for future research 
The study of uncertainty in PWS schemes has many venues for future research. In particular, 
the following topics are still under-researched and further developments on them could 
support more in-depth discussion about the implications of PWS use to fulfill conservation 
goals. Here I present some of them. 
Magnitude of quantifiable uncertainties in PWS mechanisms: There are several types of 
uncertainty that cannot be quantified and any attempt to do so could induce a wrong 
assumption of control and predictability that may be incorrect (Wynne, 1992). However, there 
are some types that can be quantified (e.g. McMillan et al. 2012) However, there are other 
uncertainties that are amenable for quantification, the outcomes of which could work as 
illustrative examples that would help policy makers, conservation investors, and other 
125 
 
stakeholders understand the reliability of the evidence they use to make decisions. Some 
researchers have already started exploring the challenges and opportunities represented by 
the quantification of uncertainties on ES (e.g. Hamel & Bryant 2017); however there are only 
few studies dedicated to accounting for uncertainty on PES mechanisms. 
Reactions to scientific uncertainty: Another interesting strand of research refers to how 
stakeholders perceive and react to communicated uncertainty in PES schemes. There are 
several debates in the science-policy interface literature concerning the potential reactions of 
decision-makers and the public towards scientific uncertainty and how to cope with 
uncertainty and risk in a variety of environmental problems (e.g. Todini & Mantovan 2007; Hall 
et al. 2007; Beven 2006; Stirling 2008; Stirling 2010; Funtowicz & Ravetz 1990). However, there 
is still a lack of empirical behavioral studies contemplating the reactions and potential changes 
on the decision-making process caused by a transparent treatment of uncertainty among 
stakeholders involved in PES schemes.  
Ambiguity and lack of clarity as sources of uncertainty in the PES literature: one of the challenges 
imposed by the avalanche of PES articles, cases, and reports worldwide is the fragile conceptual 
basis, the ambiguity, and the lack of clarity (Carey and Burgman, 2008) regarding concepts and 
processes. The distance between claims in the literature and the reality of processes in human-
environmental systems is not the only concerning point. The literature is also permeated with 
misconceptions and ambiguity regarding basic terms such as ‘service’, ‘service provider’, 
‘ecosystem’, ‘area of influence’, etc. (Barnaud and Antona, 2014; Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007; Hill, 
1977; Kull et al., 2015; O’Neill, 2001; Robertson, 2012). 
Participatory approaches to cope with uncertainty: the understanding and learning processes 
about human-environmental systems may be greatly improved through transdisciplinary 
approaches that take in to account not only scientific methods, but also non-scientific 
knowledge from local experts (Krueger et al., 2012; T. Krueger et al., 2016). There is 
considerable room for empirical studies on the effects of such approaches on the quality and 
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Conservation Projects: monitoring and evaluation practices 
 
Dear Sir./Madam, thank you for your time and dedication to this survey. This questionnaire is 
part of a scientific research project that has the goal of evaluating the conservation projects 
that have been implemented in Colombia. This is part of a project supported by Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin, Germany, and Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogota, Colombia. 
 
It is important to note that some questions are made using a scale of agreement from 1 (totally 
disagree) up to 5 (totally agree). Please select 3 in case you are not in agreement or 
disagreement. If the question does not apply to you or you do not know the answer, please 
leave the question without an answer. 
 
1. Please, mention the country in which the project you are working with is located. In case 
there are more than one, mention all of them. 
 
2. In which professional position related to a PWS project are you currently  involved? 
[ ] project manager 
[ ] technician (example: monitoring, mapping/GIS, modelling, management, project 
implementation, auditing, others) 
[ ] scientist (example: in charge of primary research for the PWS project) 
[ ] other. Specify in the last part of this survey dedicated to comments. 
 
3. What is your highest academic degree? 
[ ] bachelors 
[ ] specialization 
[ ] masters 
[ ] PhD 
[ ] does not apply 
 
4. What is your academic background? Example: economist, manager, biologist, geographer. 




5. What is the role your organization has in a PWS project? 
[ ] civil entity created specifically to manage a PWS 
[ ] regional autonomous corporation in charge of managing a PWS 
[ ] non-governmental organization in charge of the design of a PWS 
[ ] non-governmental organization in charge of implementing a PWS 
[ ] non-governmental organization directly in charge of the management of a PWS 
[ ] non-governmental organization in charge of providing support for a PWS 
[ ] private environmental consulting in charge of evaluating a PWS 
 
6. What is the degree of responsibility on monitoring of environmental variables in PWS 
projects that your organization has? 
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[ ] the organization is directly in charge of performing monitoring 
[ ] the organization is in charge of funding/paying for the monitoring 
[ ] the organization is in charge of the logistics for the monitoring 
[ ] the organization is in charge of getting monitoring data from third parties 
[ ] the organization is in charge of processing and communicating results from monitoring 
[ ] the organization does not have any type of responsibility over the monitoring processes or 
their results 
 
Monitoring system and baseline of environmental variables in the context of the PWS projects 
 
The following questions refer to the process of monitoring and constructing baselines of 
environmental variables (example: nitrogen concentration on water) that allow for the 
detection of expected environmental results (example: reduced contamination of nitrogen) on 
activities developed in the context of the PWS projects. 
 
In the following statements, please select the option that matches most closely your degree of 
agreement with these statements. The options range from 1 (totally disagree) up to 5 (totally 
agree). Please select 3 in case you are not in agreement or disagreement. If the question does 
not apply to you or you do not know the answer, please leave the question without an answer. 
 
7. The PWS projects have a good baseline regarding the environmental variables directly linked 
to the watershed service (example: discharge, turbidity, etc.), in a way that allows for the 
comparison of the previous state (before beginning conservation activities) and a posterior 
state (after the beginning of the activities, which is, the impacts of PWS schemes). 
 
Explanation: baselines refer to historic series of data about the variables that allow for a 
characterization of the watershed dynamics where the PWS project has been implemented. 
Example: discharge baseline refers to a series of many years of observational data that allows 
for the characterization of the river flow and typical seasonal behavior. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
8. The PWS project has good monitoring systems of environmental variables related to the 
conservation activities implemented by the project. 
Explanation: environmental variables of importance can include, for example, water level, 
nutrient concentration on water, turbidity, sediment concentration, etc. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
9. The PWS project are too new to produce results/impacts that can be detected on the 
watershed services. 
Explanation: the water quality data do not show any change that can be attributed to the 
implemented activities yet. 
 




10. The PWS project has monitoring data, but the TEMPORAL frequency of the sampling is not 
enough to detect the result/impact of the activities implemented that are related to the 
watershed services. 
Explanation: when the temporal frequency is not enough it means that it happens rather 
unfrequently (example: only once per year) and that makes it harder to detect the impacts on 
water quantity/quality/regulation). 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
11. The PWS project has monitoring data, but the SPATIAL distribution of the sampling is not 
enough to detect the result/impact of the activities implemented that are related to the 
watershed services. 
Example: when the water sampling does not happens close to the stream under influence of 
the conservation activities but far from it, where the influence of other land uses cannot be 
separated. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
12. The PWS projects have monitoring data, but the data does not cover the important 
variables for the detection of results/impacts of conservation activities developed on the 
watershed service. 
Example: when there is a need to monitor sediments, but there is only measurement of 
suspended solids and not of riverbed sediments. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
13. The PWS projects have monitoring data, but the data have inconsistencies or errors that 
make it hard to detect the results/impacts of the conservation activities on the watershed 
services. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
14. I believe that the problems and difficulties with PWS environmental monitoring make hard 
the detection of results/impacts of the conservation activities implemented on the 
environmental service. 
Important: in case there are no problems leave it blank. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
15. I believe that the problems and difficulties with PWS environmental monitoring make the 
prediction of the expected environmental improvement difficult to assess. 
Explanation: this question refers to the use of environmental monitoring data in simulation 
models to predict changes in environmental services under different conservation scenarios. 
Important: in case there is no identified problems leave it blank. 
 




16. From the following table of causes of problems, which ones do you consider to be the ones 
that have been affecting the most the monitoring systems of PWS projects? 
Select ALL the options that apply. 
[ ] lack of FUNDING/funds to maintain monitoring activities 
[ ] lack of technical STAFF in the field 
[ ] lack of LOGISTICS from the organizations in charge 
[ ] lack of COOPERATION/synergies with public/private organizations 
[ ] lack of technical CAPACITY of the organizations in charge 
[ ] lack of WILLINGNESS from the organizations in charge 
[ ] lack of perception of the NEED of monitoring from the organizations in charge 
[ ] lack of SAFETY in the field 
[ ] lack of access of adequate field INSTRUMENTS 
[ ] lack of CALIBRATION of instruments 
[ ] lack of field instrument MAINTENANCE 
[ ] frequent DAMAGES on field instruments done by third parties 
[ ] lack of local POLITICAL conditions 
[ ] lack of ACCESS to monitoring points due to restrictions from property owners, government 
officials or companies 
[ ] other. Specify in the final part dedicated to comments. 
 
17. From the selected points above, please state the (1) first most important, (2) second most 




18. I believe it is important to communicate the results/impacts of conservation activities of 
the PWS projects (example: increase in water quantity/quality/regulation) to those who 
support/pay/donate to these projects. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
19. Those who support/pay/donate to these PWS projects, in general, expect those in charge 
of the projects to demonstrate the environmental improvements obtained (example: increase 
in water quality/quantity/regulation). 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
20. Those who support/donate/pay for these PWS projects, in general, make the proof of 
environmental improvement achieved (example: increase in water 
quantity/quality/regulation) a condition for their financial support. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
21. I believe that the evidence of the achieved environmental improvements in PWS projects 
(example: increase in water quantity/quality/regulation) is important for the reputation of the 




[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
22. I believe that the funds/donations to PWS projects made by PRIVATE companies have the 
following motivations: 
* select all options that apply 
[ ] expectation of improvement of environmental service quality/quantity/regulation for their 
own benefit/use 
[ ] improvement of public-private relationships on local/regional level 
[ ] improvement of the corporate image 
[ ] corporate socio-environmental responsibility policy 
[ ] environmental compensation required by law 
[ ] others. In case you want, describe the motivation in the last part dedicated to comments. 
 
23. I believe that the funds/donations to PWS projects made by PUBLIC companies have the 
following motivations: 
* select all options that may apply 
[ ] expectation of improvement of environmental service quality/quantity/regulation for their 
own benefit/use 
[ ] improvement of public-private relationships on local/regional level 
[ ] improvement of the corporate image 
[ ] corporate socio-environmental responsibility policy 
[ ] environmental compensation required by law 
[ ] others. In case you want, describe the motivation in the last part dedicated to comments. 
 
COMMENTS: 
Please use the space below to make any comment/suggestion/detail that you may consider 
important or needed about any of the questions of this survey. In order to contact the person 







Conservation Projects: Perceptions and motivations of the providers 
 
Dear Sir./Madam, this questionnaire is part of a scientific research project that has the goal of 
evaluating the conservation projects that have been implemented in Colombia. This is part of 
a project supported by Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany, and Pontificia Universidad 
Javeriana, Bogota, Colombia. 
 
This questionnaire in particular, was designed to get to know more and understand your point 
of view about the conservation project in which you are participating. We would like to hear 
your opinion and perspective about this project. The answers are anonymous, which means 
that they will not be presented alone nor identifying yourself. In order to get the most from 
this questionnaire, we would like to ask you to be as clear as possible in your answers. Thank 
you so much for your availability! 
 
1. Location, date, project under evaluation, entity in charge of operating the project, 
questionnaire identifier: 
 
General Information about the respondent: 
 
2. How old are you, and how many years have you been living in this watershed/area? 
 
3. Before living here, where did you live? 
 
4. In which type of property do you live? 
[ ] family property 
[ ] inherited property 
[ ] borrowed property 
[ ] lease 
[ ] occupation 
 
5. Do you have kids? How many? 
 
6. Where do your kids live? What do they do? 
[ ] in the farm and study nearby 
[ ] in the farm and work there 
[ ] in the farm and work nearby 
[ ] in the farm and work in another region 
[ ] in another region and they study 
[ ] in another region and they work 
[ ] in another region and they are not studying/working 
[ ] other (describe) 
 
7. What is the size of your farm (hectares)? 
 
8. What type of economic activity do you have in your farm? 
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[ ] cattle ranching 
[ ] potatoes production  
[ ] aquiculture (trout) 
[ ] horticulture (vegetables in general) production 
[ ] herbs production 
[ ] fruit production 
[ ] other (describe) 
[ ] "I do not have an economic activity at my farm" 
 
9. Since when are you engaged in this conservation project? 
 
Motivations to enter the scheme: 
 
There are different motives to participate in conservation projects. Some of them are more 
individual-driven and others are more collective-driven. Now we are going to talk about your 
personal reasons and motivations to participate in this project. 
 
10. What were the initial motivations/reasons that led you to participate in this conservation 
project? 
 
11. "I decided to enter the conservation project because..." 
Select all motivations you had and then rank them by order of importance with a number 
beside the option check box: (1) the most important motivation; (2) the second most important 
one; (3) the third most important one. In case you have a motivation that is not listed, you can 
mention it in the box "Other". 
 
[ ] I thought the project would improve the conditions for the productivity of my farm. 
[ ] I thought the farm would look more organized/beautiful with the proposed interventions. 
[ ] because with the new trees planted my cattle would have more shadow. 
[ ] because my neighbors had joined the same project. 
[ ] because I started to be concerned with water resources conservation. 
[ ] because I like that people are concerned about our community 
[ ] because I like the forest and wanted to have a bit in my farm. 
[ ] because I believe that the project would improve water quantity/quality. 
[ ] because I was already concerned about conservation before this project. 
[ ] because in our community we are all interested in participate in environmental projects. 
[ ] because the economic incentives caught my attention. 
[ ] Other  (describe). 
 
Perceptions and expectations: 
 
Now we are going to talk about certain important aspects among the objectives of the project 
and the perception of participants about them. Select among 1 to 5 how much you agree with 
the following statements. The scale of answers is gradual. For example: 1: totally disagree; ... 
3: neither agree nor disagree; ... 5 total agree. 
 




[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
13. With the river fencing, my farm will look more organized/beautiful. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
14. It is important that the landscape of our region is improved with the protection/recovery 
of forest cover. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
15. It is important for the production that the cattle have more shadow by means of new 
planted trees. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
16. I think that the compensation options and incentives that the project offer to us are good. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
17. I felt motivated to participate in the scheme by the fact that other neighbors were already 
participating. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
18. I like to see that there are people that are concerned about the environment and the 
economic productivity of our community. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
19. Before this project I was not interested in the environmental activities such as water 
conservation interventions. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
20. Water conservation has always interested me, even before this project. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
21. The environment is important, but it is more important to obtain the benefits of the project 
for my farm. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 





[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
23. I would have participated in this project even without the material and economic incentives 
that I received. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
24. There were good conservation projects before this one. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
25. I trusted the previous conservation projects that were implemented here. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
26. The operators of the current project have heard us and adapted the project according to 
the suggestions of our community. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
27. Even though the incentives offered by the projects are interesting for our community, some 
of them do NOT seem to be useful. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
28. This conservation project has accomplished ALL the expectations I had when I entered. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
29. I trust the field staff of this project. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
30. I noticed some changes in the water quality since the project started. (The water quality in 
this case may refer to the perception of color, smell, sediment amount or turbidity in the 
water). 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
31. There are still some years ahead until we can notice the desirable effects of this project 
regarding the water quality. 
 






The Drought of 2015/2016: 
 
Now we are going to talk about the drought that happened at the end of 2015 and beginning 
of 2016. Select among 1 to 5 how much you agree with the following statements. The scale of 
answers is gradual. For example: 1: totally disagree; ... 3: neither agree nor disagree; ... 5 total 
agree. 
 
32. The droughts are frequent in this area. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
33. During which months has the last drought happened? 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
34. There have been stronger droughts here in comparison to the one that we felt this year. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
35. We had problems in our farm due to the last drought. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
36. I needed to make some adaptations in my farm due to the drought. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
37. The drought made me feel more conscious about the importance of conservation projects. 
 






Questionnaire for donating/payer entities on PWS projects 
 
Dear Sir./Madam, thank you for your time and dedication to this survey. Your collaboration 
contributes to science and conservation. We ask you to answer all questions, if possible. In case 
there is any question that you do not have an opinion to share, we ask you to leave the question 
without an answer. Your comments at the end of the questionnaire are very welcome. In order 
to secure the quality of the answers, please, take the time and concentration needed. The 
individual answers will remain anonymous in case this is the wish of the interviewed individual. 
 
Pre-requisite: the interviewee (or the organization in which this person is employed) must be 
involved as donator/payer in processes of one or more Payment for Watershed Services 
projects, Compensation for water-related environmental service or Mechanisms to share 
benefits. 
 
General data about the payer 
 
1. The donating/payer entity is: 
* Select just one option. 
[ ] private company 
[ ] government entity (example: ministry, autonomous corporations, regional authority, 
municipality, etc.) 
[ ] public company 
[ ] public-private company 
[ ] civil association targeting socio-environmental issues 
[ ] non-government organization / foundation / fund 
[ ] multilateral organization / international cooperation 
[ ] other. Specify in the last part dedicated to comments. 
 
2. In case it is not important to keep your answers anonymous, we would be thankful if you 
could inform the name of the organization in which you are employed and the 
economic/institutional sector that the organization is related to. 
___________________________________________________________ 
 




4. What is your highest academic degree? 
[ ] bachelors 
[ ] specialization 
[ ] masters 
[ ] PhD 




5. What is your academic background? Example: economist, manager, biologist, geographer. 
Please, include your specialization/masters/PhD degree description. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. What type of relation has the organization with a PWS scheme? 
* select all that apply. 
[ ] the organization acts as a payer/donator of a PWS scheme 
[ ] the organization acts as intermediary/support/catalyzer of a PWS scheme 
[ ] the organization acts as a fund raiser for a PWS scheme 
* catalyzer means that the organization provides to get people together around the topic, 
incentivizing different actors to participate and potentially detecting and contacting additional 
payers for the scheme. 
 
7. What type of support does the organization offer to a PWS scheme? 
* select all that may apply. 
[ ] funding / payment 
[ ] provision of materials (example: technology, stationery, construction materials) 
[ ] logistic services (example: room for meetings, food catering, transportation) 
[ ] support for other types of services (example: documentation, photography, web design, 
construction, etc.) 
[ ] technical support (example: monitoring/evaluation, agronomy, hydrologic analysis, GIS 
support) 
[ ] other. Describe in the final part for comments. 
 
8. In case the organization provides funds/payment in cash to a PWS scheme, with which 
frequency does it make the payments? 
* select all that may apply. 
[ ] a single initial payment 
[ ] regular monthly payment 
[ ] regular payment every 3 or 6 months 
[ ] regular annual payment 
[ ] punctual payment by means of specific projects 
[ ] there is no payment in cash 
[ ] other. Describe in the final part dedicated to comments. 
 




10. Does the organization use water directly from the watershed where the funding/payments 
are applied? 
[ ] yes 
[ ] no 
[ ] I do not know. 
 
11. In case you answered yes in the previous question, to which end is the water used for? 
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[ ] public water supply. Example: by means of rural and urban aqueducts, groundwater wells, 
etc. 
[ ] private water supply. Example: for pools, hotels, etc. 
[ ] incorporated on the product. Example: agricultural products, cattle ranching, bottled water, 
beverages, food, etc. 
[ ] used for industrial processes that do not include water in in the final product. Example: 
cleaning, air conditioning, dust reduction, heating, etc. 
[ ] other. Describe in the final part dedicated to comments. 
 
Motivations from the organization acting as Payer 
 
In this part of the survey, we want to understand what has motivated yourself or your 
organization to fund/pay for a PWS scheme. We begin by asking about what types of 
environmental services are of importance for you and your organization. 
 
12. How important for the organization is the water QUALITY of the watershed where funds 
are being applied? 
* The scale of importance ranges from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (very important). 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
13. How important for the organization is the water QUANTITY of the watershed where funds 
are being applied? 
* The scale of importance ranges from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (very important). 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
14. How important for the organization is the water REGULATION of the watershed where 
funds are being applied? 
* The scale of importance ranges from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (very important). 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
15. Among the following environmental services, which ones are important for the 
organization? 
* select all that apply. 
[ ] maintenance/improvement of water QUALITY 
[ ] maintenance/improvement of water QUANTITY 
[ ] water provision in dry seasons / droughts 
[ ] river discharge REGULATION during rainy seasons in order to avoid flooding 
[ ] MAINTENANCE of forest cover for carbon sequestration 
[ ] MAINTENANCE of landscape of touristic/aesthetic importance 
[ ] MAINTENANCE of biodiversity 
[ ] MAINTENANCE of fisheries 
[ ] None of the options above. 




16. From the selected environmental services, please, indicate an order of importance: (1) the 





17. Select all motivations that the organization or its representatives had to engage in a PWS 
scheme: 
* Select all that apply. 
[ ] ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICE improvement, meaning: water quality/quantity/regulation. 
[ ] TAX DEDUCTION due to environmental causes 
[ ] Environmental CERTIFICATION for its products or services 
[ ] Environmental COMPENSATION required by law due to its productive activities 
[ ] FUNDING REQUIRED BY LAW for the conservation of watersheds 
[ ] Part of the process of environmental RESTORING in areas affected by the activities of the 
organization 
[ ] Socio-environmental RESPONSIBILITY POLICY of the organization 
[ ] Responsibility/MANDATE of the organization defined by law. Example: the case of regional 
autonomous corporations. 
[ ] PUBLIC-PRIVATE RELATIONS improvement. Example: with the local communities. 
[ ] Part of the mission of the organization. Example: the case of development 
banks/international cooperation. 
[ ] SUSTAINABILITY INDEX from the stock exchange. 
[ ] SHAREHOLDERS’ requirements/demands 
[ ] Part of an impact MITIGATION strategy in the production chain. 
[ ] Environmental Services as part of the organization BUSINESS. 
[ ] IMAGE of the organization. Green Marketing. 
[ ] Investments in Environmental Services were already part of the TRADITION of the 
organization. 
[ ] other. 
 




19. Among the selected motivations, please, indicate in order of importance: (1) the most 





20. Among the above motivations, which ones were NOT initial motivations but have been 







Perceptions of the Payer/Donating organization 
 
In the following questions, we would like to know to which degree you agree with each of the 
statements. The scale is gradual, example: select 1 if you totally disagree, 3 if you do not agree 
not disagree, 5 if you totally agree. 
 
21. The main motivation to engage in a PWS scheme was the need/expectation to improve the 
environmental service (quality/quantity/regulation of water). 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
22. The organization expects that the water quantity/quality/regulation will improve in the 
watershed by means of the conservation activities of the PWS scheme. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
23. The organization believes that the PWS scheme will improve the water 
quality/quantity/regulation in the watershed by means of the conservation activities. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
24. The organization requires a proof of the achieved environmental benefit as a condition for 
the payment to the PWS scheme. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
25. In case the environmental benefits (improvement of water quality/quantity/regulation) of 
the PWS scheme are not proven over time, the organization would stop providing payments 
the PWS scheme. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
Perception of the payer/donating organization regarding monitoring, control and evaluation 
 
In this last part of the questionnaire, we aim at understanding how important it is to you and 
your organization the control and monitoring of conservation activities and the produced 
environmental benefits. 
 
26. How important it is to the organization that the PWS managers regularly verifies the 
environmental results (in terms of water quality/quantity/regulation) of the PWS scheme 
through monitoring and evaluation of indicators? 
* This is a gradual scale of importance that ranges from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (totally 
important). 
 




27. The organization regularly requires monitoring and evaluation results of environmental 
indicators from the managers/practitioners of the PWS scheme. 
* This is a gradual scale indicating degree of agreement with the statement. The options range 
from 1 (totally disagree) up to 5 (totally agree). Please select 3 in case you are not in agreement 
nor disagreement. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
28. The organization ONLY requires monitoring/evaluation reports regarding conservation 
activities performed by the PWS practitioners and NOT regarding the achieved environmental 
benefits. 
Example: a report about the implemented activities may include how many trees were planted 
or the number of benefited local families, but it would not include the impact of these activities 
over the environmental service. 
* This is a gradual scale indicating degree of agreement with the statement. The options range 
from 1 (totally disagree) up to 5 (totally agree). Please select 3 in case you are not in agreement 
nor disagreement. 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 
29. From the possible socio-environmental indicators/variables below, please indicate the ones 
that the organization requires monitoring and evaluation report to PWS managers: 
[ ] increase in river/streams DISCHARGE 
[ ] decreased amount of SEDIMENTS in rivers/streams 
[ ] decreased amount of FERTILIZERS in the productive activities in the watershed 
[ ] decreased amount of PESTICIDES in the productive activities in the watershed 
[ ] reduced concentration of NITROGEN/PHOSPHOROUS in the water 
[ ] improvement of water TURBIDITY 
[ ] discharge REGULATED during dry seasons/droughts 
[ ] discharge REGULATED during wet seasons/rainy seasons 
[ ] total area of protected vegetation in the watershed 
[ ] total area of vegetation under recovery in the watershed 
[ ] number of planted TREES in the watershed 
[ ] number of protected water SPRINGS 
[ ] total extension of protected RIVER BORDERS 
[ ] number of FAMILIES benefited by the conservation incentives 
[ ] number of TRAINED INDIVIDUALS in environmental education/sustainable production 
[ ] increase in family INCOME/poverty reduction of local communities in the watershed 
[ ] other. 
 




31. Among the indicators/variables above, please, indicate in order of importance: (1) the most 







32. Space dedicated to comments regarding the answers to this questionnaire. 









Hiermit ekcläre ich, die vorliegende Dissertation selbstaständig und ohne Verwendung 
unerlaubter Hilfe angefertigt zu haben. Die aus fremden Quellen direkt oder indirekt 
übernommenen Inhalte sind als solche keentlich gemacht. Die Dissertation wird erstmalig und 
nur an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin eigereicht. Weiterhin erkläre ich, nicht bereits einen 
Doktortitel im Fach Geographie zu Besitzen. Die dem Verfahren zu Grunde liegende 




Letícia Santos de Lima 
Berlin, 9. Oktober 2017 
 
 
 
